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Preface
The overwhelming majority of contemporary works on universal grammar are classified 
either within the field of linguistics or within that of philosophy, usually in accordance with 
their author’s professional identity and field of study. As a result of the development of scienti­
fic thought and of the increasing need for specialisation, in comprehensive subjects such as that 
of universal grammar, many scientists, when trying to explore their sources, are unable to sur­
vey those parameters of the subject which are not part of their special area. Consequently, in 
works commenting on treatises like Hermes, which combine the philosophical with the linguis­
tic aspect, a great number of passages are either misinterpreted, or simply not commented on. 
In many cases, the solution preferred by many scholars could be considered as rather unfortu­
nate: a comparative quotation of passages from various authors makes easier a fragmentary and 
partial preoccupation with the content of their work. In the existent bibliography on Hermes, 
there are cases where eminent scholars are unaware of the origin of the passage they quote and 
thus unable to identify its primary sources.
Despite the fact that Harris states his sources most of the time, the modem bibliography 
lacks a work which would elucidate the classical background of Hermes. It is also tme that up 
to now the book’s philosophical background has not been commented on; modem research has 
focussed mainly on the linguistic contribution of Hermes to the eighteenth century study of 
English language. It is hoped that this thesis will fill that gap. Hermes represents the manner in 
which the post-Renaissance rationalistic thought incorporated and further developed the medi­
eval realism of the speculative grammarians. But its major importance lies in the fact that Harris 
avoids relating his work to its medieval predecessors, and associates it with the higher ranked 
classical sources of ancient times. This thesis will trace this relation of Hermes with its classical 
background, in order to reveal Harris’ comprehensive conception of philosophical patterns 
which at first sight seem to differ from each other, and to expose his idea of integrity in philo­
sophy. An additional objective of this thesis is to familiarise the reader with the comprehensive 
eighteenth century notion of universal grammar, a combination of the linguistic with the philo­
sophical field of study. It is also hoped that by this study the reader will become aware of the 
content of a text-book on universal grammar, and that he will become familiarised with the sys­
tem of classification of the parts of speech which is suggested. The first part of this thesis 
focusses on the relation of Hermes to the philosophical and linguistic thought of its time. The 
second part is employed with the exposition of the grammatical content of the work, while the 
third treats the philosophical parameters of the subject.
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Parti
overview of H e rm e s
Philosophical, general, and universal gram m ar
During the first half of the eighteenth century the idea of words as pictures of our own men­
tal concepts was predominant. In Britain, the Royal Society was following in the study of lan­
guage the tradition of Locke, and the emphasis was on the pictorial significative power of the 
spoken form of the language. Thus, concern about language was directed mainly to its function 
in terms of synchronic communication. The tradition of medieval realism, which considered 
language as the means of communicating divine truths, and of paying tribute to them through 
the study of Greek, Latin, Hebrew, or German, was considered out of fashion, and was thus 
merely abandoned. Words were thought to be simply a means of conveying meaning; thus lan­
guage was mainly studied as an aggregation of signs. In mid-eighteenth century Britain, uni­
versal grammar was more likely to be considered in relation to seventeenth century French gen­
eral and rational grammars, while its future implementations were to be discovered in the Ger­
man Enlightenment, and the manner in which this absorbed the French and English rational 
thought.1
In order to understand the content of Hermes, we have first to occupy ourselves briefly 
with four subjects treated in this introduction, which are i) the concept of universal grammar in 
comparison with the concept of philosophical and of general grammar, ii) a brief account of the 
life and works of Harris, as also of the authors whose works are the main sources for Hermes, 
iii) the deistic parameter in Hermes, and iv) a concise profile of the content of the book under 
examination.
The first thing noteworthy in the study of grammar, is the distinction between the terms 
universal, philosophical, and general grammar, especially in view of the confusion between the 
philosophical content of the universal grammar, and the one termed philosophical.
Philosophical grammar suggests the artificial construction of a new language, made from 
selected symbols that could be taught and learned, so as to achieve universal application. Often, 
the term universal language has been used to imply either an international language in the mod­
em sense, or a philosophical language, or a combination of both of these. In the first decades 
of the eighteenth century, the French language established its dominancy in international com­
munication. The Huguenot refugees from France helped considerably in that direction. The dis­
cussion about a universal language and a philosophical grammar received an additional stimulus 
from the growing popularity and importance of the general grammar movement, especially in 
France, and from the growing study of primitive tongues, from which languages were sup­
posed to have derived.2 The hope was to overcome the Babel of the diverse spoken languages. 
Practically, the need for a philosophical language appeared as a result of the rise of the vernacu­
lar languages after the fifteenth century, and the subsequent withdrawal from the practice of 
Latin and its international employment among the literati of the medieval era.
1 Kant had studied Harris’ Three Treatises. See on this the first two chapters of Hutchings, Patrick Ae., Kant on 
absolute value, London, G. Allen & Unwin, 1972.
2 knowlson, p. 148.
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General grammar focuses on those functional principles, which are common among the 
already existent languages. It aims not for the creation of new linguistic forms of expression, 
but for the manifestation of specific grammatical forms as prevailing upon the diverse peculiari­
ties of each language. In this sense, it rejects the inconsistency of languages, and exemplifies 
them as yielding to the same ratio. The most eminent representative of this grammatical study is 
the General and Rational Grammar 3 written in the abbey of Port-Royal (1660), a work attempt­
ing a compromise between the medieval predominance of Latin with the languages of the post­
renaissance period.
Universal grammar should be distinguished from the above mentioned species of grammati­
cal study. It suggests a real existence of certain concepts (realia) in a certain metaphysical 
realm, and a natural subjection of our mental concepts to these original prototypes. The concept 
of universal grammar originates from a passage of Aristotle’s De Interpretation:
spoken words are symbols of the affections of the soul; and written words are symbols of those 
spoken. Spoken words, as the written ones, are not the same for all men. But the mental affections 
they primarily symbolise are the same for all men, as are also the same the things represented by 
the objects of these affections.4
The origin of universal grammar can be traced further in the medieval coalescence between 
grammatical theory and logics and the association of language with philosophy. The specula­
tive grammars of the modistae6 were a step forward from what was considered as the ancient 
philosophy of language, namely, the works of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Dionysius Thrax, 
and Apoltlonius Dyscolus. The study of these was based primarily on the commentary works of 
Donatus, Priscian, and Boethius. In the most famous of these countless speculative grammars,7 
we find a comprehensive description of the objectives set by the medieval grammarian:
...the first and more important is, in what way is the mode of signifying divided and described? The 
second is, what does the mode of signifying basically originate from? Thirdly, what is the mode of 
signifying directly derived from? Fourthly, in what way are the mode of signifying, the mode of 
understanding, and the mode of being differentiated? The fifth is, in what way is the mode of signif­
ying subjectively arrived at? The sixth is, what order obtains for the following terms in relation to
3 a book praised by Harris for its observations on the subjunctive article: Hermes, 1751, p. 81.
4 "Ecrri |liev  odv xa e v  xi[i 4>covxf xtov e v  xrj xpuxtT tta0T)[xdx(DV crupfioka, Kai xa ypa(J)6|Li£va xtov e v  
xt) (j)0)VT). K ai ciScnrEp ovbe ypappaxa ftdai xa cured, ovbe (jxavai a i  auxa'i/ o5v (jivxoi xauta  
crr)fXEia jiptoxax;, xauxa jrdai JtaGrjpaxa xrjs ilwx'lS, Kai a5v x a m a  opoitopaxa, jipdypaxa t[6t) xau 
xa: De Interpretatione, 1.16a4-8.
5 where grammar, logic, and rhetoric, formed the arts of the trivium of the medieval curricula.
6 They were so called because they involved the grammatical study primarily of the modes in which words sig­
nify things (modus significandi).
7 Thomas of Erfurt Grammatica Speculativa, 1325, a work previously attributed to Duns Scotus.
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one another, ie sign, word, part of speech, and terminus?8
Universal grammar inherited this background, but received its impetus particularly from a 
phrase in Roger Bacon’s Greek Grammar stating that
Grammar is one and the same in accordance with the substance of all languages, although it varies
in its accidental cases.9
This idea received most support during the seventeenth century’s rationalistic approach to 
grammatical theory, after the works of Francis Bacon,10 Tommaso Campanella,11 and Juan 
Caramuel y Lobkowitz.12 While Bacon’s idea of grammar was rather related to the sociological 
and psychological study of different people,13 Campanella reintroduced the Platonic metaphysic 
into the grammatical study, and defined grammar as a science.14 The medieval discussion on 
the type of the conventional character of language was now reintroduced, in coordination with a 
differentiation between literary and philosophical grammar. We find now a terminological dis­
tinction between natural and artificial language and grammatical method,15 which accounts 
respectively for a differentation between the common and the peculiar part in each language. 
The whole scheme reinstates the Aristotelian distinction between natural forms and accidental 
linguistic material as corresponding to such a distinction between real things. But now this is 
based in the humanist tradition of Scaliger and Sanctius, who had strongly supported a rational 
cause in tJhe structure of language, reinterpreted through the concrete Cartesian rationalism.
The concept of universal grammar relates to the structure of the medieval trivium, and the 
speculative grammar, predominant during the thirteenth and fourteenth century.1^  It represents a 
pre-linguistic science of grammar, focusing on the interrelation between language (grammar) 
and philosophy (metaphysics), as also a field for controversy between the two major opposing 
branches of the theory of universals, the nominalist-empirical and the rationalistic one. Univer­
sal grammar does not set any linguistic-scientific exemplar. It is scientific,17 only as much as 
science yields to philosophical meditation. With its non-linguistic approach, in the application 
of its terms it has no restrictions deriving from the tied relations between terminology and spe­
8 : ...unum et primum est, quomodo modus significandi partiatur, et describatur. Secundum est, a quo modus 
significandi radicaliter oriatur. Tertium est, a quo modus significandi immediate summatur. Quartum est, quo­
modo modus significandi a modo intelligendi et a modo essendi distinguatur. Quintum est, in quo modus signif­
icandi tanquam in subiecto inveniatur. Sextum est, qualem ordinem habeant ad invicem isti termini, Signum, 
Dictio, Pars orationis, et Terminus.: from the author’s preamble, in Bursill-Hall’s edition and translation, p. 
134-135.
9 Grammatica una et eadem est secundum substanciam in omnibus linguis, licet accidentaliter varietur: Bacon, p. 
27, in the 1902 edition.
10 De Augmentis Scientiarum, Oxford, 1623, 6. 1.
11 Philosophiae Rationalis, Paris, 1638: a work in the type of speculative grammars following the Thomistic 
scholastic philosophy.
12 Grammatica Audax (1654). For more on the works of Campanella and Lobkowitz, see Padley, 1976.
18 Padley, 1976, p. 156.
14 and not an art: a subject of controversy during the medieval times.
15 Vossius, De Arte Grammatica, Amsterdam, 1635.
16 Leff, p. 111.
17 in the modem sense, brought up after the middle of eighteenth century.
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cific theoretical models from which these terms originate. On the contrary, universal grammar 
has an outstretched time-reference in the terminology it employs. If spoken language is the 
external testimony of mental language, the only agreement between the universal grammarians' 
and the scientific approaches concerns naturality in language.
Comparatively, both the philosophical grammar of the language-planners and the universal 
one, are not grammars of a spoken language. But while universal grammar yields to a set of 
predominant logical interrelations between thoughts in a metaphysical order, the philosophical 
one suggests the creation of new speech patterns. Universal grammar is considered prearranged 
in a mental realm of a preexisting supreme mind, and it can only be reflected in our thoughts; 
thus our mental concepts are considered subjected to an eternal logic. Philosophical grammar 
derives its determination from human agreement. It is a later construction of artificially arranged 
signs, reflecting not any supreme, but our own human thoughts.
Universal and general grammar are identified with each other, as they both affirm the sub­
sistence of common grammatical abstraction between human languages. But universal grammar 
differs from the general, in that it admits of an a priori truth and of a transcendental correspon­
dence of these abstractions to specific forms to which these yield.
James Harris and the editions of H erm es
James Harris (1709-1780) was well known during his time for two things: his relationship 
to Lord Shaftesbury,18 and the authorship of Hermes,19 He was very competent in the study of 
Aristotle and music,20 “in the theory and practise of which he is said to have had few equals”. 21 
Being several times a member of Parliament, he served also as Lord of the Admiralty, and of 
the Treasury, appointed additionally as a secretary and comptroller of the Queen Charlotte. His 
works are:
-Three treatises (1744-45) containing:
i) Dialogue on Art,
ii) Dialogue on Music,Painting, and Poetry, and 
Hi) Dialogue on Happiness.
-Hermes, or a Philosophical Inquiry Concerning (Language and) Universal 
Grammar, 1751.22
-Philosophical Arrangements, 1775.
-Philosophical Inquiries, 1781.
According to the 1891 Dictionary o f National Biography, the following works are also attribu­
ted to Harris:
- On Rise and Progress o f Criticism, from Papers by James Harris, 1752.
18 His second wife, Lady Elizabeth Ashley Cooper, was the third daughter of the second, and the sister of the 
third Lord Shaftesbury.
19 That is why he was usually called by his contemporaries Hermes Harris.
20 Being a very close friend to Handel, he tried to transform Salisbury into a city of music and art.
21 The source from a biographical manuscript kept in Hampshire Record Office: Malmesbury Collection, 
9M73/91008.
22 The word language was omitted after the first edition.
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-Spring: a Pastoral, represented at Drury Lane on September the 22th, 1762. 
Additionally, he contributed to the translation of Xenophon, made by Sarah Fielding.
In the eighteenth century, in Britain, Hermes gave a new impetus to the study of universals. 
The book appeared for the first time in 1751, under the title Hermes, or a Philosophical 
Inquiry concerning Language and Universal Grammar. The publication was so suc­
cessful that many editions followed the first one.23 To these, produced either in London or 
Dublin, we must add its two translations, one in French (1795) by Francois Thurot 
(encouraged by and dedicated to Garat, a famous philosopher of language), and one in German 
(1788), by Chr. G. Ewerbeck.24 The number of its editions testifies to the great appeal the 
book had for the readers of its era.
Harris2^  greatly influenced Thomas Reid {Inquiry, 1764), James Beattie {Dissertations 
Moral and Critical, 1798, and Theory o f  language, 1788), Lord Monboddo {O f the 
Origin and Progress o f  Language, 1771-1792), and Robert Lowth {A Short In tro­
duction to English Grammar, 1762).26 The notion of universal grammar reintroduced by 
Harris in the eighteenth century, caused a gradually increased interest in the study of grammati­
cal theory: Robert Lowth, Joseph Priestley,27 and Lindley Murray28 were Harris’ direct antece­
dents; but their works included also the linguistic study of language: they belonged to the new 
era of modem scientific linguistic study of grammar.^Hermes was also the cause for many 
reactionary works, like John Home Tooke's Diversions o f Parley (1798-1805), and Georg 
Michael Roth's Antiherm es oder philosophische Untersuchungr uber den reinen 
B egriff der m enschlichen Sprache und die algemeine Sprachlehre.
The authors and the tradition discussed in H erm es
We will not, of course, give any account here of Aristotle, Plato, Boethius, Locke, or 
Hobbes. There is no need, additionally, to repeat Harris’ account of Greek and Latin authors 
he suggests to his readers as examples of linguistic perfection. By the explanatory memos of 
the authors either quoted, or indirectly referred to, it is hoped that in the progress of the exposi­
tion of Harris’ universal grammar, the ideas introduced will be easily accommodated with a 
specific philosophical background.
Theodore Gaza was the first to incorporate in Gellius’ Noctes Atticae (1469) the first
23 1765, 1771, 1773, 1786, 1794, 1806, 1816, and 1825.
24 This was the book suggested by Humbolt to Schiller, when the last asked for advice on books for the study of 
Greek: Aarself, Han, From Locke to Saussure, University of Minnesota, 1980, p. 350.
25 Also known among the literati of his age as Hermes Harris.
26 Lowth’s concept of universal grammar is of a general and rational type, conceived at a secondary level, and 
aiming at grammatical accuracy, while the primary scope is confined to the linguistic practise within the limits 
of the specific English language:
“...easiness and perspicuity have been sometimes preferred to logical exactness... Universal grammar 
cannot be taught abstractedly: it must be done with reference to some language already known; in which 
the terms are to be explained and the rules exemplified” (from the preface of his work).
27 The rudiments o f English Grammar (1761,1768).
28 English Grammar, Adapted to the Different Classes of Learners (1795).
29 See also the references on this in Hayashi, 1978.
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edition of ancient Greek text: an extended extract from the Platonic Gorgias. Among others, he 
contributed to the education in Greek studies of innumerable humanists, including Lorenzo 
Valla and Antonio Beccaria, as also to the edition of countless classical Greek texts. But above 
all, his major legacy was his own work rpappariKTjg Eioaycoyrfg B ipM a T eoaapa  
(Introductionis Grammaticae Libri Quattuor, 1495), which, in subsequent centuries of western 
thought, was the main descriptive source of Greek grammatical theory and text study.
Georgius Gemistus (or Pletho, 15th c.) whose name was paraphrasing that of Plato’s, 
took part in the Council of Florence and the negotiations for the reunion of the two Christian 
churches. He inspired Marcilio Ficino to establish a Platonic Academy (1459), and thus he 
marked the turn of Latin thought towards the study of Platonic works. Representing the higher 
tones of the Neoplatonic paganistic mysticism in the controversy with the Latin Aristotelianism 
of the time, his ample writings introduced a system of universal pantheism.
Nicephoros Blemmides (1197-1272), head of a school of philosophy established by 
the emperor Ioannes Batatzes in Nice, represents the higher achievements of medieval Greek 
thought in comprehension of ancient Greek philosophy. Yiis' Emropr) Aoyucrjg and’E n l 
roprj &voLKfjs were for both eastern and western European education the best and most pre­
cise abridgements of the Aristotelian thought, as elaborated in the first case by Porphyry, and in 
the second by Olymbiodorus, Simplicius, and Philoponus.
Aelius Donatus (4th cent.), a grammarian par excellence,30 was the author of two works 
on the Latin language: the Ars Minor, an elementary grammar book in the form of a dialogue, 
concerning the parts of speech, and the Ars Maior, a more advanced study of language sub­
jects, including solecisms and tropes. Donatus’ work became very popular especially during 
the middle ages.
P. Consentius (middle of 5th c.): in his grammatical work, under the title Ars P. Con- 
sentii V. C. de duabus Partibus Orationis, Nomine et Verbo31 (Basle, 1528) focused only on 
the noun and verb, using in his examples the material of Donatus and Charisius. A work under 
the title Ars de Barbarismis et Metaplasmis, a source for earlier views on language, is also attri­
buted to him.
Sergius’ work De Litter a was comments on Donatus’ Ars Maior, 1. It is not clear whether 
the Explanationes in Artem Donati, based on remarks made by Servius, should be totally 
ascribed to Pseudo-Cassiodorus, also called Sergius, or to the Sergius mentioned here. From 
the authors quoted by Harris, Servius and Sergius had written commentaries on Donatus, and 
thus are classified with the exegetical grammarians, while grammarians whose works, such as 
those of Priscian and Consentius, were preoccupied mainly with the inflections and dealt with 
the subjects of Donatus’ Ars Maior, were called elementary ones.
Flavius Sosipater Charisius (first half of 5th c.), a Christian professional grammarian, 
author of five books with weak grammatical comments under the title Institutiones Grammati­
cae. He is also known as Flavianus, or Cominianus, names that belong to some of the authentic 
writers of the material he used.
Priscianus Caesariensis (late 5th c.) was the author of the influential eight volume
30 Donatus dixit was a famous method of establishing a solid base for a grammatical argument.
31 where V. C. probably stands for Vir Clarus.
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Institutiones Grammaticae (also known as Commentiariorum Grammaticorum Libri XVIII) , 
which deals with subjects of both grammar and syntax, as also of the Institutio de Nomine et 
Pronomine et Verbo, on the basic features of the inflections, a very popular work which often 
has been wrongly identified with the Institutiones Grammaticae. He taught grammar in Con­
stantinople, and in his work he followed Apollonius Dyscolus.
Gerard(us) Johann(es) Voss(ius) (1577-1649) was one of the representatives of the 
Dutch “Golden Age” in the field of classics and education, a theologian, friend of Grotius, and 
Arminianist,32 professor of Rhetoric and Chronology in Leiden University. Harris refers to his 
Analogia.
Carl von Linne (Carolus Linnaeus, 18th c.) was the first natural scientist to impose a 
unificatory set of principles on genera and species of organisms, in his Systema Naturae 
(1735). There, man is classified with the apes and the bat in a primary order of mammals, but 
is distinguished by his reason, which is considered independent of his physiological aspect. 
Additionally, Linnaeus presented a classification of the genus Homo Sapiens in terms of cli­
mate and culture.
Amafanius, an early Roman writer, follower of the philosophy of Epicurus, who is only 
known by Cicero’s negative critique in Academica, 1.2, and Tusculanae Disputationes, 4.3.
Chalcidius (between the 4th and the 6th c.), a Platonic philosopher, author of the Inter- 
pretatio Latina partis prioris Timaei Platonici, printed in Corsica (1520).
Ioannes the Grammarian (or Ioannes Philoponus, 7th c.), an Alexandrian scholar, 
disciple of Ammonius, whose study of Plato and Aristotle led him to the sect of the Tritheists, a 
heresy condemned by the council of Constantinople of 681. Among his works we should refer 
to the De Quinque Dialectis Graecae Linguae Liber, and the Xvvaywyij rcJv Jipdg d id  
'<f)opov orjpaatav diaQdpcog rovovpevajy Aigecov (Collectio vocum quae pro diversa sig- 
nificatione Accentum diversum accipiunt), the Commentarii in Aristotelem (:in Prior & Poster­
ior Analytics, Physics, Meteorologia, de Anima, de Generatione Animalium, de Generatione et 
Corruptione, Metaphysica).
Macrobius (Ambrosius Aurelius Theodosius, 5th c.), a Greek grammarian. Harris 
quotes from the work De Differentiis et Societatibus Graeci Latinique Verbi, which is an abrid­
gement of Macrobius’ authentic text. The main point relating to Macrobius was the controversy 
over whether he maintained in his works the strictly philosophical attitudes of Neoplatonism or 
whether he accommodated himself with its Christianised version.
Olympiodorus (first half of the 6th c.), the last Alexandrian neoplatonist, influenced pri­
marily by Damascius, and secondarily by Iamblichus and Syrianus. Very acute as he was in the 
perception of the Platonic philosophy, he bequeathed to us extended comments on several of 
Plato’s dialogues.
Maximus Tyrius, a Platonic writer at the time of Antonines, author of the AiaXe§£Lg 
(Dissertationes) or Aoyoi (Sermones), on subjects relating to philosophy and theology.
Nicomachus of Gerasa was a Pythagorean who wrote on arithmetic and music. His 
influence on western European thought can be traced through Boethius’ brief references to his
32 The Arminians, or Remonstrants, members of a sect founded during the second half of the sixteenth century in 
Holland by Jacobus Arminus, were opposed to the determinism of the Calvinists.
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work.
Servius, an unknown author of an eleven part work carrying the title ServiiArs Gramma­
tica: Expositio Magistri Servii super Partes Minores.
Theodectes (4th cent. b. c.) was pupil of Isocrates, the style of whom he followed in 
his rhetoric and poetic work, but also of Plato, and Aristotle. He is considered the writer of a 
Tiyyn  *PrjroptKij, where he follows Aristotle in the classification of words, and also of a col­
lection of orations; both works are now lost.
Terence (Marcus Terentius Varro) was a contemporary of Cicero and one of the most 
illustrious Roman writers. Harris, on several occasions, quotes from Terence’s De Lingua 
Latina (first edition at Rome, 1471). Six of its twelve volumes have been preserved. The work 
was divided in three parts: i) De Impositione Vocabulorum, on the origin of words and terms, 
treating subjects of the history of Latin language, etymology, and classification of terms, ii) De 
Declinationibus, on the inflection of nouns and verbs seen as forms, the nature of which is 
divided into the natural (analogy) and the arbitrary part (anomaly), iii) Ut Verba inter se con- 
jungantur, on the laws of syntax.
Alexander of Aphrodisias (end of the 2nd c.-beginning of the 3nd c.) was the most 
eminent Aristotelian commentator (thus called o ’E^rjyrjTtjg, the Exegete), who tried to free the 
Aristotelian philosophy from Ammonius’ syncretism. He strongly opposed the Platonists, the 
Stoics, and the Epicureans. In Ilepi Eipappevrjg his argument for a real existence of fate 
was based on the common use of language, internal consciousness, and universal opinion. He 
further emphasised the distinction between free and necessary action (two things that the Stoics 
were trying to reconcile), as also between fate, chance, and possibility. Harris, quoting from 
Ilepi Wvxrfs, follows Alexander in the description of God as the very form of things. It is 
significant here, that Alexander has been discussed as an atheist, because of his many passages 
attributing intelligence and mind to the deity.
Apollonius Dyscolus, the Alexandrian grammarian who was so poor, that he wrote on 
shells, attracted the attention of the emperor M. Aurelius. As he was the first to systematise 
grammar, Priscian called him grammaticorum princeps. Harris quotes from his Ilep i o v v rd  
§ea)g t o v  Xoyov pepwv (De Constructione Orationis, or De Ordinatione sive Construction 
Dictionum).
Ammonius (late 4th c.) was a Neoplatonic, priest of the “Egyptian Ape,” professor of 
grammar in Alexandria and Constantinople, and contemporary of Helladius. His work, from 
which Harris quotes, is entitled Ilep i opoicov Kai SiaQdpoov Xegecov, and Ilep i ’Epptf 
veiag.
Damascius the Syrian (end of the 5th c.) was the last Neoplatonic philosopher in the 
School of Athens. He was the teacher of Simplicius, and was also known as o diddoxog , 
since he succeeded in the cathedra of Athens Proclus’ disciples Marinus and Zenodotus. Harris 
quotes from Damascius’ work ’Arzopicu K a i  Avoeig tie pi tcdv  jipojrajv apxtov, where 
all things have their first principle in an all-in-one and undivided divinity.
Proclus ( Diadochus). Harris quotes from Proclus’ commentary work on the Platonic 
Parmenides and Timaeus, avoiding any reference to the theological comments of Proclus’ other
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works ( E ls t i ) v  IJXdrojvos ©eoXoyLav and I t o l x e 'kd o l s  ©eoXoyiKTj), with the content 
of which he is in almost absolute accordance. Proclus extended the mystic content of the Plato­
nic works, so as to include his pantheistic views deriving from his study of Orphic and Chal- 
daean oracles. He was thus suspected of violating the laws of the Christian emperors, and he 
was compelled to quit Athens for some time. He wrote a special treatise on the coordination 
between the Orphic, Platonic, and Pythagorean doctrines, and he thought of himself as a rein­
carnation of Nicomachus of Gerasa. His doctrine of emanation aims to represent ideas in a real­
ised logical classification, where the subordinate simple ideas derive from composite ones, 
regarded as the principles of things.
Simplicius (6th c.), a disciple of Ammonius and Damascius, was one of the last Neopla­
tonic Aristotelian commentators. His interpretation of Aristotle forced a compromise of it with 
the Platonic doctrines. His inquiries into the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy are consid­
ered untainted by the Orphic and Chaldaic mysticism seen in the other neoplatonists. Harris 
quotes from Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, and he also gives Simplicius’ 
account and terminology of the triple order of ideas.
Themistius (4th c.) was a pagan Aristotelian commentator, philosopher and rhetorician, 
who served under several emperors in Constantinople, and was highly praised during his time. 
Harris quotes Themistius, as also Alexander of Aphrodisias, from the editio princeps of the 
Greek text made by Aldus in 1534.
Porphyry (3th c.), the famous anti-Christian Neoplatonist, disciple of Plotinus, who 
tried to reconcile the Aristotelian philosophy with the Platonic doctrines, is only referred to by 
Harris for his Eioaycoyij .
Alcinous, a Platonic of the Caesars’ era, was the author of the’Em rotnj tc o v  n kd rw vo s  
doyfidrwv, a compilation of Aristotelian and Platonic terminology. He confined the Platonic 
ibeai to the meaning of general laws, distinguishing them from eibri as the forms of things.
William Grocyn (1446-1519), an English scholar, one of the first, among More, Colet, 
and Linacre, who taught Greek in Oxford. He was accused by Erasmus for following the 
medieval scholastic preference of the Aristotelian doctrines in comparison to the Platonic philo­
sophy. Harris refers to Grocyn’s Grammatica in his discussion of the tenses, and he suggests 
that he himself follows in this subject the line traced, after Grocyn, in Scaliger, and Samuel 
Clarke.
Julius Caesar Scaliger (first half of 16th c.) was a French physician and scholar of Ita­
lian descent, who became famous for his biased attack against Erasmus’ Ciceronians. With his 
De Causis Linguae Latinae (1540) he tried to determine a set of principles for the Latin gram­
matical theory. He was the first during the Renaissance era to introduce to language the Aristo­
telian methods of classification, avoiding the Platonic dualism between matter and form, and 
seeing matter in its potential character. The Aristotelian fourfold causality, having its predeces­
sor in the modistic grammars of the middle ages, is followed by Scaliger. Harris quotes from 
Scaliger’s work, especially on the function of the tenses, the indicative mood, the conjunction, 
and the preposition. Scaliger is also Harris’ Latin source in his effort to establish grammar as a 
science, and not an art. The notion of common sense in Hermes is also reminiscent of Scali-
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ger’s communis ratio of language. Harris rejects Scaliger’s speculative concept of language as 
the mirror of nature, an idea suitable for the language-planners of the seventeenth century.33 
Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), a divine, is regarded as one of the greater anti-Lockian 
metaphysicians of the English rationalistic deism of that time. His assertion that though two and 
three are equal to five, five is not equal to two and three,34 is upheld by Harris in Hermes. It is 
noteworthy that Clarke’s theology attracted accusations from both the deists and the church, 
while he was also charged with Arianism. His D. D. thesis in Oxford defended the view that 
none of the articles of the Christian faith is opposed to the right reason. To protect his work, 
Harris refers only to Clarke’s translation of Iliad (Homeri Ilias Graece et Latine), published in 
two parts (1729 and 1732).
Sanctius (Francisco Sanchez de las Brozas, also known as Franciscus Sanctius 
Brocensis, 16th c.), is the author of the Verae brevesque grammatices Latinae institutiones 
(1562), many of the ideas of which later became part of his famous Minerva: seu de causis 
linguae Latinae, Salamanca, 1587). In Hermes, where frequently Sanctius’ notions are traced 
back to Scaliger’s work, Harris quotes Sanctius’ account of the arts of trivium and the gram­
mars of the Arabic and Hebrew languages, his remarks on the infinitive, on the accidental char­
acter of gender and persons, his rejection of the impersonal verbs, and also his view on the 
comparative degrees, the conjunction, and the interjection. In the preface of Hermes, as also 
elsewhere, Harris considers his task to be, as with Sanctius, restorative of the ancient glory of 
language, bringing it back to the refined form of the classical languages, free from the barbar­
ism of contemporary ones.
It is not that Harris just follows Sanctius’ rationalistic approach. The formative guidelines 
of a universal grammar, as presented in Hermes, are indebted to Harris’ study of Minerva. In 
Hermes, Harris himself does not admit to any immediate influence from Sanctius. But his son, 
in the preface to the complete edition of Harris’ works, ascribes the initiative for writing 
Hermes to his father’s reading of Sanctius’ text. 35 We have no reason, of course, to argue 
against this. This being so, we have to identify the following passages in Minerva from which 
the concept of Harris’ universal scheme seems to derive:
...Nam qui nomine casu facta contendunt, audacissimi sunt, nimirum illi, qui universi mundi 
seriem et fabricam fortuito ac temere ortam persuadere conabantur... Sed ut hoc in ceteris idio- 
matis asseverare non possum, ita mihi facile persuaderim, in omni idiomate cuiuslibet nomen- 
claturae reddi posse rationem: quae si in multis est obscura, non tamen propterea non investigan- 
da... Non igitur dubium est, quin rerum omnium, etiam vocum, reddenda sit ratio: quam si
33 For more on Scaliger, see Padley, 1976, p. 58-77.
34 in the sense that a substance is something more than the material aggregate of its parts.
35“What first led my father to a deep and accurate consideration of the principles of universal grammar, was a 
book which he held in high estimation, and has frequently quoted in his Hermes, the Minerva of Sanctius. To 
that writer he confessed himself indebted for abundance of valuable information, of which appears that he knew 
well how to profit, and to push his researches on the subject of grammar to a much greater length, by the help 
of his various and extensive erudition”: Harris, 1841, p. 6.
The first Earl of Malmesbury, when writing this, has in mind not a specific reference in Hermes, but Harris’ 
words in the Philosophical Inquiries, where Sanctius is acknowledged as the source of this universal grammatical 
theory: "...this invaluable book (Minerva), to which the author of these treatises readily owns himself indebted 
for his first rational ideas of grammar and language..." (ibid.,p. 393).
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ignoraverimus rogati, fateamur potius nos nescire, quam nullam esse constanter affinnemus.
Scio Caesarem Scaligerum aliter sentire; sed haec vera ratio est. Haec tam multa invitus con- 
gessi contra morosos quosdam, qui, quum in Granunatica rationem explodant, testimonia tan- 
tum doctorum efflagitant. An non legerunt Quinctilianum lib. 1 cap. 6 init. qui sermonem con- 
stare ratione, vetustate, auctoritate, consuetudine scripsit? Ille igitur non rationem excludit, sed 
in praecipuis enumerat, quasi vero Laurentius, et alii Grammatici, suarum etiam ineptiarum non 
statim conentur adhibere rationes, quales quales ipsi sint. Usus porro sine ratione non movetur; 
alioqui abusus, non usus, dicendus erit: auctoritas vero ab usu sumpsit incrementum. Nam si ab 
usu recedat, auctoritas nulla est: unde Cicero Caelium et M. Antonium reprehendit, qui suo arbi- 
trio, non ex usu, loquerentur.Nihil autem potest esse diutumum, ut inquit Curtius, lib. IV, cui 
non subest ratio. Reliquum est igitur, ut omnium rerum ratio primum adhibeatur, turn deinde, si 
fieri poterit, accedant testimonia, ut res ex optima fiat illustrior. Quae causa fuit, ut has nostras 
vigilias, Minerva seu de causis linguae Latinae, inscriberemus; quia cuiuslibet quaestionis cau- 
sas et vera principia eruere conamur, improbantes cum Cicerone (lib. II De Natura deorum) 
Pythagoricum illud. Ipse dixit.36
While Scaliger was influenced by the modistic speculative grammars and their conception of 
language as mirror of the universe, Sanctius took over from where Scaliger had stopped, over­
coming this imitative function of language, and Harris, two centuries later, reintroduced Sanc­
tius’ patterns, assigning them to the earlier classical initiators of the philosophy of language.
The deistic dimension of Harris’ universal grammar
In tkie strictest sense of deism, since reason is the same for all men, there should be one
36 In this; extract, I preferred the abbreviated interpretation of Sanctius’ text, as given by Robin Lakoff, in his 
review off the edition of Port-Royal’s grammar, in Language, 45 (1969):
People who claim that names come about by accident are very rash, particularly those who try to comvince us 
that the order and design of the whole universe arose accidentally and randomly... But while I cannot make this 
claim in other languages, still I can easily persuade myself that in every language a logical explanation can be 
given for any random name. If this is unclear in many cases, we should not refuse to look into it for that 
reason... Then there is in doubt that the explanation can be given for everything, even for words: if we do not 
know what that explanation is when we are asked, we should admit that we do not know, rather than declaring 
firmly that there is none. I know that Caesar Scaliger... feels otherwise, but this is the correct way to look at it. 
I have collected so many of these arguments against my will, to counter certain fastidious people who, since 
they throw out logical arguments in grammar, ask only for the attestations of scholars.Haven’t they read 
Quintilian..., who wrote that language consists of logic, tradition, authority and custom? Clearly he does not 
exclude logic, but puts it at the very top of the list-as if Laurentius and other grammarians aren’t always trying 
to use logical explanations, whatever they are worth, for their own stupid ideas. Furthermore, usage is not 
changed without a logical basis; otherwise it should be called abuse, not usage: but authority gains strength 
from usage. For if it deviates from usage, it is no authority at all; Cicero criticized Caelius and M. Antonius on 
these grounds, that they spoke according to their own judgment, not in accordance with usage. Nothing can last 
long, as Cutius says..., if logic is not behind it. So it remains first to summon up the logical explanation for 
everything, then, if possible, to provide attestations in addition, so that the argument, already strong, may 
become even more striking. That is the reason that we wrote this work of ours, Minerva, or Explanations for the 
Latin language: because we are trying to bring into the open the explanations for and real principles behind any 
questions that may arise; disapproving as we do along with Cicero... that motto of the Pythagoreans, Ipse dixit.
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religion and all propositions should be universally accepted. As long as Plato is classified 
among the theists, true knowledge is not considered as favourably given to separated sects.37 
Additionally, for some of the deists, knowledge of dead languages and of systems of thought is 
not considered as necessary for conceiving truth. Harris does not follow this deistic anti-
intellectualism;3^  in Hermes, proof of the one and the same truth39 depends upon examples der­
iving from an authoritative tradition.
God is the supreme intellect, in an unspecified but composed sense: it is the God of the 
deists, the divinity. If one is to classify further Harris's deistic rationality, one should not 
reckon him with relation to the extreme, strictly critical, view of Christianity.49 His deism 
should be seen as a constructive compromise with it, trying to restore a sense of unity in 
belief.4i He seems not to reject Christian belief, but Christian theology. His rationalism appears 
weak, not as a result of a real philosophical weakness, but in order to avoid inconsistencies 
with his social status and a break with the establishment. He does not want a battle in the open 
field with the theists; there is no need to attack directly the Christian belief, and it is very wise 
of him to restrict himself to offering just an alternative source of thought.
On a certain view, the sources he chooses to reveal each time seem to offer him security 
during controversial times. The substance of works such as those of Pletho and Alexander 
Aphrodisiensis are too distant from the common reader of the middle eighteenth century, to 
provoke an immediate counter-attack on Hermes. Thus, Harris identifies himself with deism, 
as far as God is identified as an intellect, and as far as the Stoic doctrines of happiness are 
reflected. Additionally, the discussion on goodness is based also on Stoic terms, and there are 
many quotations from several of the Stoics' major works. Moreover, moral virtue, is discussed 
in the same way, reminiscent not so much of Herbert of Cherbury, but of the revivals of Plato­
nic and Stoic arguments, immediately after the late medieval times. Indeed, Harris makes a real 
effort to stay away from Herbert's deism.42 On the other hand, his rationalism follows the tra­
dition of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, on the general principles that God exists, and that 
this is demonstrably true, as also in his antithesis to sensory experience and the British empiri­
cism. Sometimes his language brings in mind Spinoza and his impersonalization of God. His 
rationalism occasionally sounds paradoxical and weak, because his argumentation remains 
mainly intra-theological. But it was this recommendation of apparently self-evident deductions, 
easily adapted to the common notions of its readers, that made Hermes so popular during its
37 For example, Jews.
38 Hermes was written in a time when for theologians Christianity was based on reason rather than on faith, 
while in the years before 1751 Christianity was seen by the deists as essentially irrational.
39 Harris calls it a truth of reason, although similes like that of the sun in the preface pinpoint the light of 
natural reason.
40 Such as the view of Thomas Paine in his work The Age of Reason (1794 & 1796).
41 i.e. uniformitarianism, according to which, since reason is identical in all men, there should be only one reli­
gion and all of its propositions should be universally accepted; see also Stein, p. 135.
42 Something strongly supported by N. Chomsky, in his articles in Stich, Innate Ideas, 1975.
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time.43
The choice of the name Hermes for the book's title coordinates with the book's sources.44 
On the one hand, the name is reminiscent of the previous century's preference for the Latin 
Mercurius.45 It symbolises the unity of the spiritual and the material world, the contact between 
the physical and the metaphysical, the transition from the first to the second, from language and 
words to the universal forms, existing like them everywhere and in all time. Hermes is the God 
of language in-formed.46 The confusion in ancient times that there may be not just one but 
many Hermes seems similar to the people's inability to see the unity of the forms and discern 
one in many. Moreover, Hermes represents that which only accidentally can be caught, that 
which because of its divine supremacy cannot be wholly conceived. A book on universal 
grammar should bare his name in its title as having the same intermediary role.
It is the Neoplatonic sources of Hermes that offer Harris an alibi, a shelter for, and a cover 
of his deism. What he does actually, is to reintroduce all the basic rationalistic dogmas and ter­
minology of the previous one hundred years, by presenting the same principles and terms as 
reflecting the earlier philosophical tradition. This way of handling philosophical terminology 
and thought, namely the ascent to the first sources of rationalism, rendered Hermes popular, 
and, perhaps, security for the author, as for the ideas presented in the book. But above all, it 
permitted the compilation of a tightly compiled philosophical “vocabulary,” where terms and 
modes of thinking which seem to differ in their very first origin are presented in their unity. 
Thus his extended quotations from Pletho's Platonicae et Aristotelicae Philosophiae 
Differentia47 set the example for an empiricism incorporated in the comprehensive scheme of 
rationalistic philosophy.
The mind of Harris is the platonic voiiq, "instantaneous, indivisible, and at once intellec­
tion," contrary to the temporary divisible and successive character of sensitive perception. It is 
so perfect, compared to the senses, and so supreme, that “if we were to define circle, either by 
one or the other, senses would perceive its circumference and mind would perceive its
43 If Harris had not painted his anti-empiricism with such bright colours, he would have offered himself the 
opportunity to present a total, well-composed, partly original, and compact philosophical stance. An effort, per­
haps, of Harris to hide his coalescence with free thought, lies under the emphasis of his attack on experimental- 
ism and empiricism. Otherwise, we cannot explain the absurdity of criticising someone who, like Harris him­
self, subordinated faith and revelation to reason.
44 The title of Hermes seems to be in an utterly deistic sense; published three years after Rev. Con. Middleton's 
Free Inquiry (on the Christian miracles), and in the tradition of Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue (1699), 
and Hume's Inquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748).
45 John Wilkins, Mercury, or The Secret and Swift Messenger: shewing how a man may with privacy and speed 
communicate his thoughts to a friend at any distance; together with an abstract o f Dr. Wilkins's Essay towards 
a Real Character and a Philosophical Language, London 1668: reprinted by J. Benjamin, Amsterdam- 
Philadelphia, 1984.
46 The most comprehensive source for Hermes is the volume 13 (Alchemical studies) of C. G. Jung, in his Col­
lected Works, Routledge & Kegan Paul, New York, 1967. Hermes is a) the guardian of the many -sounding 
tongue (rcafujxDVEi YkoSacrris pedeo&v), b) the participation mystique, c) the divine fire in the meaning not of an 
opposing but of an internal component of the deity, d) the lumen naturae as bestowed by God upon his creatures, 
e) the god of revelation, f) the unchanged unconscious, g) the wind god, h) the life-giving principle, i) the hold­
ing the world together and standing in the middle between body and spirit, j) the symbol of the united double 
nature, k) the Koyoq, becoming the world, 1) the one in many, and the many in one, m) the symbol of prima and 
ultima materia and n) the mediator. For more, see also Vemant, 1983.
47 It is a polemic against averroism, which ascribes (dvayei,) Aristotelian thought to its Platonic predecessor.
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c e n t r e ” .48 in Hermes, general ideas are original, connate, and essential to the divine truth. 
Harris admits of a triple order of general ideas:
the maker's form (intelligible and previous to the natural form) the form of the subject 
(natural, sensible and concomitant), and the form received from the contemplator (intelligible and 
subsequent).49
His rationalistic concept of an "economy of the whole" is determined in the following way:
...objects from without first move our faculties, and thence we move of ourselves either to practice 
or contemplation. The life or existence o f God ...is not only complete throughout eternity, but 
complete in every instant, and is for that reason immutable and superior to all motion.50 
...tho' we are not Gods, yet as rational beings we have within us something divine, and that the 
more we can become superior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and place our welfare in 
that good, which is immutable, permanent, and rational, the higher we shall advance in real happi­
ness and wisdom. ...From this single principle o f immobility, may be derived some of the noblest 
of the divine attributes; such as that of impassive, incorruptable, incorporeal etc,51
Such observations derive from Aristotle, for whom immutability, perfection, and completion of 
God as the first mover, are the presuppositions of the supremacy of universals. General ideas 
must be independent of the increase or decline of our intellectual apprehension. While for con­
tingent truths remission (namely, weakening) may proceed infinitely and never stops, this does 
not happen with universals, where the certainty of their truth is defined. In his discussion on 
intension and remission, Harris reflects the platonic concept of assimilation (op-oicoai?) to God 
as the end of philosophy.52 He also quotes from MaximusTyrius’ Dissertationes, 17:
one may be naturally advanced to comprehend things, but without being conscious of his capabil­
ity; another is moreover conscious of that; but also he is not perfect, unless his ability to appre­
hend and his apprehension of all and of the same things do not subject to time.53
In his comment on the abstraction of the universal from the particular, an act of abstracting 
from images the intelligible species and of contemplating without the accidental principles of the 
individuals,54 Harris specifies that
48 Harris, 1751, p. 365.
49 Ibid., p. 377.
50 Ibid. p. 359-p.360.
51 Ibid., p. 362
52 In Plato's Theaetetus, 176a, and in Aristotle's Ethics 10.8.
53 : To\5 ydp Noo o p£v v o e i v  JtetJruKEV, Kai votov/ o be Kcd Jte<j)'OKe, Kai v o eT . Kai odxos aujtto 
t e X e o ^ ,  av prj jrpoaBfj  ^ auxtjj t o  Kai voeiv. ’A e l ,  Kai Jtdvra v o e I v ,  Kai pij akkoxE akka/QaxE e l t ]  
av EvxEkEOxaxo? o v o e i v  aci Kai jndvxa, Kai apa. Harris cites as sources also Physics, 4, 19, and Meta­
physics, chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 : Harris, 1756, p. 162.
54 See also Leff, p. 223.
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the images, impressions, pictures in our sensorium, or relicts of that motion caused within us, are 
the permanent phantasms that the human mind first works, and by an energy ... spontaneous and 
familiar to its nature, it discerns at once what in many is one; what in things dissimilar and differ­
ent is similar and the same.55
What then perceives this constitution or union? ...We must neccessarily ...recur to some higher 
collective power, to give us a prospect of nature, even in these her subordinate wholes, much more 
in that comprehensive whole, whose sympathy is universal, and o f which these smaller wholes are 
all no more than parts. And this is pure truth. By virtue of this power the mind views one general 
idea in many individuals; one proposition in many general ideas; one syllogism in many proposi­
tions; till at length by properly repeating and connecting syllogism with syllogism, it ascend into 
those bright and steady regions of science. Even negative truths and negative conclusions cannot 
subsist, but by bringing terms and propositions together, so necessary is this uniting power to 
every species of knowledge.56
The pertinence of universal grammar
The first thing to be defined is the field of application of a universal type of grammar. Cer­
tainly, a universal grammar does not have an instructional character, suggesting different guide­
lines in each language for the linguistic act. Its first aim is to disclose semantic principles, com­
mon amongst languages, which are reflected in the words of each one of them. For this pur­
pose, it seems that the subject of universal grammar is the common syntax of languages. How­
ever, it is not just a type of general syntax. The words of each language have a specific effi­
cacy, force, and power,51 and the aim of such a grammar, is to reveal words and their semantic 
relations, as the effects of principles whose causal character is classified within the scope of a 
scientific approach to philosophy (Such as this of Metaphysics is considered to be). In an 
extract quoted from the second book of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ I le p i Wvxrfg, it is 
explained that, while we are all acquainted with the existence of things describable by language, 
a universal grammar acquaints us with the substantial nature of them.58 Thus such a subject is 
termed for the ordinary people as scientific, while for the liberal it is a speculation upon the the­
orems of science.59 The meaning of this statement is that philosophy, as a science in the mode
55 Hams, 1786, p. 362.
56 Ibid., p. 363-4.
57 Harris, p. 293.
58 ’Akk’ earl t c o v  dvxcov, a  xrjv |x e v  djtap^iv e x e i  YvcopipaxdTT]v, ay v c o c j t o tdxT|v be xrjv odaiav. 
"Qajtep rjfxE Kivrjau;, Kai o x o j t o ? ,  exi be pakkov o xpbvoS- ’E k o o x o u  yap xoxrxcov t o  p£v elvai 
yvcopipov Kai dvap<j)ik£KTov. Tu; be j io x e  e o x i v  avxcov r] o\3aia, t c o v  xak&rco>ramov opaOffvai. ’Taxi 
piv xi xomcov r\ a|ruxij. To p£v yap elvai xi xijv ajwxijv, yvcopipoxaxov Kai c^avEpcoxaxov. Ti 5e 
j io x e  e o x iv ,  au pa5iov KaxapaOetv. The soul here mentioned will be the subject of the next, third part of 
Hermes. The above passage is translated by Harris in 1786, p. 433.
59 Ibid. p. 295. The distinction is based on Metaphysics, 1.2.982b20-21, where it is said that philosophers pur­
sue scientific knowledge for the sake of understanding it, and not targeting its practical utility: <J>avEpov da 8 ia  
to EidEvai to EJtioxaaGai eS'uokov Kai od xpfiCTetJ^  xivoc; evekev.
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of conceiving universal and necessary truth,60 stands at the heart of all sciences. Such a con­
templation
...tends to call forth and strengthen nature's original vigour. Be the subject itself immediately lucra­
tive61 or not, the nerves of reason are braced by the mere employ, and we become abler actors in 
the drama of life, whether our part be of the busier, or the sedater kind.62
Our perception, when contemplating true science, strengthens the vigour of natural sub­
stances, because the pursuit of truth is good, the latter being a final end63 and a sign of our vir­
tue.64 Consequently, a universal perception of grammar is an intellectual action, an end in itself, 
serving no further purposes than that of an intellectual good, which is
the most excellent within us, ...accommodated to all places and times, ...depending neither on the 
will of others, nor on the affluence of external fortune, ...decaying no with decaying appetites,
...but rising in vigour, when those are no more.65
Thus the application of universal grammar is demonstrative of our intellectual virtue. Intellect­
ual virtue, which is concerned with the divine nature, is to be distinguished from the moral one, 
which concerns the ethical quality and purposes of human actions. Therefore, universal gram­
mar is an inductive act, in the mode of which, by the application of our discursive faculty, we 
ascend to the pure intellect of God.66
The framework of Hermes
The book, in its 1751 edition numbers 437 pages of text, the preface included, apart from 
the dedication (to Lord Hardwicke) and an index. In its extensive footnotes we should note not 
only the absolute preference for quoting from the ancient classical authors, but also the avoi­
dance of any reference to and citation of the author's rationalist contemporaries. The fact that 
Harris's work is an adoption of specifically selected philosophical traditions is a sign of his not 
being imitative, but intellectually fair.67 Although the author calls his work an inquiry, this is
60'H ejTumjpr) jtept xtov KtxGokov eoxiv \krr6kTii|)u; K ai xtov e£ dvdyKT]? ovxtov: scientific knowledge is 
judgment about universal and necessary things: Nicomachean Ethics, 6.6.1140b31-32.
61 0 6  yap Jtpos xPh A d£ta pexpeixai: the value of philosophical teaching cannot be measured in 
money: Nicomachean Ethics, 9.1.1164b3-4.
62 Harris, 1786, p. 295.
63 TdyaGov 0 5  jtdvx’ EtJ/iexauThe good has been defined as that at which all things aim: Nicomachean Ethics, 
1.1.1094a2-3. To 8’ apioxov xekeiov xi <J)atvexai: The highest good is clearly something final: ibid. 
1..1097a28.
64'H dpexrj dyaGov xi eoxiv: virtue is a kind of good: Topics, 6.4.142bl4.
65 Harris, 1786, p. 299.
66 Harris is citing here the philosophical definition of God, given in Metaphysics 1074b, which distinguishes 
between sciences and first philosophy in terms of their subjects: while in sciences the object of our thoughts is 
different from the thought itself, divine knowledge is self-predicating.
67 "It is by J. Harris’ Hermes that Sanctius is given the respect he deserves": Michael, p. 23.
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not something attempted by himself, but suggested to the reader.
Hermes is the perfect example of a combination of the rationalistic approach to language 
and of the Aristotelian cast of mind; and that, regardless of its philosophical weakness and want 
of originality. It is also a first class example of the synthesis of Platonic and Aristotelian doc­
trines, and, as it follows the tradition originating from Renaissance Platonism, it verifies Pla­
tonism and Neoplatonism as a unity. 68 The subject is language and universal grammar; but it 
has nothing to do either with the language-planners’ tradition, since it does not offer any new 
scheme, or with the idea of grammar as it developed after 1751, in a clearly linguistic-scientific 
approach. That is, perhaps, why the word language is omitted from the title of the English edi­
tions after the first one. Taking on that tradition, dominant in the middle ages, and after a gap of 
almost a century, Hermes revives the idea of a grammar yielding to philosophy. It does not 
reveal any original material. What is offered is a first class acquaintance with the ancient sour­
ces of truth and reason. Hermes is not an attempt to reintroduce scholasticism, although Harris 
knows that scholasticism will be the first thing attributed to his book:
the chief end ...to excite the readers to curiosity and inquiry, ...not to teach by prolix and formal 
lectures,from the efficacy of which he has little expectations, ...he [the author] thinks nothing 
more absurd than the common notion of instruction, as if science were to be poured into the mind, 
like water into a cistern, that passively waits to receive all that comes...69
Harris tries to restore the image of this reasoned truth in a time focusing rather on the vernacu­
lar languages, than on the value of the classic ones. It is an attempt to reestablish the active 
power of ancient metaphysical doctrines, jointly with the belief in principles, which are invari­
able and traceable by one uniform mode of reasoning; the end is that the reader may
...see how the same reason has at all time prevailed; how there is one truth, like one sun, that has 
enlightened human intelligence through every age, and save it from the darkness both o f sophistry 
and error.19
Moreover, he aims to turn his readers to those neglected sublimer parts of science, the studies 
of mind, intellect, and intelligent principles.71 This last relates Hermes with Harris’ time and 
place, and puts it in its proper place in respect to the British philosophical tradition in relation to 
empiricism and the Royal Society.
Hermes' content consists of three parts: the first and second of these treat respectively the
68 These two become discrete later, in the nineteenth century: Wallis, p. 171.
69 : from several points in the preface of Hermes.
70 Harris, 1751, p. x.
71 Ibid, p. 351.
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resolution of speech into its constituent categorematic and syncategorematic terms,72 while the 
third focuses on language in terms of the distinction between matter and form.
In his division of speech, Harris resolves language into two species of words, the substan­
tives and the attributives, calling them principals and accessories respectively. Following 
Aristotle he defines the first as words significant by themselves and the second significant by 
relation. While substantives are analysed into primary (nouns) and secondary (pronouns), attri­
butives are resolved into verbs, adjectives and participles. From the attributives, adverbs are 
called “attributives of the attributive”, while the substantives are divided into the prepositive and 
the subjunctive (connective). Finally the accessories are analysed into the definitives (article, 
demonstrative pronoun) and the connectives (conjunction, preposition).
Practically what Harris does here, is take the Aristotelian four-part division of speech 
(noun-verb-article-conjunction, corresponding to substantive- attributive-definitive-connective) 
and build upon it a further subdivided structure. He defines speech as “the joint energy of our 
reason and social affection”. To understand his idea of energy we must go back to 1774 and his 
Dialogue Concerning Art, the first of the three treatises he had published that year:
every production whose nature has its being or essence in a transition, call it what it really is, a 
motion or an energy: thus a tune and a dance are energies... On the contrary, call every production, 
whose parts exist all at once, and whose nature depends not on a transition for its essence, call it a 
work, or thing done, not an energy or operation...73
Thus, energy takes its meaning by comparison with work or operation.74 The relation between 
energy and social behaviour {social affection) is clear when we consider that “life is a certain 
energy, and each man energises about those subjects, and with those faculties, for which he 
has the greatest affection”.75 By a second definition of speech, Harris makes his point: since 
Aristotle declared that “life is the evepyeia of voik;”,76
speech or discourse [namely language] is a publishing of some energy or motion of the soul...
72 This classification reflects the philosophical scope of Harris' approach to language. Despite the fact that he 
has to establish, for the sake of his subject, a grammatically solid ground, based on the grammarians of the past, 
Harris is reflecting on the parts of speech in the philosophical tradition, differentiating between significative and 
consignificative terms. The distinction is between words which have a self-sufficient signification, as the noun 
and the verb, and those which do not signify separately, but need a noun or a verb. While the noun and the com­
mon verb are traditionally seen as the categorematic terms of a sentence, the number of terms recognised as con- 
significative, increased in the advancement of philosophical linguistic thought. Aristotle has mentioned three
syncategorematic, or consignificative terms (every, no, and the copula is). Apollonius added the pronoun and 
some of the Greek adverbs in the categorematic terms, and the conjunction, the preposition, and the articles in 
the syncategorematic. The whole subject was highly elaborated during the middle ages: by reading the works
mainly of Priscian, but also of Boethius, western European thought developed the distinction between signif- 
icantia and consignificantia; the most eminent treatise were the Syncategoremata ofWilliam of Sherwood and the 
Tractatus Syncategorematum of Peter of Spain.
73 Harris, 1841, p. 18
74 Aia<Jx)pd 6 e x i?  <J)divExa. xajv x eXo jv  xa pev yap evepYEiat Etai xa 6 e jrap’ aura? eya xiva:
75 : a quotation from Ethics in the Dialogue concerning Art, p. 18.
76 Metaphysics, 1072b.
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Thus ratio and mind (soul) are the main guidelines for speech. The definitions of the several 
species of words are approximate extracts quoted from either Aristotle or his Alexandrian com­
mentators. Language is “a system of articulated voices, symbols of our ideas and principally of 
the general and universal,77 word is a voice articulated and significant by compact,78 a sound 
significant of which no part is of itself significant”.^
Harris lays a special stress on the character of the sentence. The sentence, and not the 
word, is the fundamental speech unit; whether it is assertoric (assertive), interrogative, impera­
tive, precative, or optative, the soul's power of perception and volition are expressed through 
the sentence. Thus the sentence is the grammatical unit of a philosophical species of grammar. 
This is in absolute accordance with the rationale of a universal grammar: the grammatical unit is 
identified with the logical unit; the sentence is identified with the proposition of the logician and 
the unit of the syntactic structure of the philosopher of language.80 The sentence of Harris' 
grammatical resolution of universal theory, is identified with the sentiment of the third book of 
Hermes, where the form of language is treated: it is that which in the Philosophical Inquiries is 
defined as that “through which we assert anything general or universal”.8*
However, what is most important here is reason in the sense of rational energy: speech,
namely language, is rational communication, related to nature.82 The species of the modes of 
speaking, which in great measure depend on those of the modes of thinking, are in fact “no 
more than so many literal forms intended to express these natural distinctions”. Since inteijec- 
tions “coincide with no parts of speech, but are either uttered alone, ...without altering its form, 
either in syntax or signification”,8^  they are not considered parts of a universal type of dis­
course. When the discussion comes to the adverbs, the attributives of the attributes, Harris 
notes:
...it is worth while to observe how the same thing participating in the same essence, assumes dif­
ferent grammatical forms from its different relations.84
The whole proposal becomes more explicit in the second book of Hermes, treating accessories. 
The author, after talking about the distinctions between individuals, species and genus, and 
while discussing definitives, says that “minute change in principles leads to mighty change in 
effects”. Following the tradition of universal grammar, he discusses the coalescence of some
77 Harris, 1751, p. 328-9.
78 ibid., p. 328-9.
79 Ibid., p. 20.
80 Harris also repeats the Aristotelian definition of the sentence (De Interpretatione, 4.16b26-28) as “a compound 
quantity of sound significant, of which certain parts are themselves also significant”: ibid., p. 19.
81 On the subject of vovq and bidvvoia, Harris had stated: ...there are two pieces of sentiment, both called in 
English either a sentiment or a sentence, and in Latin sententia... bidvvoia, or sentiment exists, where demon­
strate anything either to be or not to be; or through we assert anything general or universal: Harris, 1841, p. 
173-174.
82 A quotation from Sanctius is worth mentioning here(: creavit Deus hominem rationis participe , ibid., p. 5, 
and a comment on an anecdote concerning Heraclitus, quoted from Aristotle, which concludes: “there is no part 
of nature too mean for the Divine Presence”.
83 Harris, 1751, p. 289.
84 Harris, 1786, p. 203.
2 3
pronouns with pronominal articles: this, any, some, all etc. are words which despite being pro­
nouns, in a general concept of grammar, accept a more definitive and certain role. While con­
junctions connect the meanings of simple sentences (and do that even when functioning as 
adversative), prepositions, connective only of words, extend themselves by degrees from cor­
poreal to incorporeal and intellectual subjects, forming “this universe or visible whole, which is 
made one by that general comprehension”.^
The grammatical concord between the substantive and the attributive stands for the logical 
concord between subject and predicate, while these concords in speech produce propositions 
and sentences.s6 The origin and the ultimate objective of these propositions is the intellect of 
the living God. This is the universal reason implied from the very first beginning. The Deity is 
defined as:
a perpetual energy of the purest intellect about the first, all-comprehensive objects o f intellection, 
which are no other than the intellect itself87
In Hermes, Harris makes no special effort to clarify any distinction between soul and mind, as 
they are both immediate references to God. But it is interesting to see how Harris had specified 
the human mind a few years earlier:
Novq is the inductive faculty, which out of the particulars and the many forms out what is general 
and one. This species of apprehension is evidently our first and earliest knowledge.88
Even from that dialogue, Harris was talking about universal truths obvious to people's com­
mon sensed This common sense is a power, with several propositions, formed by induction, 
as its proper objects, which are of a general character. Giving an account of the terms jtpoA,^ 
tyeiq, Koivai-8[X(J)iiTai-(|)iiaLKai evvoiai, and praenotiones, Harris adopts Diogenes Laertius 
view, that “a preconception is the natural apprehension of what is general or universal”. For 
Harris,
..there are truths or universals, of so obvious a kind that every mind or intellect, not absolutely 
deprived, without the least help of art, can hardly fail to recognise them.90 The recognition of 
them, or at least the ability to recognise them is the common sense ( k o i v o s  v o v g ) ,  as “being a
85 Ibid., 1786, pp. 266-67.
86 Harris, 1751, p. 279.
87 Ibid. p. 301.
88 Harris, 1841, p. 301.
89 The primary meaning of common sense is that which stands in relation to nonsense and the nonsensical. 
Aristotle: "we must set the observed facts before of us and after first discussing the difficulties, go on to prove, 
if possible, the truth of all the common opinions about these affections of the mind, or, failing this, of the 
greater number, and the most authoritative; for if we both refute the objections and leave the common opinions 
undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently" (: Nicomachean Ethics, 1145b2-7;cf.ll72b35-1173a2). 
Epictitus defines common sense (koinolq noy3q) as the state of affairs where there are some things which undis­
torted men perceive by the use of their common faculties (III,VI,8). Here common sense is the elementary men­
tal outfit of the normal man (see also: C.S. Lewis, Studies in words, Cambridge, 1960, p. 146).
90 Harris, 1841, p. 46.
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sense common to all, except lunatics and idiots”.91
Mind is the ultimate cause, the primary subject of the matter and form of language. Matter 
and form, the elements of this whole, are parts of the Deity's mental separation. While matter is 
admitted not as material mind (a term relating rather to the empiricists' senses) but as natural 
capacity, in the meaning of “original and native power of intellection,” form is expressive of 
the intellectual supremacy of the mind. Harris speaks about the “form of forms, ...the supreme 
intelligence which passes through all things and which is the same to our capacities,the fountain 
of all symmetry, of all Good, and of all truth, imparting to every being its essential and distinc­
tive attributes”.92
While the matter of language is just articulate voices (sound), the aim of the signification of 
language is to bring man through his natural speech closer to the universal mind; it is some sort 
of completion for the human being:
...meaning is that peculiar and characteristic form, by which the nature or essence o f language 
becomes complete,93
Attributive words, referring to natural attributes, are in no way essential for such a completion. 
They are just “species of sounds with certain motions concomitant”. For Harris, the distinction 
between arbitrary and natural accidents is an essential part of his theory. It is not enough to 
consider speech just in respect of natural issues. It is important for a universal grammar to pre­
sent speech in the procedure of a composition towards mind. If language was just an imitation 
of the universal mind, then every one having the natural faculty to know the original, could 
become aware of its imitations, namely, of every word of every language concerning the same 
subject.94 On the contrary, language should be examined in relation to the modes in which it 
reflects a unificatory intellective activity. Thus, while the common grammatical study focuses 
on the differentiation between semantic units, universal grammar identifies the coordinative 
unity of them:
... a sentence, connected by disjunctives, has a near resemblance to a simple negative truth. For 
tho' this as to its intellection be disjunctive (its end being to disjoin the subject from the predicate) 
yet as it combines terms together into one proposition, 'tis as truly synthetical, as any truth, that 
is affirmative 95
In Harris’ discussion on form, the meaning of language, we discover the Platonic ideas. 
When talking about the connective power of prepositions, he states that
those parts of speech unite of themselves in grammar, whose original archetypes unite ofthem-
91 Ibid.,, p. 46.
92 Harris, 1751, p. 310.
93 Ibid., p. 315.
94 Ibid., p. 330.
95 Ibid., p. 250.
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selves in nature.96
Language is symbols deriving from accidents in a quite arbitrary way, and not a pictorial 
image, an imitation of the universe, coming out of natural attributes:
there never was a language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the properties and 
essences of things, as a mirror exhibits their figures and colours91
The conventional and arbitrary character of the formal aspect of language is not anything 
more than an answer to the question how speech symbolises archetypes. Particular languages, 
additionally, differ exactly in that point, namely, in the system of conventions accepted:
...and many words possessing their signification under the same compact, unite in constituting a 
particular language 9i
By the question “what is language a symbol o f ’, we are introduced to the examination of 
the general ideas. Language is significant of general truths 99 These truths or ideas are common 
to individuals100 and exist independently from a specific time reference. Of these two character­
istics the first is essential for our social affection{namely, our intercourse-communication), the 
second for our acquiring the rational speech and doctrines of the classical languages, now 
dead.101
Language of course, does not consist only of general terms. It is also “expressive” of the 
particular and the ordinary, being the subject of every day intercourse1^  among people. But in 
terms of only this fact, someone could not contemplate sufficiently upon language: words 
which are commonly used in our everyday life are just particular terms having their own utility 
and end', but words signifying general ideas, reveal:
the most excellent and essential part of language, since from them it derives that just proportion of 
precision and permanence and that comprehensive universality, without which [language] could not 
possibly be either learnt, or understood, or applied to the purposes of reasoning and science.103
Thus, because terms are precise, permanent, and universal, we are able to reason and to com­
prehend the world. These characteristics of the form of language, the very existence of univer­
sal truths is what makes up the definite and steady part of language: that part which the specula­
tive mind admits, and which does not change by yielding to different subjects each time, or to
96 Ibid., p.263.
97 Ibid., p.335.
90 Ibid., p. 327.
99 Ibid., p. 342.
100 Ibid., p. 20.
101 “...the language of those who lived ages ago,...may be as intelligible now,as it was then”: ibid. p. 342. It is 
very characteristic that such passages lack any reference to the future.
102 a term which relates to the above mentioned social affection.
1°3 Ibid. p. 345.
the different ways we experience things.
It is noteworthy here to repeat that Harris does not reject empirical science, but endorses the 
differentiation between that and speculative science: practical wisdom, as he says, is based only 
on senses; it yields only to the utilities of every day life,104 but it is not a means to approach the 
universal mind. Perceptions coming just from the senses are “at least indefinite and more fleet­
ing and transient than the objects they exhibit”, 105 because they cannot subsist without the 
immediate presence of those objects. Sensitive perception is different from the intellective, as it 
can only conceive terms separately; on the contrary, mind conceives truth as a unity of its 
terms:
...it discerns at once what in many is one; what in things dissimilar and different is similar and the 
same.106
Speculative science is the only way to approach this source of general truth. It is that sort of 
scientific knowledge with which we can ascend from the multitude of things to their causes 
which are their principal elements. In his dialogue Concerning Art, Harris had written on the 
subject of speculative science:
by the most excellent science ...is meant the science of causes, and above all others, of causes effi­
cient and final, as these necessarily imply pervading reason and superintending wisdom. This 
science... with a view to itself, and the transcendent eminence o f its object, was more properly 
called rj npdrrrj (fakooo^ia, the first philosophy.107
104 Ibid., preface.
^  Ibid., p. 353.
106 Ibid., p. 362.
107 Harris, 1841, p. 26n.
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This part intends to familiarise the reader with the resolution of speech according to the 
grammatical patterns of Harris’ universal grammar. The content of this part refers to the gram­
matical material of language: not to the philosophical background and testification of the 
linguistic act, but to the common manner in which concepts physically appear in each language. 
Consequently, the arrangement of the chapters in this part will not vary much from that fol­
lowed by Harris in the first and second parts of Hermes. The second task undertaken, both 
here and in the third part of this thesis, is the exposition of the relation between the observa­
tions made by Harris and the classical sources upon which these are based.
The species of words
The first thing noteworthy, is the distinction between the classification of the parts of 
speech in common grammar,1 and the classification of the species of words in the universal 
one. Both types of grammar accept as a first criterion of the distinction between the parts of 
speech, the inflectiveness or variability of words. For a universal grammar this criterion is 
inadequate on the base that a word which is variable in one language, may be expressed in 
another language by some other form of wording. For example, the Greek dual number and the 
variation in gender, case, and number in the Greek and Latin adjectives, are not generally 
accepted as necessary distinctions, since they cannot be found in many other languages, and 
thus not essential. Similarly, the Latin genitive is expressed in English by a periphrasis, and the 
Latin accusative, the predicate, by mere position.
The only proper semantic distinction would be between those words significant by them­
selves (principals), and those significant by relation (accessories). The first may stand in 
speech absolutely, in the sense that they have a meaning even when uttered alone, while the 
second are attributed a significative fumction only when associated to the first. The root of this 
distinction it is to be found in a passage of Apollonius’ On syntax, book 1, chapter 3, where is 
said that:
In the same manner, as of the elements, or letters, some are vowels, which of themselves complete 
a sound; others are consonants, which without the help of vowels have no express vocality; so 
likewise may we conceive as to the nature of words. Some of them, like vowels, are of themselves 
expressive, as is the case of verbs, nouns, pronouns, and adverbs; others, like consonants, wait for 
their vowels, being unable to become expressive by their own proper strength, as is the case of 
prepositions, articles, and conjunction; for these parts of speech are always consignificant, that is
1 : article, noun, pronoun, verb, participle, adverb (where inteijection is included), conjunction, and preposition. 
This is the analysis of the Alexandrian grammarians. In Latin the analysis was the same, apart from that inter­
jection was considered a separate part of speech.
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are only significant, when associated to something else.2
Among the principal words now, there is a further functional distinction between substan­
tive and attributive terms, which reflects the distinction between substance and attribute. This 
distinction is based on the predicational view of Metaphysics 1028b-1029a,3 where the sub­
stratum is that of which else things are predicated, while it itself is not predicated of anything 
other. The accessories are subdivided into the definitive and the connective words, according to 
the number of principals they consignify. The first always refer to (<define or determine) only 
one principal term, while the second relate the principal terms to each other. Substantives corre­
spond to the nouns of traditional grammar, attributives to verbs, definitives to articles, and con­
nectives to conjunctions.
Harris gives an account of different views as regards the number of the parts of speech. 
The Platonic division of speech into only two parts,4 followed by Aristotle in De Interpreta­
tio n ,5 aimed to define a perfect assertive proposition; such a survey is confined within logic 
and dialectic. A universal grammar, according to Harris, should rather follow the tradition der­
iving from the Poetics, where, apart from the noun and the verb, article and conjunction are 
admitted as separate parts of speech. It was in the spirit of the Poetics, that the Stoics and the 
Latin grammarians took on the semantic resolution of the parts of speech, by suggesting further 
subdivisions of them. This last point made by Harris, accounts for the fact that universal gram­
mar is not confined within a propositional interpretation of the semantic scope of language, but 
functions also within a more comprehensive philosophical realm.
The substantive terms
Substantive words signify substances, either natural, artificial, or abstract.6 They are also 
classified in respect of the substantial nature they denote, namely the genus, the species, and 
the particular individuals. Seen in the material perspective of a universal grammar, they are
2 : ’'Eti, ov xpojtov xcov oxoixeuov xa pev eoxi cjxovqEvxa, a  Kai Ka0’ eauxa cjxovqv ajtoxeXeT. Ta 6e 
aopcfwova, ajiep aveu xcov cjxovqevxcov ovk exei prycrjv xqv ek^kovtictlv. Tov auxov xporcov eoxlv eji! 
vorjaai icd Jti xcov Xe£ecov. Al p£v yap adxcov, xpojtov xiva xcov cJxovqEvxcov, prjxal eIcti. KaBajtEp 
EJti xcov pripaxcov, ovopaxcov, avxcovopicov, EJtippripdxcov. Al 6e, cooxepeI cnjpcjxova, dvapEvooai xa 
cf)covqEvxa, od SovapEva lcax’ Iblav prjxd Elvai. KaBajtEp eju xcov jtpo0EO£cov, xcov apOpcov, xcov 
cxuvbEcrpcov. xa yap xoiauxa cxeI xcov poplcov acrucjoT^ palvEL.: Harris, 1786, p. 28. In support of the 
above distinction, there is also cited an extract from Priscian: “Itaque quibusdam philosophis placuit nomen et 
verbum solas esse partes orationis; caetera vero, adminicula vel juncturas earum; quomodo navium partes sunt 
tabulae et trabes, caetera autem (id est, cera, stuppa, et clavi et similta) vincula et conglutinationes partium navis 
(hoc est, tabularum et trabium) non partes navis dicuntur” (: from book 11, quoted ibid. p. 29).
3 Nov pev oov Eipr]xai, xt jiox’ eoxlv r] odala, oxi xo pi] K a0’ djioKEipevoo, aXXa tea©’ oi5 xa 
aXka.: ...substance is not that which is predicated of a subject, but that of which the other things are predicated: 
Metaphysics, 7.3.1029a8-9; also ibid.,, 6.3.1029al5-16: ...xo yap jiooov ovk odala, aXXa paXXov 
onapxEi xaOxa jcpcpxco, ekeivo eoxlv odala: quantity is not a substance, but rather the substance is that to 
which these affections primarily belong.
4 Sophist, 261c6-262e2.
5 De Interpretatione, chapters 2 and 3.
6 Abstract substances are said to derive from the transformation of attributes into substances, e.g. whiteness.
2 9
divided into those of a primary and secondary order. The first class includes words denoting 
substances by naming them, while the latter are substitute words which stand in the place of the 
proper substantives.
The substantives of first order
Number and gender are, according to Harris, the two features of the substantive words, as 
these two are the attributes of natural substances. Since, in the realm of substances, only genus
and species denote plurality, general and special substantives only, admit of the plural number.2
The fourfold distinction of the substantial nature in terms of gender, is regarded as having 
its parallel in language, although there is not a special gender for the hermaphrodites,8 despite 
the fact that in many languages there is no grammatical denotation of gender.9 Harris tries to 
prove that the distinction of gender in the substantives of almost any language, has its prerequi­
site in nature. An error results from the incorporation of God in the category of substances 
which naturally carry the distinction of gender. This becomes almost resolved later, when the 
neuter comprehensive abstract noun of deity is introduced for the description of God,19 The 
end of Harris’ proof rests on more solid ground when he distinguishes between the logical 
style of discourse, which does not admit of gender, and the rhetorical one,11 which accounts 
for the personification, different in each language, of abstract nouns. But the most persuasive 
ground for the distinction in gender of the substantives is to be found in the discussion of per­
sonal pronouns:
But though all these pronouns have number, it does not appear either in Greek or Latin, or any 
modern language, that those of the first and second person carry the distinction of sex. The reason 
seems to be that the speaker and hearer being generally present to each other, it would have been 
superfluous to have marked a distinction by art, which from nature and even dress was commonly 
apparent on both sides. But this does not hold with respect to the third person, of whose character 
and distinctions, (including sex among the rest) we often know no more, than what we learn from 
the discourse. And hence it is that in most languages the third person has its genders, and that even 
English (which allows its adjectives no gender at all) has in this pronoun the triple distinction of 
he, she, and it.12
7 Particular names which are in plural, are actually of a special character, either when denoting a smaller sort of 
species (e.g. Marki Antonii), or in the meaning of some eminence attributed, as when the name becomes a com­
mon appellative.
8 The neuter gender was called from Protagoras cnceijos (:Aristotle, Rhetoric, 3.5), while later it was defined as 
t o  p e t o £ u .
9 Harris regards the lack of grammatical mark of gender in the English language as denoting the neuter.
10 Harris states that the grammatical genus is defined only in reference to its opposite (he also quotes from 
Ammonius on this).
11 Since the common use of language is not of a special concern for the universal grammar, the distinction 
between logical and rhetorical style stands as a differentiation between philosophical and literary uses of lan­
guage.
12 Harris, 1786, p. 69-70.
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The meaning of this extract is that substantives, either primary or secondary, carry an essential 
distinction of gender, that this distinction is a semantic one, and that only its appearance varies 
from language to language.
The substantives of secondary order
The discussion of the secondary substantives opens with the distinction between objects of 
first and second knowledge and acquaintance.13 Substances are differentiated in discourse in 
accordance with the way we refer to them. This mode of reference may be either demonstrative, 
or relative.14 When we refer to a substance in the demonstrative way, we treat it as an object of 
first knowledge and we apply its name. The substantives of secondary order are words which 
refer to a substance without denominating it. They have no determined meaning, they cannot be 
significant when standing separately in speech, but they adopt each time a different meaning, in 
accordance with the word to which they are related in the sentence.
Personal pronouns are the first class of secondary substantives treated: they do not stand 
just in the place of the noun referring to a substance, but more strictly they substitute the sub­
stance’s proper name15 in discourse.16 Since the substantive words participating in the forma­
tion of discourse are distinct from each other,17 the distinction between the three persons of the 
pronoun, enables one specify which is the primary substantive implied by the secondary one. 
Therefore, the distinction of person is one of the mandatory properties of the pronoun.
The second essential property of a pronoun is the distinction of number, while a third one is 
the distinction of gender. This last is not rejected by the grammatical portrayal of gender only in 
the third person. It is just that there are different semantic parameters in discourse, as denoted 
by each one of the persons:
...an I to the first, and a thou to the second, are abundantly sufficient to all the purposes of 
speech. But it is not so with respect to the third person. The various relations of the various 
objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and distant, present and absent, same and differ­
ent, definite and indefinite, etc.) made it necessary that here there should not be one, but many pro­
nouns, such as he, this, that, other, any, some, etc.^%
13 Introduced by Apollonius in several parts of his work On Syntax.
14 “Interest autem inter demonstrationem et relationem hoc; quod demonstratio, interrogationi reddita, primam 
cognitionem ostendit; quis fecit? Ego. Relatio vero secundam cognitionem significat, ut, is, de quo jam dixi”, 
Priscian, book 8, quoted in Harris, 1786, p. 64-65. The relative character of the personal pronoun was defined by 
Apollonius, in book 2 ch. 5, as to fiexd 6ei£eo>s rf dva<|>opds dvrovopa^opevov.
15 “Pronomen est pars orationis, quae pro nomine proprio uniuscujusque accipatur”, Priscian, book 12, quoted in 
Harris, 1786, p. 65.
16 “For though the first and second [persons] be as commonly described, one the speaker, the other the party 
addressed; yet till they become subjects of the discourse, they have no existence. Again as to the third person’s 
being the subject, this is a character, which it shares in common with both the other persons, and which can 
never therefore be called a peculiarity of its own”: ibid. p.67-68. In support of this view, Harris quotes from 
Priscian and Gaza.
17 because the substances denoted are distinct.
18 Ibid., pp. 71-72.
Pronouns stand as secondary substantives only when they substitute the primary ones, and 
not when they stand before a noun, adopting an adjectival character. In this case, they are not
substantives, but definitives (or articles ).19
The point is that the pronoun as treated here is not an accessory word;20 pronouns as both sub­
stantives and pronominal articles, function in a mode of relation; but this mode is different in 
each case. In primary terms, we have signification in a mode of substitution, and the pronoun 
offered is an alternative wording in reference to the name of a substance. This reference is in a 
mode of reminiscence, so that at least one more sentence, apart from that given, is involved. In 
the accessory terms, we have consignification in the mode of grammatical juxtaposition. The 
pronoun, functioning as a definitive, modifies the meaning of the substantial term within the 
limits of the same sentence.
Another property of the substantive pronouns refers to the mode of coalescence between the 
persons, either those of the personal type with each other, or those of the personal with those 
of the demonstrative type. The first and the second person of the personal pronoun coordinates 
only with a pronoun of the third person (either personal or demonstrative). Obviously, this 
stands in respect of the distinction among substantial natures, and the only one perhaps which 
would not comply with such a rule is the substance of the higher and most comprehensive 
order.
An additional observation on the personal pronoun refers to the difference in the mode in 
which each one of its persons signifies the primary substantive:
It may be observed too, that even in epistolary correspondence, and indeed in all kinds of writing, 
where the pronoun I and you make their appearance, there is a sort of implied presence, which they 
are supposed to indicate, though the parties are in fact at ever so great a distance. And hence the rise 
of that distinction in Apollonius, T a g  p e v  r r fg  o ty e ro g  e l v a i  d e i f e i g ,  r a g  b e  r o v  v o v ,  that 
some indications are ocular, and some are mental.21
The last diversity in function in the persons of the personal pronoun is to be found mainly 
in the Greek language. The case concerns juxtaposed propositions which are related by their 
pronominal predicational terms (e.g. That is, I  also will be a soldier.). This relation is in the 
mode of contradistinction. According to whether there is an emphasis in the opposition among 
the pronominal terms, the result is a semantic variation of the personal pronoun between its 
enclitic (the Greek poi) and its contradistinctive function (the Greek epoi 6e).22
The variation in function of the demonstrative pronoun motivates an additional classifica­
tion: a pronoun may function as having i) a prepositive, ii) a subjunctive, or iii) a pronominal
19 The remark is based on Apollonius: To ap0po pexd ovopaxoc;, Kai ij avxcovvpia dvx* ovopaxoc; (: On 
Syntax, 1.3): “the article stands with a noun; but the pronoun stands for a noun”: quoted ibid., p. 73.
20 the character of which is defined as consignificative by a relation of position.
21 Ibid., p. 77. The citation from Apollonius is from On Syntax, 2.3.
22 The distinction between opBoxovoopevai and bpckixiKeg dvxcovvptes had its function mostly in the Greek 
language, and thus they were considered by Apollonius as different types of the personal pronoun. Harris under­
stands that since English has not separate morphemes to mark the contradistinctive pronoun, the whole distinc­
tion falls rather within the limits of a variation in accent.
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character. The prepositive works within a simple proposition. Its capability to act as the subject 
of a simple proposition indicates that it retains the character of a substantive word incontrovert- 
ibly (e.g. He is ill). The pronominal one stands as a modifier of the primary substantive, with 
which it is juxtaposed (e.g. That man defrauded me). The subjunctive has a compound 
nature:23 it compines the function of a secondary substantive with that of a connective (e.g. 
Light is a body, which moves with great celerity). Grammatically, subjunctive pronouns intro­
duce relative clauses, namely the demonstrative and the relative ones. On this occasion, the pro­
noun connects the proposition in which it stands as a subject, to the proposition in which the 
primary substantive denoted subsists. This function is in the subjunctive mode, as the pronoun 
subjoins a whole proposition to a term of another. Thus, while the prepositive pronoun stands 
as a substitute of a propositional nominal term, the subjunctive presents a whole proposition 
(the relative clause) as the substitute of this term:
Hence we see why the pronoun here mentioned is always necessarily the part of some complex sen­
tence, which contains, either expressed or understood, two verbs, and two nominatives.24
The sources for this subjunctive function of the pronoun are to be traced in Apollonius, 
Gaza, and Scaliger. Harris quotes from the fourth chapter of On Syntax, where Apollonius 
rejects the pronominal function of the subjunctive pronoun:
The subjunctive article (that is the pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a verb of its own, and 
yet is connected withal to the antecedent noun. Hence it can never serve to constitute a simple sen­
tence, by reason of the syntax of the two verbs, I mean that which respects the noun or antecedent, 
and that which respects the article or relative. The same too follows as to the conjunction and.
This copulative assumes the antecedent noun, which is capable of being applied to many subjects, 
and by connecting to it a new sentence, o f necessity assumes a new verb also.25
By considering the employment of the subjunctive pronoun as universal,26 Harris indicates its 
general character as seen in function. The universal is the mode in which the pronoun subjoins 
the proposition it introduces, to another one. But the proposition of a relative clause is not 
necessarily the essential definition of a primary subject, as it may or may not give the essential 
properties of it. Thus we have to distinguish here between two different types in the mode of 
signifying: the accidental and the demonstrative on e.27 In the first, the pronoun introduces a 
proposition which bears the accidental attributes of a primary subject in terms of time and place
23 Ibid., p. 81.
24 Ibid., p. 80.
25: To ojtotcacxiKov apBpov ejti prfpa ibiov ^epexai, oxrvSeSefievov 61a  xrfs dva<}>opdis xqj jtpoKEipevtp 
ovopaxi. Kat evxetjBev djtXo\5v Xoyov oo5 JtapioxavEi Kaxa xrjv xcov Stio fhpidxcov ow ta^ iv  {X&yco 
xrjv ev xcp ovopaxi Kai xrjv ev adxql xqj apBpq)} o'jtEp jrakiv jrapEutEXo xqj Kai auvSEapcp. Koivov 
|xev jrapEXdpflavE xo dvopa xo jrpoKEipEvov, crOpjtXEKov 6e EXEpov Xoyov Jiavxco? Kai EXEpov prjpa 
jtapEXapPavE..
26 ibid., p. 81-82.
27 The terms here used are borrowed from Thomas of Erfurt’s Grammatica Speculativa, Longman, 1972. Harris, 
actually, does not go so far as to describe this distinction in the mode of relation.
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(e.g. the man who approached us was John), while in the second, it introduces a proposition as 
a definition of the subject signified by a primary substantive, namely as a universal (e.g. a tea­
cher is a man who has sufficient knowledge o f grammar). It is this last function of the subjunc­
tive pronoun which Harris refers to, when saying that
The application of this subjunctive, like the other pronoun [namely, the personal ones], is univer­
sal. It may be the substitute of all kinds of substantives, natural, artificial, or abstract; as well as 
general, special, or particular... Nay, it may even be the substitute of all the other pronouns, and is 
of course expressive of all three persons.2*
The attributive terms
Attributives are the principal terms denoting not only attributes, but also those functioning 
as nominal substitutes of attributes. Such a description indicates the attributive character of 
verbs, adjectives, and participles, in the sense that these grammatical classes can stand as the 
predicate in a proposition.
Every articulate sound, that forms the predicate in a proposition, is called a verb.29
On this definition of the verb, given by Ammonius, Harris assigns the common predicational 
function of the adjective and the verb.30 This function was specified more accurately by Pris­
cian, as a common semantic property irrelevant to the grammatical declinability of the terms:
We must disclose not the declension, but the propriety of signification of the names... It is not the 
similarity in inflection that associates the parts of speech with each other or distinguishes them, 
but their significative power.31
The first property of the attributive term (the predicational one), is that it denotes the exis­
tence of the attribute ascribed to a substance. This becomes evident, either by the single applica­
tion of the auxiliary verb (e.g. He eats his food), or, in the case of a common verb, by its reso­
lution into the auxiliary verb and a complement (e.g. He is eating his food). This observation is 
based on Metaphysics, 5.7.1017a8-9 &27-30. The distinction in wording between proposi­
tions in which being is directly expressed, and propositions in which being is stipulated by 
implication, lies in the remark made by Aristotle, that
28 Harris, 1786, p. 81-82.
29 I ld a a  (Jxovrjv, KaxT]Yopoi3|Lievov opov e v  jtpoxaaEi Jtouyuaav, prjpa KaXEiaBai., quoted in Harris, 
1786, p. 87.
30 “...Ammonius is explaining the reason, why Aristotle in his tract De Interpretation [16a.l5] calls Tevkoc, a 
verb”.
31 Non declinatio, sed proprietas excutienda est significationis... Non similitudo declinationis omnino conjungit
vel discemit partes orationis inter se, sed vis ipsius significationis. The sentences quoted are respectively from
the second and the thirteenth chapters of Priscian’s work.
34
Being is expressed either in the mode of its accidental properties, or by the application of its essen­
tial name... And there is no difference between the man is recovering and the man recovers, nor
between the man is walking or cutting and the man walks or cuts.32
The first differentiation is between the absolute existence of the propositional subject, denoted 
by the single application of the copula, and the qualified one, when the copula ascribes to the 
subject a complement. It is a distinction between a simple affirmation of the subject by the 
application only of the substantive verb, and the act of predicating of the subject a certain attri­
bute.
A further distinction in the function of the substantive verb refers to the mode of predication 
in accordance with the parameter of time. An attribute may by predicated to a substance as ever­
lasting, or not. When, for example, the attributive stands for the definition of the substance, 
which is a universal, the proposition stands as a general axiomatic truth. The necessity of it is 
invariable, since its truth accepts no differentiation in time; thus the proposition becomes the 
ground on which demonstrative knowledge is built up. On the other hand, the substantive verb 
may predicate an attribute of a subject, which is ascribed to it not permanently, but accidentally 
(e.g. George is running), so that the validity of the proposition is dependent upon a time refer­
ence. Thus the function of the substantive verb in relation to its differentiated time reference is 
revealed in the present tense: it discloses the differentiation between propositions of general and 
those of particular validity. The source Harris bases his remarks on, is Boethius’ comments on 
Aristotle’s De Interpretatione.33 The distinction between two types of syncategorematic func­
tion of the substantive verb, presented in the Aristotelian terminology, manifests the distinction 
between 6o£a and ejticmjpTi, as a result of the difference in status between propositions the 
truth of which happens to be the case, and those of which it is (or is held to be) always the 
case.
The common attributive terms
Verbs, participles, and adjectives are considered the common attributive terms. The prime 
distinction introduced here refers to the mode in which the attribute is associated with the sub­
stantive.
There are cases where the attributive (an adjective, or a participle) is just juxtaposed next to 
a substantive, without a denotation of semantic coalescence between them. In this case, the two
32 To o v  keyexai t o  p ev  K a r a  CTup|3e{Iipc6s, t o  6e K a0’ a u r o ... O u06v y a p  5icuj)Epci t o  dvOpcajro? 
vyiaivcDv e o r iv  f (  t o  avOpam og vyia'ivei, ovbe t o  avOpcojto? flaSi^w v eotiv f f  TEpvwv t o \5  dvO pam x;
PaS'l^El f[ TEfiVEL..
33 “Cum enim dicimus Deus est non eum dicimus nunc esse, sed tantum in substantia esse, ut hoc ad immuta- 
bilitatem potius substantiae, quam ad tempus aliquod referatur. Si autem dicimus dies est, ad nullam diei sub- 
stantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc enim, quod significat, tale est, tanquam si dica- 
mus nunc est. Quare cum dicimus esse, ut substantiam designemus, simpliciter est addimus; cum vero ita ut 
aliquid praesens significetur, secundum tempus”: quoted ibid., p.92.
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terras form an imperfect sentence, nothing more than an expression of juxtaposed utterances. 
On the other hand, the attributive may coalesce with the substantive, forming a perfect assertive 
sentenced  either when it has the grammatical form of a common verb, or when it is denoted 
by a complement (an adjective or a participle) predicated of the subject by the support of the 
substantive verb. The source of this distinction is in Categories, 2.1al6-19:
Of the things expressed, some are expressed in a semantic combination with each other (like man 
runs, man wins), and others are not (like man, ox, runs, wins).35
Thus the foremost feature of an attributive term is its being predicated of the subject, denoting 
both the attribute and an assertion.
The second distinction of the attributives focuses on their semantic diversity. Adjectives 
signify the quality, or quantity, which is predicated of a subject. Verbs and participles signify 
motion, or privation of motion. Consequently, the next distinction is between adjectives, on the 
one hand, and verbs and participles on the other: the latter consignify time,36 while adjectives 
lack this time-reference.
What is noteworthy here37 is that Harris seems to modify deliberately the Aristotelian defi­
nition of the verb. In De Interpretatione, 3.16b6-8, Aristotle says that
Verb is a sound which has an additional signification, this of time; no part of the verb has mean­
ing if taken separately; the verb always represents something asserted of something else.38
The meaning of 7tpoaar)fJLaZvov is explained in 3.16b25-26: it indicates a synthesis which 
is difficult to comprehend if the verb is taken separately from the other words.39 Harris explains 
the term as “over and above... its principal signification, which is to denote some moving and 
energising attribute”.40 This wording is proper in respect to the literal translation of Jtpdg, but 
is not what Aristotle meant. For him, ovvdeoLg is a well-formed crvpjzXoKrj: a semantic com­
position made out of well-coordinated and harmonised parts; therefore, the consignification of 
time is to be considered as primary in comparison to the syntactic structure of the sentence, and 
not to its predicational signification. By reversing the semantic levels, Harris tries to make the
34 The distinction between perfect and imperfect sentences is an attempt by Harris to translate the Boethian 
terms orationesperfectae et imperfectae. This is in accordance with the Aristotelian koyos, and also in accordance 
with the definition of the sentence given in Poetics 20, and in De Interpretatione 3, which Harris follows in 
Hermes, 1.2. But actually it is doubtful whether an imperfect sentence is a sentence at all (on this, see Nuchel- 
mans, Gabriel, 1973, p. 125).
35 Tcov keyopEvcov xa pfev Kara avpjikoK ilv keyexai, xa 6’ cxvev aupjtkoKrjs. T a  pev o v v  Kaxa av[l 
jtkoicfjv otov avGpamos, xpexsi, avGpcmos vuca, xa 6’ ovev  cnjpjtkoKf^ otov avGpawtos, floik, xpfcxEL, 
vikoL
36 by the fact that they are applied in a specific tense.
37 Harris, 1786, p. 96.
38 'P fjpa be eox l xo Jipoacrnpatvov xP°vov> pepo? o v b z v  aripaivEi x^pu;, Kai eoxlv  cxei xcov
KaG’ EXEpoU kEyopeVCOV OT]p£LOV.
39 ...JipoaaT]paivEi 8e ovvGectiv x iva , rfv oveu xcov cnrpcEipEVcov ovk eoxl vo fjaa i.
40 By principal signification is meant the grammatical one; if it were to be taken semantically, a principal sig­
nification having something else above, is not yet principal.
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universal aspect of the semantic function more obvious. He seems to have in mind the signif­
ication ad secundum tempus, mentioned above by Boethius. But the truth is that Jtpooorpial 
vet is closer to the syncategorematic sense of the Stoic ovoorjpalvEL, which denotes the act 
of consignifying.
Harris understands that there is no ground for an argument supporting the consignificative 
power of the attributive as primary. As for the consignification of time, he reverts things into 
their proper order:
because the same time may be denoted by different verbs, . . .and different times by the same verb 
...neither of which could happen, were time any thing more, than a mere concomitant. Add to this, 
that when words denote time, not collaterally, but principally, they cease to be verbs, and become 
either adjectives,41 or substantives,42
Time is the second attribute (after motion), consignified by the verb. The distinction between 
past, present, and future tenses, as also the one following the different grammatical species of 
each one of them, results from this consignificative power.
The tenses of the verb
In common grammar the classification of tenses follows a relative perception of time. In a 
statement, the necessity of truth, yielding to the modes of scepticism of our knowledge, is 
restricted to what is believed to be certain; and thus a relative time reference, expressed by the 
tense of the verb, comforms with the relative necessity of the predicational act. But universal 
grammar is interested not simply in certain truths, but in truths which are necessary. For the 
grammarian of universals relativity in time refers to predicational acts which are directed to phy­
sical objects (the matter of the world) and not to the necessary truth of a tenseless formal sub­
stance.
The fundamental question focuses on the time reference in relation to the mode of predica­
ting: how can time be both continuous and relative? Duration in time is essential, because it is 
one of the foundation stones on which universal propositions base their truth.43 Contrary to 
this, the relative character of time refers to the way we perceive it, and that seems inconsistent 
with a universal application of reasoning. The contradiction between the omnipresent and the 
instantaneous present is focused in the linguistic employment of the present tense, and it is dis­
missed by a differentiation between that which exists and the instant. Time, which is divisible, 
does not exist; otherwise, it would be an essential attribute of God, and thus his reality would
41 Such as timely, yearly, daily.
42 Such as time, year, day. The quotation ibid., p. 97.
43 Thus Aristotle in Prior Analytics,!. 15.34b7-12 says: Ael 6e kapPdveiv to  novel dndpxeiv pq k o to  
vov oplaavras, oTov vuv q ev xcpde xcji xpdvcp, dkk’ dnXcix;. did toiootcdv ydp npoxaaecov Kai xoos 
ookkoyiapooc; noioopev, enei Kaxd ye to  vov ^apflavopEvqc; xfj? npoxdaew? ook eoxai ookkoyid 
pot;: we have to consider the universal not as defined in respect of time, either of the present moment or in any 
wider sense of presence, but simply as defined. Because we construct our propositions of such premises; if the 
premise were to be defined in time, there could be no syllogism.
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be divisible, something rejected by the rationalists. Thus the problem consists only in the dou­
ble semantic function of the present tense. Harris devotes twenty pages to explain this relative 
character of time reference, until he reaches the same conclusion by using a quotation from 
Nicephorus Blemmides:
Present time therefore is that which adjoins to the real now or instant on either side, being a limi­
ted time made up of past and future, and from its vicinity to the real now said to be now also 
itself44
The main point of Harris’ survey45 is twofold: 
i) the common grammatical order of past, present, and future tense, is a resolution of time 
reference, in respect only of the specific instance in which the verb functions. In this case, the 
predicational act is valid, and what is inferred by it is true, only for as much time as the essen­
tial mode of predication and the accidental consignification of time are identical with each other.
ii) a different order, that of present, past, and future, is a more qualified semantic resolution 
of time reference; it reflects the order in which we perceive and form the knowledge of things: 
experience of the present things, memory of the past, and analogical reasoning for the future. 
The description of future here is based on the third chapter of Aristotle’s DeAnima, and on a 
quotation from Scaliger’s De Causa Linguae Latinae:
However, the order of the tenses is in its function different from their nature. For what has passed, 
is prior to what is now; it seemed that priority should be given in accordance with this reason. 
However, what is offered to us in the present, this creates the first impressions in our mind; for 
this reason the present tense occupies the first place; for it is common to all animals. But the past 
is offered only to those yielding to memory, and the future to those, which are even fewer, who 
have the privilege of wisdom.46
The criterion for the distinction among the tenses is whether there is a denotation of definiti­
veness or not, and also the variety of it. Harris accepts the following scheme:47
a) Aorist of the present: I  write.
b) Aorist of the past: I  wrote.
44 ’E v eo t o *s o u v  x p o v o s  eoxlv o e<J)’ EKdxepa JtapaKElpevos xcj) Kup'uo^  vuv. Xpovos [XEpiKtSc;, e k  
£>a]}a)06xos Kai pekkovxos cju v eo x c o s , Kai 6 ia  xrjv Jtpo  ^ xo Kupiaxj vuv yEixvlaaiv, vuv kEyopEvog 
Kai auxoc;:from the’Exuzopri OvcnKrfg, G.iE.p. 1107, quoted in Harris, 1786, p. 119.
45 which is full of references on Aristotle and his commentators.
46 “Ordo autem (temporum scilicet) aliter est, quam natura eorum. Quod enim praeteriit, prius est, quam quod 
est, itaque primo loco debere poni videbatur. Verum, quod primo quoque tempore offertur nobis, id creat primas 
species in animo; quamobrem praesens tempus primum locum occupavit; est enim commune omnibus animali- 
bus. Praeteritum autem iis tantum, quae memoria praedita sunt. Futurum vero etiam paucioribus, quippe quibus 
datum est prudentiae officium.” The quotation is from ibid., p. 139.
47 Harris’ classification of tenses was prevalent during the middle decades of the eighteenth century. Grammati­
cally, his comments on the verb, as also those on the article, contributed towards an eclectic semantic approach 
to the parts of speech. For more, see Michael, 1970, p. 423 & 356. In strictly grammatical terms, his universal 
grammar aimed at a better control over the [vernacular] language, for better descriptive and analytical procedures: 
ibid., p. 514.
3 8
c) Aorist of the future:/ shall write.
d) Inceptive present: I  am going to write.
e) Middle or extended present: I  am writing.
f) Completive present: I  have written.
g) Inceptive past:/ was begining to write.
h) Middle or extended past:/ was writing.
i) Completive past: I  had done writing.
j )  Inceptive future: I  shall be beginning to write. 
k) Middle or extended future: /  shall be writing.
1) Completive future: I  shall have done writing.
In the first three tenses, the consignification of time is comprehensive and indiscriminate; in the 
second triad only the commencement of the action implied by the verb is definite; in the third 
triad the time reference appears to be mediative and interposing, and in the last triad it consigni- 
fies a completion. The aorist of the future suits perfectly gnomic expressions and legislative 
statements. Harris distinguishes conclusively the three types of the aorist from all the other spe­
cies of tenses. He calls the major characteristic of this species indefitiveness, but what he has in 
mind is that this is the group of tenses suggested to an attribute in order to be essentially predi­
cated of a subject-especially the aorist of the present, which has the most time-extensive signif­
ication. This last is the most appropriate for predicational acts which ascribe an attribute to the 
eternal substance 4s Compared to this, the remaining species of tenses seem “nearly to approach 
a perfect non-entity”. This observation derives from Aristotle’s remark that...x6 & ek p/fj 
ovToiv cruyKEipevov, db'uvaxov av S6£eie xaxE/eiv jtoxe ovoiaq,,4? as it was further 
elaborated by Philoponus, in his work commenting on the Introduction to Arithmetic of Nico- 
machus:
How therefore is it that they approach nearly to non-entity? In the first place, because here (where 
they exist) exists the past and the future, and these are non-entities. For the one is vanished, and is 
no more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural substances pass away along with time, or rather it
is upon their motion that time is an attendant.50
The specific time allusion in the remaining species of tenses does not suit the universal predica-
48 It is exactly in this spirit that the Stoics had called the present tense, seen in its common function, imper­
fect present. Harris quotes from Priscian on this, Harris, 1751, pp. 130-131.
49 De Partibus Animalium, 4.14: “...Now that which is made up of nothing but non-entities, it should seem 
was impossible ever to participate of entity”: quoted ibid., p. 106.
50 : ncos be xolc; pq odcn yEiTvid^Ei; npcorov p&v, ejteibrj evrouOa to JtapekGov eotl Kai to peTkov, 
TaOra be pq ovra. To piv yap q^dviarat Kai ook eti eotl, to be oxmci eotl. SopjtapaOEEi 56 Tip 
Xpovca Ta (JroaLKd Jiavra, pakkov 56 xrjs KivqaEto? airrcov JtapaKokaOOqpd eotl o xpdvo^.: ibid., in 
p. 106 and 431.
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tional act, but it is a consignification complying with predicating in the modus accidentalis. 
Consequently, these tenses are not examined in full detail.
There are two modes of time reference denoted by the completive present. The mode of the 
time in which the attribute is predicated of the subject is present. At the same time, there is an 
additional connotation of time (past) relating to the time of the completion of the act signified by 
the verb. Harris denominates them contrarily, although he recognises their complementary char­
acter.51 The contrariety subsists between the sense of completion and the diversity amidst the 
two different semantic levels in which the predicational act of the verb may be resolved.52 The 
origin of such a distinction is in De Interpretatione, 1.16al3-14. and 1.17al-3:
Truth and falsity subsist in combination and separation ... every sentence has a meaning ...but the 
proposition is that in which truth or falsity subsists 53
The conclusion to be deduced is that, in propositional terms, the meaning of the attributive is 
not an aggregate of the semantics of its grammatical parts.
Finally, the middle and the completive past tenses may coalesce in the same way. This is to 
show an extension of time, and to express either a frequency in repeating an action or 
modesty.54
The Modes
The relation between the substantive and the attributive accomplished by the verb, reflects 
the mental union of the substance with the attribute. The mood of the verb illustrates the manner 
in which the attributive term is assigned to the subject of the proposition. Since a verbal propo­
sition is significant of a mental one, it is obvious that the grammatical mood of the verb reflects 
the manner in which the attribute is related to the substance.55 Thus, in the Aristotelian termino­
logy, the mood reflects either a perception, or a volition of our soul.
Harris presents a resolution of the different semantic manners in which the verb functions. 
His whole effort is an attempt to identify the species of the grammatical behaviour of the verb 
with the figures in which an attribute is predicated of a subject. That is why he introduces two 
classifications. The fundamental analysis reflects the grammatical variations of the verb known
51 “The completion of one contrary is put for the commencement of the other, and to say has lived or has been 
has the same meaning with is dead or is no more.
52 For example, in the English present perfect, the auxiliary verb and its accompanying past participle in the 
sentence he has died seem respectively to affirm and deny the same thing.
5 3  JCEpt y a p  c t t j v B e c t l v  K a i  S i a i p E a i v  e o t l  t o  tyE 'C Soc; K a i  t o  a k q 0 6 s ;  . . . e o t l  6 6  k o y o c ;  a n a ?  p i v  
o q p a v r i K o s ,  . . .d j io t J x x v r iK o s  6 6  a d  r t d s ,  a k k ’ e v  $  t o  a k q 0 E d E iv  r f  4 >Ed5 EO0 c a  d j r a p x 61-
54 i.e. the type scribebat of the Latin verb, in the meaning of he used to write, and the Greek tense Jtaparccmcoq 
in examples such as IIoXelkXeuzos ejiolel.
55 “As therefore all these several modes have their foundation in nature, so have certain marks or signs of them
been introduced into languages, that we may be enabled by our discourse to signify them, one to another. And
hence those various modes or moods, of which we find in common grammars so prolix a detail, and which are in
fact no more than so many literal forms, intended to express these natural distinctions”: ibid., p. 145-147.
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as iyKXioeLs,56 and are the following:
a) the declarative or indicative, to assert what we think certain,
b) the potential, for the purposes o f whatever we thing contingent,
c) the interrogative, to procure us information when we are doubtful,
d) the requisitive, to assist us in the gratification o f our volitions, which is resolved into i) 
the imperative, and ii) the precative, or optative, and
e) the infinitive.
The function of these modes is scrutinised in their comparison to each other. The indicative 
is the only mode for predicating truth; as its necessity either derives from nature, from our 
detecting the truth of things, or is based on axioms, this mode is favoured in demonstration and 
all sciences, as also in the predication of metaphysical truth. The indicative mood of the present 
tense of the verb stands as the verbal representation of substances existing either in time or 
eternally.57
A variation of the potential mode is the subjunctive, which refers to complex propositions; 
signifying the final cause, it subjoins the proposition to another of an indicative mode (e.g. He 
says that this may turn against him). It signifies the truth (or falsity) of a proposition by an 
assertion which is dubious and conjectural;58 its potential character is lacking necessity.
The interrogative and the requisitive differ from the first two modes in that in many cases 
they postulate a proposition in response to what they testify.59 They also differ from each other. 
The requisitive does not function in the first person of the singular number, while the interroga­
tive performs in all the singular and plural persons. Whereas the requisitive form may be set in 
anticipation of an action, the interrogative coincides with assertoric propositions, as it always 
asks for an assertive statement in response. This coincidence becomes apparent in that the verbs 
of the interrogative and the assertive sentence are grammatically of the same form, and differ 
only in the addition of a particle, in tone, or in the accent. The actual difference is that the indi­
cative mode of the interrogation lacks the assertion.60 Finally, while the interrogative may func­
tion either in the past, the present, or the future tense, the time reference of the requisitive is 
always the future.6* This unfolds the main distinction between the two modes: the truth in state­
ments of the requisitive grammatical form lacks necessity (e.g. Square the circle, please). In
56 This becomes apparent when Harris states that the species of modes (meaning the grammatical moods of the 
verb) in great measure depend on the species of sentences: ibid., p. 144. Harris also notes that grammatically the 
variation of modes in the verb may be marked either by auxiliary verbs, or by syllables enhancing the verb’s 
time reference.
57 To explain the distinction between these two time-references, Harris quotes an extended extract from Boethius, 
ibid., p.160-161.
58 Ibid., p. 158.
59 Harris also refers here to the case of a question or command refering to things impossible: e.g. is it possible 
to square the circle?).
60 The remark is based on Apollonius, 3.21:"Hye ovv jtpoKEipevri opicrriKirj eyicXiCTts, xf|v eyKEipevqv Kara 
4>acrr]v ajiopdXXooaa, peGioraxai xo\3 koXelaGai -opiotlkt) dvajEX/r|pa)0elaa 6e rff  ^ Kaxcujwxcrecos, on<5 
orpE<j)Ei els to Etvai opioriKTj: “The indicative mode, of which we speak, by laying aside that assertion, 
which by its nature it implies, quits the name of indicative-when it reassumes the assertion, it returns against its 
proper character”: quoted ibid., p. 151.
61 Following the grammatical tradition of Apollonius and Macrobius, Harris differentiates in the imperative 
between two different modes of time: the imperative o f the future is the imperative of the present tense, and 
places the action of the verb in the future; the imperative of the perfectum is formed by the root belonging to 
the past tenses (oKcnpdraj, be gone) and presents the future time-reference as an extension of the present.
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interrogations of past and present tense, by their affinity with the assertoric type of proposition 
required, the truth in question has to be affirmed or denied definitely. Harris, reflecting the dis­
tinction noted by Ammonius between epajvrjpa and Tivopa, distinguishes between simple 
and complex interrogations, namely between interrogations which demand a simple affirmation 
or denial, and interrogations introducing cases ordered in juxtaposition by the disjunctive or, 
and of which only one will be affirmed.
In the second classification, which is a re-naming of the basic grammatical moods, the ter­
minology applied is more consonant with a rational acknowledgment of the distinctions 
between the modes; the infinitive and the optative are here omitted, which means that according 
to Harris these types do not signify directly a volition or affection of the soul. According to this 
classification, the modes of signifying are:
a) the mode o f science, identified with the grammatical indicative mood,
b) the mode o f  conjecture, identified with a type of the subjunctive reffered to above as 
the potential,
c) the mode o f  proficiency, identified with the interrogative mood,
d) the mode o f  legislature, identified with the imperative form of the requisite mood. 
Occasionally, the indicative functions as an extended requisitive form of the imperative; it is the 
case of examples such as Be it therefore enacted, or You shall not kill, where the indicative 
expresses command.
By saying that the application of the infinitive is somewhat singular,62 Harris means that 
this is to be found always in the same mode of signifying action, carrying no distinction of per­
son or number. The infinitive is considered of an indefinite nature,63 in the sense that it does 
not represent any natural distinction. As the propositional subject, it does not signify a sub­
stance, but an action, which may stand as a substantive term and may be attributed a comple­
ment. As a part of an attributive phrase, it coalesces naturally with all verbs. Harris distin­
guishes two types of coalescence between infinitive and verb. If the verb signifies volition (e.g. 
I  desire to live), “the coalescence is so intimate, that the volition is unintelligible, ‘till the action 
be expressed”. In this case the character of the infinitive is complementary, and both terms 
cooperate in forming a single semantic function of the attributive. When the verb signifies 
action (e.g. I  eat for to live), the actions implied by the two terms remain distinct. This is 
because the infinitive stands elliptically in the place of another clause, which denotes the final 
cause. Thus the two terms coincide in that they both are in the same mode of signifying action, 
but are differentiated from each other, in terms of the distinction between the action implied.
Finally, number, person, and gender are excluded from the modes of signification ascribed 
to the attributive. Even when marking the attributive,64 they are considered by Harris as signs 
of the elegance of a language, as they are actually features of the substantive signifying acciden­
tal traits of the substance.
62 Ibid., p. 167.
63'Prffia yevLKoharov andverbum generate according to Ammonius and Priscian respectively.
64 Either the verb, as it was Sanctius’ opinion for the person, or the adjective, which in many languages has 
these three distinctions.
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The species of verbs
Verbs are classified into different species in terms of the referential parameters of the energy 
they denote. Harris accepts three types of verb as essential to all languages: the active, the pas­
sive and the neuter. In order to explain their differences, he discusses them in respect of their 
differences with the traditional grammatical types of the transitive and the middle verbs.65
The first distinction is between the active (e.g. Cato loves Portia) and the passive form 
(e.g.Portia is loved). It refers to the active or passive character of the substantive standing as 
the propositional subject, or, in other words, to the nominative which denotes the substantive 
term leading the sentence. The second distinction is between neuter and transitive verbs. It is a 
distinction actually between those verbs which can be resolved into the substantive verb and an 
adjectival form of the verb as a complement(e.g. Caesar walks: Caesar is walking), and those 
verbs which are not likewise resolvable, as the substantive term denoted by the attribute is dif­
ferent from the propositional subject (e.g. Caesar meets Cato).
It is interesting to note that Harris considers active verbs which lack the accusative of their 
transitive reference, as functioning in the mode of the neuter verbs (e.g. He doesn’t know how 
to read Homer). Actually, the accusative is omitted because of an ellipsis; but this seems to 
mark a different kind of verbal reference, as the verb “respects the mere energy or affection 
only, and has no regard to the subject, be it this thing or that”.66
Apart from this semantic classification of verbs, there is another one, focusing on their ety­
mological derivation: some verbs derive from adjectives, others from abstract nouns. This clas­
sification does not refer to all verbs, but only to a small number of them, such as equals and 
whitens.
The participle and the adjective
The participle is the term which, without participating in the assertive character of the verb, 
signifies the attribute, and additionally carries a time reference. The adjective signifies the attri­
bute, but lacks the time reference. By the application of the adjective, a certain quality, quantity, 
and/or relation, are attributed to the substance denoted by the subject.
The verbal adjectives are those adjectives out of which a verb of the same grammatical root 
may be formed (as is the case with verbs such as the Greek icrd£(o and the Latin albeo): they 
disclose the mode in which a verb may affirmatively refer to a propositional subject. Harris 
refers also to the type of adjective which derives its substantive character from being the gen­
itive of a substantive in a nominal phrase (e.g. the Socratic philosophy).61
65 In the middle verb, the subject reserves the energy denoted by the verb. “This energy has to the same being a 
double relation, both active and passive”: ibid., p. 175. Harris gives also the Stoic terminology of crupflapa 
ifrov rf crupPapa,, uiapacrupPapa, and jiapaKaxTiYopi^pa, in respect of the predicational act of the middle, 
the neuter, the transitive verb, and the case of predicating between substantive terms which are in the oblique 
case: ibid., pp. 180-181.
66 Ibid., pp. 178-179.
67 The pronoun functions in the same way: e.g. the book of me: my book.
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While, in the case of verbal adjectives, the adjective adopts a specific time-reference, the 
participle, in its adjectival function, does not signify action, and loses its own time-reference. 
With this remark, Harris concludes his comments on the participle. It is remarkable that, since 
he is basing his observation on ancient and not on medieval sources, he does not specify the 
relation verb-participle on the analogy of their common verbal matter and their diversified 
forms. He restricts himself to a few grammatical observations on the deponent verbs of Latin, 
and on the way verb and participle coalesce in English.
Harris rejects the nominal character of adjectives as essential, as it is considered homogen­
eous with the verb, and can never properly denote a substance.68 Finally, the semantic coales­
cence between the species of attributive terms reflects the one between natural species.®
The attributives of secondary order (adverbs)
The adverbs do not predicate attributes of a subject, but they do denote features of its attri­
butive terms. Thus their adverbial character may refer to all attributive terms, i.e. to verbs (e.g. 
He flies around), participles (e.g. He is running quickly), and adjectives (e.g. An admirably tall 
statue), of which all the adverbs are considered natural appendages .70 Adverbs are the modif­
iers of the attributives; they modify their significative power, by annotating an intension or 
remission of the quality or quantity these ascribe to the propositional subject. Thus they pertain 
to comparison and comparative degrees, which consequently are attributed to the verb and the 
subject. When Harris say that no substantive “is susceptible of these comparative degrees”,?i 
he does not mean that these degrees are irrelevant to the propositional subject: no substance 
accepts intension and remission, because comparison is a part not of its essential definition, but 
of its accidental description. 72 That is why he rejects the notion of three comparative degrees. 
This notion is based on Categories, 5.3b33-37:
it seems that substance does not admit being more or less; ...each substance, being such, cannot be 
affirmed to be more or less.
Harris remarks here that “it must be confessed these comparatives, as well the simple 
[positive], as the superlative, seem sometimes to part with their relative nature, and only retain 
their intensive”. 73 The adverb participates in the predicational act only in the mode of a simple 
relation between the signification it introduces and that of the primary attribute. A certain quality 
or quantity determinant of a substance accepts no intension or remission in terms of its defini­
tion even if uttered in the form of an adjective describing the noun of a nominal phrase. And
68 Ibid., p. 190.
69 Ibid., p. 188.
70 Ibid., p. 194. As an appendage of the verb, the adverb is not a component part of it. The verb, within a sim­
ple proposition, cannot signify comparison.
71 Ibid., p. 201.
72 Harris is especially praising Sanctius’ comments on the derived accidental character of comparison, treated in 
Minerva, 5.10 & 5.11.
73 A o k e l  6 e rj oooia (nrj EJtibexeoOai t o  paXXov Kai t o  t^ t t o v . ...aXk’ a n  E K a o n r]  ouaia  t o OO’ o'jtEp 
e o t iv , o\) kEyeTai paXkov Kai ijrrov: Harris, 1786, p. 199.
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since the most appropriate definition is the species and the genus, adverbs do not coalesce with 
attributives which predicate the species and the genus implied by the propositional subject.
The comparative act formed by the addition of the suffix to the positive degree is seen as a 
method of retrenching the adverb, by incorporating its mode of signification into the primary
attributive term.74
Harris admits of the following basic classification of the adverbs: a) adverbs o f discrete 
quantity (such as once, twice), b) adverbs of relation (such as more, equally, proportion­
ally), c) adverbs o f quality (such as honestly, circularly). These represent the fundamental 
forms of semantic modification of the attributive. Since adverbs are the attributives of the attri­
butives, they are actually a subdivision of the general category of terms which signify attribute. 
This means that the adverb does not restrict its field of reference only to the attributive terms of 
the first order (verb, adjective, participle): in terms of the matter-form distinction, it shares the 
same matter with the above three terms, being a variation in utterance of the attributive form:
...it is worthwhile to observe how the same thing, participating in the same essence, assumes differ­
ent grammatical forms from its different relations. For example, suppose it should be asked, how 
honest, honestly, and honesty differ. The answer is, they are in essence the same, but they dif­
fer, in as much as honest is the attributive of a substantive; honestly, of a verb; and honesty , 
being divested o f these its attributive relations, assumes the power of the substantive, so as to stand 
by itself. The adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are common to verbs of every species.75
The essence mentioned here, is the real form of the attribute K a d ’ a v r d v  (per se),16 and it is 
inherent in the above grammatical forms, which are its accidental appearances, and which vary 
from language to language. The affirmation of a common, universal, and omnipresent semantic 
ground of these words, means that we move a step towards knowledge of the real substance 
and its natural union with the attribute.7?
The adverbs o f time constitute a distinction of the time-reference denoted by the tense of a 
verb which signifies motion. They are subdivided into those carrying a simple time consignifi-
74 This, of course, holds also for the adjectives and the participles.
75 Ibid., p. 203.
76 KaG’ aura 6’ oaa  xkapxei t e  e v  tc o  t i  e o t i v ,  ...(rj yap odaia adxcov e k  xodxcov eatl, Kai e v  xcp 
Xoycp xqj XEyovxi xi e o t i v  Evimdpx81)- Kai oaoic; xcov djtapxovxcov adxolg aura e v  xcp Xoycp Ev\xrcdj5 
Xovai xcp xi e o x l  SriXodvxi...: I call these things per se, which exist in the essential nature of a thing (because 
they are components out of which this essential nature subsists, as also essential parts of the utterance descri­
bing this essential nature. I also call per se the attributes existing in this nature, which are elements of its defi­
nition: Posterior Analytics, 1.4.73a34-39. Also in Metaphysics, 4.18.1022a24-35: " Q o t e  Kai t o  Ka0’ auxo 
jtoXXaxcos avayKT] XsyEoGai. e v  [aev  yap Ka0’ auxo t o  xi r\v Elvai EKaoxtp, . . .e v  S e  ooa e v  xcp xi 
e o x l v  'UJtapxei, . . . e x l  S e  e I  e v  adxcp S e S e k x o l  Jtpcpxco ff xcov adxod t l v ' l ,  . . . e t l  od prj e o x l v  aXXo at 
t l o v  . . . e t l  ooa povcp dxapxeL, Kai povov, . . .S lo  t o  KExcopLopEvov Ka0’ adxo: Hence in virtue of 
itself has to have various meanings; it denotes i) the essence of each particular, ii) everything that a definition 
includes, iii) any attribute of a thing received directly in itself or in any of its parts, iv) anything that has no 
other cause, v) everything belonging to a thing alone qua alone; and hence the thing taken as separate is in virtue 
of itself
77 ’E j t e lS o v  yap ex co jxev  dxoSLSovaL Kara xrjv (Jiavtaoiav Jtrpi xcov aupPEpTik o t o v ,  rj jtdvxcov ff xcov
jtXeioxcov, t o t e  Kai JtEpi xrjs odaias E^ opEv X e y e lv  KaXXLoxa: for when we are enabled to expound all the
accidental properties, or most of them, then we become qualified to talk about the essence: De Anima,
1.1.402b21 -25.
4 5
cation (such as afterwards, formerly), and those signifying the manner of motion (such as 
swiftly, hastily). In the first case, the consignification of time is simply coinciding with the 
motion signified by the verb. In the second, the adverb functions as a modifier of the significa­
tion denoted by the verb, showing “an intension or remission peculiar to motion”.78 The 
adverbs o f place specify the signification of verbs which indicate privation of motion. Similarly 
to the classification of adverbs of time, they are divided into those which do not modify the 
meaning of the verb, and simply define a locution (such as there, hence) in a complementary 
mode, and those which act as modifiers of it (e.g. upwards, downwards).
In the first class, of either adverbs o f time, or adverbs or place, the attributive action of the 
adverb and that of the verb coincide in the mode of a simple relation; the adverb here confines 
the semantic time or place reference denoted by the tense, and generally the grammatical form 
of the verb. Contrary to this constraining function, in the second class, an adverb predicates a 
modification of the verb, by indicating a semantic extension of its meaning. The adverbial func­
tion of the preposition, either when keeping the same grammatical form (e.g. He rides about), 
or not, is to be included in this case. Finally, adverbs o f interrogation are held to coalesce with 
the subjunctive function they assume in the form of the relative pronoun. Here again, the same 
grammatical form is being ascribed to two different functions, working in one case in the mode 
of interrogation, and in the other, in the mode of a relation by subjunction. To explain this last 
distinction, Harris comments:
The difference is, that without an interrogation, they [namely, the adverbial and the pronominal 
functions of the expressions here discussed] have reference to a subject which is antecedent, 
definite, and known; with an interrogation, to a subject which is subsequent, indefinite, 
and unknown, and which it is expected that the answer should express and ascertain...79
The grammatical form of the adverb, namely the word taken as a separate utterance in itself, 
and disunited from its variant functions, has a general or multiform nature. This comprehensive 
form of it, in terms of logic, brings forth the mode in which a complement is predicated of a 
subject during a predicational act. But in its universal semantic function, it discloses the capa­
city of language to illustrate the manner in which the essential nature of a real being coalesces 
with its accidental properties. This coalescence refers to the classification of realities in terms of 
the tripartite hierarchy particular- special-general. The Aristotelian categories are the ten types 
in which being can be predicated.80 The adverb, which is the nominal formulation of the mode 
of a predicational act, needs to establish its power to signify the real being in every one of these 
ten ways.81 While a philosopher would prove this simply by the semantic distinction between 
the adverbial species in accordance with the ten Aristotelian categories,82 Harris proves it analo­
78 Harris, 1786, p. 205.
79 Ibid., p. 208.
80 De Anima, 2. 412a.
81 The authoritative source quoted from Harris on this is Gaza: 6io 6ij kcc'i dfxeivov lc k d c ; 6eica x a l xe5v 
EJiipprpxaxcov yiw \ GeaOai eiccava, aoolav, Jtoiov, j i o c j o v , rcp6s or, K.x.k.: therefore, to admit perhaps of 
ten genera of the adverb: from the second part of Gaza’s Introduction to Grammar.
82 Substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and affection. The types of adverbs 
referred up to now are in respect of this classification.
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gically, in respect of the multiformity in derivation of the grammatical form of the adverb:
...adverbs may be derived from almost every part of speech: from prepositions,...from participles, 
and through these from verbs, ...from adjectives, ...from substantives, ...nay even from proper 
names, as when from Socrates we derive Socratically,83
The doctrine of derivation has its root in Varro’s De Causis Linguae Latinae, 6.37,84 and 
refers to the derivation of not just the inflective, but of a great number of grammatical forms, 
from a limited number of primeval words. These primitive grammatical forms are the general 
natures mentioned above : a determined stock of terms denoting the genus, which may compile 
a fundamental dictionary of the matter of a language. The formatted types (both functional spe­
cies and inflective types)85 encountered in a common dictionary are just grammatical variations 
of this material.
A question seems to arise here when considering the word nature. The diverse meaning of 
this word is actually preparing the ground for the philosophical analysis of grammar following 
in the third part of Hermes. The point in question here is this: how these general terms are said 
to be natural, whereas words are said to be set by convention? The question relates to the 
analogy/anomaly controversy.86 For the universal grammarian, the subject discloses the separ­
ate natural level of meanings and syntactic structures; these forms are independent of variation 
of words in general usage, as also from language to language.
Here, we have also to distinguish between two types of derivation: the natural and the 
voluntary. The voluntary derivation depends on the free will of the speaker: it reflects the con­
ventional usage of language, and it accounts for its arbitrary character, as same things are 
uttered in each language in a different grammatical form (wording). The natural derivation 
yields to a natural ratio, traceable by our discursive faculty; it demonstrates a consistency 
amidst the etymological derivation of the grammatical forms in ordinary usage, and a natural 
arrangement of meanings. It is a function corresponding to all languages, and thus it reflects a 
universal regularity, traceable by universal grammar.
83 Harris, 1786, pp. 209-10. It is obvious that adverbs deriving from substantives (such asapishly, leoninely) 
cannot signify comparison, but just manner, or skill. The terms substantives here refers not simply to nouns, 
but to adjectival substantives generally.
84 Primigenia dicuntur verba ut lego, scribo, sto, sedeo et cetera, quae non sunt ab alio quo verbo, sed suas 
habent radices. Contra verba declinata sunt, quae ab alio quo oriuntur, ut ab lego, legis legit, legam et sic indi- 
cem hinc permulta. Quare si quis primigeniorum milium simplicium verborum origines ostenderit, satis dixerit 
de originibus verborum, cum unde nata sint, principia erunt pauca, quae inde nata sint, innumerabilia: Primitive 
are words such as lego, scribo, sto, sedeo, and the others having their own roots and not deriving from some 
other word. Derivative words, on the other hand, are those developing from some other, as from lego, come 
legis, legit, legam, and in the same way from this same word derives a great number of words.Thus if one has 
shown the origins of primitive words, and if these are in number a thousand, at the same time he will have 
revealed the origin of five thousand different words. But if without showing the source of a single primitive word 
he has shown the way in which the rest have developed from primitives, he will have spoken adequately about 
the origins of words, because the primary elements of these words are few and the words which have sprung from 
them are innumerable.
85 These two constitute the two different types of declension: the derived, which is the one here treated, and the 
accidental, the common inflection of nouns and verbs. For more in Breva-Claramonte, 1983, p. 225.
88 For more on this, see Robins, 1951, p. 16.
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The article
The discussion of articles ( articuli, ap0pa) is set out in terms of their coalescence with 
pronouns: together they combine to form the semantic category of accessories, which are 
defined as words “significant by relation”.i An article has no meaning, but is “by nature a defi­
nitive”^ The genuine article, when subsistuting a noun, has always to be associated with an 
adjective or a noun, while the pronoun may sometimes be considered to be functioning as an 
article (or a definitive).3
Articles themselves are distinguished from each other according to their definite or indefi­
nite character: the indefinite is used to indicate our “primary perception” of an object, which 
“lacks of a proper name or its proper name is not known”,4 by referring to its species or genus, 
and is to be used with objects of first knowledge and indication ( jrpwvr] With the defi­
nite article, we refer to objects of “secondary perception”, namely to anything which is known 
and with which we have been familiarised in the past. But actually, both types of article are 
considered to be of a definitive character,6 as they indicate the capacity of specific substantive 
terms to become definite.6 Their definitive character becomes apparent when they refer to a spe­
cies or a genus; in such a case, they both act in order to reduce the unknown by denoting a par­
ticular individual. The precise difference between the two types of the article is, according to 
Harris, that the so called indefinite article “leaves the individual unascertained, whereas the 
definite ascertains the individual also”.7
The main part of Harris’ discussion of the articles is based on Apollonius Dyscolus, from 
whom he quotes several extracts; articles, in their consignificative role as related to other 
words, are of a referential character;8 there is also a semantic coalescence with the attributive 
character of the adjective in the case of a noun which must be further specified.9 But apart from 
this referential role, an article may have a more direct con-significance when, applied to specific 
“common appellatives”, it attributes to them the character of specific proper names (e.g. the 
Philosopher as implying Aristotle).10 As for the use of the article as a mark corresponding to
1 Harris, 1786, p. 31.
2 Ibid., p. 224.
3 The grammatical quotations here are from the works of Apollonius Dyscolus, Priscian, Gaza, Donatus and 
Vossius.
4 Ibid., p. 214.
5 This is based on Apollonius: Ta yap dopioroSak; jiote vooijpeva rj toO apGpoo jtapaGecru; ixrco opid 
pov too  jtpoaojjcoo ayei.: “those things, which are at times understood indefinitely, the addition of the article 
makes to be definite as to their person”, ibid., p.217. Harris makes a point of the similarity in the indefinite sig­
nification between the application of the indefinite article in the singular forms, and the plural forms lacking of 
article. The observation was also made by John Wallis, in his Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae, Oxford 1653, p. 
71: si vero pluribus particularibus (sive speciebus sive individuis) vox generalior applicetur, illud numero plurali 
innuitur...sic men homines, de individuis dici manifestum est; et virtues virtutes, de virtutis vel speciebus vel 
individuis: quoted in Michael, 1970, p. 360.
3 Harris, 1786, p.225.
7 Ibid., p.217.
8 : ibuopa dva<t»opaig, according to Apollonius.
9 “It is with reason therefore that the article is here also added, as it brings the adjective to an individuality, as 
precise, as the proper name”: ibid., p. 222 (: it is a translation of Apollonius from Harris.
10 “...to presume a kind of general and universal notoriety”: ibid., p.223.
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the grammatical genus of a proper name, Harris, probably having in mind that this is not of 
universal applicability, seems to consider it rather a sign of pleonasm.11
It seems that the syntactic operation of the articles upon adjectives, number words, or 
nouns, must be in accordance with certain rules referring to the semantic compatibility and coa­
lescence of the words joined together; a number word or an adjective should never be unde­
fined  (: unassociated by an article) when applied to a defined (by the application of an article) 
noun. Interrogatives also do not need the support of an article, since the object of their refer­
ence, either in itself or its attributes (quantity or quality) is unknown, and we cannot define that 
of which we are ignorant. In the construction of propositions, Harris points to a difference 
between the Greek and the English language: while in the first the article serves to define the 
subject and to distinguish it from the predicate (e.g. elvai vtjv rjdovijv ayadov), in the sec­
ond it enhances the force and efficacy of the noun (e.g. Those are the men)A2 Harris conceives 
the nature and function of the article15 in terms of three parameters:
a) an act of reduction of the meaning of nouns, where the meaning descends grammatic­
ally from the realm of genus and species to that of individuals, and is a feature of both the defi­
nite and the indefinite article (e.g. Atag 6  TeXatiajviog),
b) a differentiation between the two different types of article in the degree of relation 
between the grammatical and the semantic form of the nominal phrase, and thus in the degree o f 
accuracy in the description of the noun, where the indefinite article leaves the noun semantically 
unascertained, whereas the definite does not (e.g. This is a/the man), and
c) a differentiation between the two types of the article in terms of the referential familiar­
ity, offered “in respect to the way the nominal phrase is perceived” (e.g. the two men).
In its general perception, the above theoretical perspective on the semantic function of the 
article, which firstly derives from Apollonius Dyscolus,14 was introduced in Britain by John 
Wilkins.15 But it is in Harris’ work that the so called “familiarity theory” was reintroduced into 
the grammatical study of the article, a theory which endured throughout the eighteenth18 and 
nineteenth century up to the time of Russell17 and his “uniqueness theory”.18 Monboddo19 fur-
11 unless it marks a distinction of gender.
12 Harris, following Apollonius and Gaza, rejects the denomination of the relative pronoun as a subjunctive arti­
cle ( being contrasted to the prepositive one, above commented) and includes the whole subject within the dis­
cussion of the pronouns.
13 For more on the linguistic aspect of the subject see: Lyons, Christopher G. References and Articles, in Leit- 
ner, 1991.
14 InUhlig, Gustav, Grammatici Graeci, Part II, Vol. II, Apollonii Dyscoli, De Construction Libri quattuor 
Edition and Commentary, Teubner, Leipzig, 1910. See also: Householder, 1981.
15 Wilkins, John. 1668, An Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language.
16 More on the subject can be found in: Joly And.: The Study of the Article in England from Wallis to Horn 
Tooke, 1653-1789, in Hans Aarsleff, Louis Kelly and Hans-Josef Niederehe, 1987.
17 Russell, Bertrand, On Denoting, in Mind (1905) 14, p. 479-493.
18 a uniqueness of the content of the nominal phrase indicated by the application of the definite article.
19 Monboddo, James Burnett, Lord, 1774: Of the Origin and Progress of Language, Vol. II. Edinburgh: J. Bal­
four. Reproduced by Scholar Press, Menston, 1967. In the same series of facsimiles is also reproduced (1967) 
John Ward’s Four Essays Upon the English Language (1758), a work which follows the same ideas about the 
use of articles.
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ther widens the meaning of eminence attributed to a noun by the definite article.20 Although he 
considers the article a or un as a defect of the English and the French language, he regards it as 
a particle and not an article; this last observation is in accordance with Harris’ treatment of the 
article as of a grammarian of universals, despite the fact that he follows the traditional termino­
logy. In the third part of Hermes, when discussing the form of language, he includes the defi­
nite and indefinite article in the same category with a number of other words:
Let the general term be man. I have occasion to apply this term to the denoting of some particular.
Let it be required to express this particular, as unknown; I say, a man; known; I say the man; 
indefinite; any man; definite; a certain man; present and near; this man; present and distant; 
that man; like to some other; such a man; an indefinite multitude; many men; a definite multi­
tude; a thousand men; the ones of a multitude, taken throughout; every man; the same ones, 
taken with distinction; each man; taken in order; f ir s t man, second man etc.; the whole multi­
tude of particulars taken collectively; all men-the negation of this multitude; no man.2*
Harris was aware that little respect was accorded the article in the Latin language; he quotes 
on that from Quintilian,22 and Scaliger. It was in the tradition of the last especially, that the arti­
cle was not highly praised as having a considerable function in language, and it was Harris 
who changed that in the post-Wallis study of grammar, followed also by Lowth,23 and others. 
Lowth, specifically, speaks about the great importance of the proper use of the article as, addi­
tionally, a sign of excellence of a language.24 The meaning, for the grammarian of the univer­
sals, of such a function of the article, is that it has been attributed a specific task: not just as 
implied by contemporary linguistic scientific thought, according to which a definiteness or 
indefiniteness only is to be conveyed.25 As shown in the text quoted above, the article relates 
the grammatical form of the name defined with its meaning by giving additional semantic data 
for it. By its reference to the name of the genus or species, in the case of a particular thing, the 
article serves to consignify the degree of our own perception of this thing. Such a description 
is seen in terms of the accuracy offered in the conveyance of the data: the vague character of the 
indefinite one is compared to the restricted latitude and specificity of the definite.28 So that actu­
ally the article has not a referential character, but affects the referential character of the noun 
defined, and that is the function of a syncategorematic word.
The examples taken by Harris from the Greek, Latin, and English languages have the pur­
pose of answering the question how we can describe and recognise a nominal term more accur­
20 He expands the eminence seen by Harris in phrases like the C ity, meaning London, by including it in exam­
ples like the city, in the more general meaning of something already well-known to the hearer (see also Lyons, 
p. 312).
21 Harris, 1786, p. 347.
22 uNoster sermo articulos non desiderat; ideoque in alias partes orationes fraguntuf': Inst. Oratoria, 1.4.19.
23 Lowth, Monboddo and Beattie were the most faithful to the doctrine of universal grammar as presented by 
Harris.
24 Lowth, 1762, p. 26n: quoted from Joly A., 1987.
25 altought the concept of the article as a determiner is much closer to its syntactic function than to its gramma­
tical one.
26 “But this is not enough. The thing at which we are looking is neither a genus not a species. What is it then?
An individual”: from Harris, 1786, p. 215.
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ately. In the answer given, it is clear that Harris combines both the grammatical-semantic and 
the universal perspective. For the first he follows the tradition of Apollonius, Priscian, Scali- 
ger, and Gaza, the distinction between objects of first acquaintance and those of second know­
ledge being derived from the older of them.27 This is in answer to the question “what is this 
thing... we are looking at?” From Apollonius he also derives the variation in the degrees of 
semantic eminence of the noun, due to the semantic definition carried by the definite article.28 
Harris analyses the differences in the semantic definition of a name and the semantic alterations 
in complex nominal phrases when the article may determine either the noun or the adjective.29 
It is obvious that there is a similarity between the function of the article and the adjective, so 
that they could be classified under the same category of syngategorematic terms. It is in this 
spirit that he quotes those extracts from Apollonius which lay a stress on the referential charac­
ter of the definite article.30
We may carry this reasoning further, and show, how by help of the article even common appella­
tives come to have the force o f proper names; ...and thus it is by an easy transition, that the arti­
cle, from denoting reference, comes to denote eminence also; that is to say, from an ordinary pre- 
aquaintance, to presume a kind of general and universal notoriety.31
After this point Harris’ discussion ascends to the realm of universal grammar: “what kind 
of thing is this we are looking at?” There is a degree of eminence attributed to a noun, and what 
Harris does is to include in the same category, but as different subdivisions, the general and the 
universal:32
In a word the natural associators with articles are all those common appellatives, which denote the 
several genera or species of beings. It is these, which, by assuming different articles, serve either 
to explain the individual upon its first being perceived, or else to indicate, upon its return, a recog­
nition or repeated knowledge,33
27 There is also a citation from Gaza translated by Harris, which combines the parameters of time and noun refer­
ence: to apGpo Jtoiei 5i’ dvcotdkriaiv jipoeYvoxipivoo too ev Tfj owrd£ei...: “the article causes a review 
within the mind of something known before the texture of the discourse”, ibid., p. 218.
28 Another source for the doctrine of eminence is Christopher Cooper’s Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae, Lon­
don 1685, p. 102: quando loquimur de re vel persona, quam lector vel auditor scit vel scire supponatur, quia emi­
nence est, vel antedicta; ut the hing: quoted in Michael, 1970 p. 359. According to Michael, Harris is the first 
English grammarian who makes the implication of the previous reference the essential function of the definite 
article.
29 For the case of the article determining an adjective: Aeovroos apa icai t i  toiovtov rj jtpoaGeou; eon toO 
apQpou, cruvi6id£,ouaa to  ejuGetikov nj> icupup ovopan: “it is with this reason therefore that the article is 
here also added, as it brings the adjective to an individuality, as precise, as the proper name”,Harris, 1786, p. 
222.
30 To apGpov jtpov<J)EOTGjaav yvokriv bTjXoi : “the article indicates a preestablished acquaintance”, ibid., p. 
220.
31 Ibid., p. 223.
32 In examples such as the Speaker as the high officer in the British Parliament, and the Poet as a name imply­
ing Homer, ibid., p. 223.
33 Ibid., p. 229.
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The Pronoun
Pronouns, or as they are called, substantives of the secondary order, are discussed in terms 
of the distinction between objects of first and second knowledge and are placed in the latter 
category. The definitions of the personal pronouns given by Harris are based on Priscian, 
Apollonius, and Gaza. As Harris observes in the first book of Hermes, where pronouns are 
mostly treated:
...when we read Euclid, we find neither first person, nor second in any part of the whole work.
The reason is, that neither speaker nor party addressed (in which light we may always view the 
writer and his reader) can possibly become the subject of pure mathematics, nor indeed can any­
thing else, except abstract quantity, which neither speaks itself, nor is spoken to by another.34
Number, the lack of grammatical gender of the first and second person of the pronoun, and the 
differentiation in genders in the third one, are the general grammatical properties of the use of 
pronouns in most languages. Bearing in mind the criterion of sufficiency of language, the third 
person of the personal pronoun should be classified together with the demonstrative and the 
indefinite pronouns.35 Such a classification is based on Priscian’s grammatical theory, accord­
ing to which “the first and second person do not require a differentiation in utterance as they are 
present for each other; and thus they function demonstratively but the third person in other 
cases functions as demonstrative (e.g. hie) and in other as relative (e.g. is, ipse).36
The genuine semantic role of the pronouns is as substitutes of words of primary significa­
tion, and thus they are called substantives o f a secondary race or order. Harris distinguishes 
between this function of the pronoun, “always standing by itself, assuming the power of a 
noun and supplying its place”,37 and the definitive or articular character of it, when, by assum­
ing a consignificative place before the noun, it has a function similar to that of an adjective. In 
the first book of Hermes, he states that specific pronouns (such as he, this, that) when attached 
to a noun seem to behave more like articles rather than genuine pronouns substituting the 
noun.38 In accordance with their consignificative character, a universal grammarian has to con­
sider, such words as articles (namely, definitives):
Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the essence of an article be to define and ascertain, they are 
much more properly articles, than anything else, and as such should be considered in universal 
grammar39
34 Ibid., p. 69.
35 Ibid., p. 72.
36 : ...quod prima quidem et secunda persona ideo non egent diversis vocibus, quod semper praesentes inter se 
sunt, et demonstrativae; tertia vero persona mo do demonstrativa est, ut hie, iste; mo do relativa, ut is, ipse...: 
ibid., p. 71.
37 Ibid., p. 73.
38 Two extracts quoted from Quintilian and Scaliger are given by Harris as comments on the lack of articles in 
the Latin language.
39 Ibid., p. 234.
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On this occasion, demonstrative pronouns such as this and that are classified together with 
indefinite pronouns, such as all and some. For the grammarian of the universals the aim of 
these syncategorematic terms is to denote something which will identify the noun better and 
more accurately: such a and many, denote respectively the indefinite and definite multitude,40 
this and that, denote a referential parameter of space (distance), all, some, others, and any add 
to the noun a quantitative information defining it as a whole or part(s) of it:
...Some, to denote a definite part; any to denote an indefinite; and other, to denote the 
remaining part, when a part has been assumed already. Sometimes this last word denotes a 
large indefinite portion, set in opposition to some single, definite, and remaining part, which 
receives from such opposition no small degree of heightening 41
It is apparent that as we deal with a more comprehensive type of grammar, the universal, the 
division of the parts of speech is made upon different semantic criteria, and is thus a different 
one. On the syntactic terms of this grammar, Harris distinguishes between the prepositive char­
acter of the personal pronoun,42 and the subjunctive character of the relative one in the con­
struction of propositions:
...it is in the united powers of a connective, 43 and another pronoun, that we may see the force, and 
character of the pronoun here treated. ...the sentence still retains its unity and perfection, and 
becomes if possible more compact than before. We may with just reason call this pronoun sub­
junctive, because it cannot (like the prepositive) introduce an original sentence, but only serves to 
subjoin one to some other, which is previous. The application of this subjunctive, like the other 
pronouns, is universal.44
The universal application of the subjunctive pronoun is based on its ability to substitute 
substantives which refer to natural, artificial and abstract substances, or, in other words, to 
substitute general, special, and particular propositional subjects. It even substitutes other types 
of pronouns, its additional connective character making it essentially different to the others.45 It 
is in this spirit, according to Harris, that subjunctive pronouns (namely the demonstrative and 
the indefinite one) fall into the same category of pronominal articles, classified together with the 
article, when taken as pronouns, and with the adjectival character of words such as no and 
none. This definitiveness of the subjunctive pronoun is evident once it is analysed: the demon­
strative one, in phrases like this picture I  approve, but that I  dislike is attributed an act of redu­
cing the meaning of the common appellative in order to denote the particular object, by also 
adding information referring comparatively to the two subjects. Similarly, indefinite pronouns
40 Ibid., p. 347, where Harris gives an account of these articles and definitives.
41 Ibid., p. 235.
42 “as capable of introducing or leading a sentence, without having reference to any previous,”: ibid., p. 77.
43 meaning a conjunction.
44 Ibid., p. 79-81.
45 Ibid., p. 83 and 86.
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such as some, all, other(s), and any, coincide in their referential character with a degree of defi­
nitiveness. Here, it is interesting here to note the distinction between the grammatical-syntactic 
function of the pronoun and that considered within the scope of universal grammar. While for 
the common grammatical sense there can be no coalescence between article and pronoun,46 and 
thus these cannot be juxtaposed, in the case of a universal semantic function, specific types do 
share the same consignificative role. While for Apollonius it is the article which, when quitting 
its connection with a noun, becomes a pronoun,47 for Harris it is the pronoun which, in its coa­
lescence with the article, falls into the same category as pronominal articles.48
The conjunction
Conjunction4? is classified together with the article and the pronoun, falling into the class of 
accessory words, so Being in the same category with definitives, they are differentiated from 
them as their task is not to define or determine but simply to connect, si Harris devotes a whole 
chapter to the conjunction in the second book of Hermes. Semantically, they exceed preposi­
tions, as their function is to connect not words (names), but propositions (sentences). Thus, 
compared to the accidental character of the preposition, they are attributed an essential role in 
the construction of speech. A conjunction is
a part of speech, void of signification itself, but so formed as to help signification, by making two 
or more significant sentences to be one significant sentence.52
Harris distinguishes between two functions of the conjunction: the grammatical one, as a 
connective of sentences, and the semantic, as a connective of the meanings of these sentences. 
While the result, in the first case, is a compound sentence with its parts connected in mere jux­
taposition, in the second case there is a semantic interrelation, of a specific sort, among the pre­
46 Harris is basing his remarks on this on Apollonius (ekeivo odv dvTtovup'ia, to p£xa bEi^ Eto? rf dva<J)oj5 
as dvrovopa^dpEvov, o5 od ctuveoti to apbpov), Priscian (supra omnes alias partes orationis finit personas 
pronomen) and Gaza (rcdvrq 6e, ook ejribExovrai apOpov), ibid., p.226-7.
47 ’A u r a  o w  xd  a p 0 p a , trfc; Jtpos xd  d v o p a x a  aw ap xq aE G x; d j io o r a v r a , el? t t |v  i5ji;otetgcypevt]v 
d vT w vu p tav  pETCDtbrTEi/'Orav t o  apO pov pi) pEt* o v d p a ro ?  JiapaX apPdvryTai, rconjcrriTai 6e o w e d  
£iv  ovopaxoc; irfv JtpoEKTEi0Ep£0a ek JtdoT]s dvdyKTis ep; d v T w vu p iav  pExaXi]4>0rjOExai, EiyE o\3k eyyi
vopEvov pet’ dvopaxoc; fruvapEt dvxi ovdpaxo^ jtap£kTj<J)0£i: ibid., p.73-74. There are also citation on the 
same from Donatus, Priscian and Varro.
48 Harris takes the term pronominal article from the works of Donatus and Priscian. It seems that for him, the 
remarks on the subject made by Priscian and Varro are in accordance with Apollonius, something not evident 
from the extracts quoted in Hermes. There is here a noteworthy comment on Vossius’ Analogia, and his remarks 
on the dissimilarity between Greek and Latin in the function of the definite article: “...he [Vossius] did not 
enough attend (!) to the ancient writers on this subject, who considered all words, as articles, which being asso­
ciated to nouns (and not standing in their place) served in any manner to ascertain, and determine their significa­
tion), ibid., p. 74-75.
49 as also the preposition.
50 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
51 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
52 ibid., p. 238.
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mises of a complex proposition. In other words, while the first is a grammatical aggregation, 
the second ends in a prepositional inference. In this last case, there is a further functional dif­
ferentiation between the several conjunctions, relating to the sort of connection they offer: that 
between the conjunctive (such as because) and the disjunctive one (such as or). While, for the 
common grammatical aspect of the subject, the division is confined between coordinative (such 
as and, for, but, or (n)either...(n)or, both...and) and subordinative conjunctions (such as 
although, as, because, if, since, that, whether), for the universal grammar the species of it dif­
fer and further are semantically subdivided. The conjunctive is of two types: the copulative (as) 
and the continuative type (if, because, therefore, that).53 Such a distinction is based, according 
to Harris, on the fact that the conjunction actually connects not just the sentences in general, but 
their subjects. While in the case of the copulative the nature of them is simply compatible with 
each other, in the case of the continuatives there is an essential co-incidence among them, and 
thus the sentence constructed is consolidated into one continuous whole:54
The reason is, with respect to the first, the co-incidence is merely accidental; with respect to the 
last, it is essential, and founded in nature.55
The continuatives now, are further divided into suppositive (if) and positive (because, there­
fore, as): this distinction is based not on the sort of connection offered, but on whether the 
character of the introductory clause is affirmative either contingently or necessarily. Harris car­
ries on the subdivision of the positive conjunctions into the causal56 (because, since, as) and the 
collective51 (therefore, wherefore then). While the first subjoins causes to effects,58 the second 
works in the opposite way. The main point of such a distinction is that the causal conjunctions 
function in deductive reasoning, while the collective in induction;5? and that, as all the other 
continuative conjunctions, without of course rejecting their copulative character, which always 
stands as the base of their differentiated functions as semantic extensions of it. The priority of 
induction over deduction is reflected in Harris’ distinction between the fortuity of the causal 
and the essential character of the collective conjunctions.60 Furthermore, causal conjunctions, 
despite the fact that they serve all four types of causality, differ in the modus significandi of the 
sentence following them. Whereas, in the case of the material, the efficient, and the formal 
cause, the necessary truth of the causal function, introduced by the conjunction, is affirmed by 
the use of the indicative mood of the verb, in the case of the final cause the potential or contin­
gent nature of the subject differs in the function of the conjunction:
53 The terminology comes from the Latin grammatical tradition, and Harris derives this directly from Scaliger 
and Priscian, showing the etymological derivation of this distinction.
54 Harris, 1786, pp. 242-243.
55 Ibid., p. 243.
56 Causales, ai5tiologikoil.
57 Collectivae- illativae, syllogistikoil.
58 “Resolvuntur autem in copulativas omnes hac, propterea quod causa cum effectu suapte natura conjuncta est”, 
quoted by Harris, ibid., p. 247.
50 “Now we use causals in those instances, where, the effect being conspicuous, we seek its cause; and collec­
tives, in demonstration, and science properly so called, where the cause being known first, by its help we discern 
consequences”, ibid., pp. 246-247.
60 Ibid., p. 247.
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the reason is, that the final cause, tho’ it may be first in speculation, is always last in event. That 
is to say, however it may be the end, which set the artist first to work, it may be still an end 
beyond his power to obtain, and which, like other contingents, may either happen, or not. Hence 
also it [the final cause] is connected by conjunction of peculiar kind, such as that, i v a ,  ut, 
etc.61
The disjunctive conjunction
A disjunctive conjunction is a part of speech which, while it conjoins sentences, disjoins 
their meanings.62 On this occasion, the semantic function is opposed to the grammatica- 
lone.This is as far as a grammatical examination would go.63 But for universal grammar, the 
disjunctive conjunction is of major importance. It is one of the parts of speech indicating the 
analogy between language forms and ontological ones. When placed within a simple sentence, 
the disjunctive conjunction makes it resemble a negative truth (e.g. It is day or night). Despite 
its disjoining role, it combines the subject and the predicate in such a way, as to make it appear 
that they were of an affirmative character.64 In this case, the grammatical function of the dis­
junctive resembles a physical interpretation of the language, according to which we deal with 
two predicational terms, which are, at the same time, opposed to each other in their essence, yet 
actually component parts of the same predicational term.66
The ontological parameter of a semantic interpretation, undertaken by a universal grammar, 
treats the disjunctive as a sign in the mode of diversity. The act of disjoining seen in the linguis­
tic realm, is in accordance with the dialectical pursuit when dividing the ontological realities and 
moving progressively from the genus to the species, and, finally, to the particulars, which 
carry the mark of distinction, number, and order.66 Even the distinction between the causal and 
the collective67 conjunctions is based on this concept. The first ones are to be used in language, 
in respect of a descending act of self-dividing of a generic universal form. The descent from the 
all-encompassing one to the many parts of its definition resembles the self-predicational act of 
God as resolving his truth into its basic elements. The second refers to our own linguistic act of 
composing the terms of prepositional truth, ascending from the particular to the universal. The 
comments made here by Harris, are based on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 16al3, and Meta­
61 Ibid., pp. 248-249.
62 It is useful to keep in mind that the disjunctive conjunction treated here is commented on not as relating 
words, or simple phrases, but sentences.
63 The citations, in p. 250, in support of this are from Gaza and Priscian. According to Gaza, o i 6e bia^evncxl 
Koi xd SLa£e,UY|iEva owxiOeacrL, Kai rf jrpdypa drro Jtpdypaxos, fj Jtpoaaxjtov drco Jtpoauiatov 
vow tes, xrjv <J>paaiv ejticmvSodaiv. In the same spirit, Priscian defined the disjunctives as “quae, quamis dic- 
tiones conjungant, sensum tamendisjunctum habent”.
64 “For though this as to its intellection be disjunctive (its end being to disjoin the subject from the predicate) 
yet as it combines terms together into one proposition, it is as truly synthetical, as truth, that it is affirmative”, 
ibid., p. 250.
65 It is in respect of Aristotle’s remark that “division and union are the same...but their essence is not”, Physics, 
4.13.222al9-20.
66 Harris, 1786, p. 250.
67 The term borrowed by Harris from the platonic collection (auvaYcoyij).
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physics, 5.4. 1027b20-24.68
The differentiation within the type of the disjunctive between the simple (e.g. either...or), 
and the adversative (e.g. either...or) conjunction,69 is investigated as to its respective relation to 
a specific degree of the diversity seen in propositional reasoning:
...it is to express in some degree the modification of this diversity, that disjunctive conjunctions 
seem to have been invented. ...the simple do no more, than merely disjoin; the adversative disjoin 
with an opposition concomitant. Add to this, that the adversative are definite; the simple 
indefinite.10
The simple disjunctive but seen in its function within a complex proposition, offers the subject 
alternative types of predication, of which only one expresses a definite affirmation. Harris here 
makes the point that words introducing elliptic phrases of a comparative degree such as [idX
Xov or dvriq (interpreted as rather...than) seem to behave as a conjunction'll and attribute to
the subject a degree of definitiveness (e.g. /  desire the people should be saved and not be 
destroyed). The degree in the mode of diversity is expressed in respect to the variation between 
the different types of the adversative conjunction: the absolute, the comparative, and the (m)- 
adequate. In the first case, the absolute disjunctive but denotes contradiction, either between 
the attributes of the same subject, or between different subjects when attributed the same predi­
cament: (e.g. Gorgias was a sophist, but not a philosopher- Brutus was a patriot, but Caesar 
was not.) As Harris remarks “there can be no opposition of the same attribute in the same 
subject’’.72 The adversative of comparison as (in examples such as Virgil was as great a poet as 
Cicero was an orator) apart from its connective character, consignifies a comparative relation 
between the subjects of a complex proposition, attributing to them a sense of equality or 
excess. In the third type of adversatives, which stands for what the Greek and Latin grammati­
cal tradition had called respectively evavTicopartKOL ovvdecrpoi or conjunctions adversati-
vae, Harris includes the adverbs unless and although, denoting respectively the adequacy and 
inadequacy of one simple proposition to stand as the efficient cause of the other. This is the 
case in examples, such as Troy will be taken, although/unless the palladium is preserved.
This last distinction, in relation to a remark made by Harris on the same subject, 73 is dealt 
with in a mostly illuminating way. The aim of a general grammar is to overcome the specific 
languages and reveal semantic functions as common. Similarly, propositional logic uses in each 
language common functions, or forms, either in a priori or in a posteriori reasoning, in the con­
68 In Harris’ own translation: a)“true and false are seen in composition and division”, and b) “composition makes 
affirmative truth, division makes negative, yet both alike bring terms together, and so far therefore may be called 
synthetical”, ibid., p. 3.
69 These two types of disjunction are identified in modem logic with the inclusive and exclusive disjunction.
70 Ibid., pp. 251-252.
71 It is a remark based on Gaza’s comment on the Greek sublative conjunction (dvaipexiKos cruv6ea(io?). Har­
ris iterpretes it as a “disjunctive of the subsequent from the previous”, ibid., p. 253.
72 Ibid., p. 254.
73 “This distinction [between adequate and inadequate adversative conjunctions] has reference to common opinion, 
and the form of language, consonant thereto. In strict metaphysical truth, no cause that is not adequate, is any 
cause at all”, ibid., p. 255.
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struction of demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms. But due to its metaphysical perspective, 
universal grammar affirms the prevalence of a priori reasoning. And as for our own discursive 
faculty, it accepts a triple distinction between human judgment (boga),74 “true knowledge 
accompanied by an account” (Xoyoq)75 which is seen as knowledge of the forms to which lan­
guages correspond (el6t|), and knowledge of their supreme form (elboq eibtov), which stands 
as their only real adequate cause, being of an absolute necessity. For Harris, the semantic 
forms within a language, manage, more or less, to express these natural eibrp76 The disjunctive 
form is the strongest possible wording for the incompatibility between the forms signified by 
the subjects of the propositions related.77
Concluding the subject of the conjunctions, Harris comments briefly on the adverbs of 
time and place. Although they keep their adverbial character when introducing a single interro­
gative sentence, they function as conjunctions when they adopt a relative character and conjoin 
propositions: thus they are called adverbial conjunctions. Words like when, whence, where, 
whither, whenever, and wherever, share with the prepositions this role of consignifying time
and place, and are thus considered within the scope of universal g ram m ar.78
The definition of the conjunction as a word consignificative of a relation between proposi­
tions, and not as just a connective of w o r d s ,?9 derives from Harris’ study of Scaliger, Sanc- 
tius, Apollonius, and Ammonius. In Minerva, Sanctius distinguishes between connectives rela­
ting the partes orationis inter se, and those relating orationes inter se, of which conjunction is 
one. Scaliger, before him, had made the same remark80 when making a point about the different 
treatments of the conjunction offered by the grammarians, who “conjunctionis notionem veteres 
paullo inconsultius prodidere.” The basic grammatical source for both of them is undoubtedly 
Apollonius, who had presented in innumerable references this semantic aspect of the conjunc­
tion. But the primary source is Aristotle and his discussion on the subject in Poetics and Rhe­
toric. The semantic aspect of the conjunction is based on the definition of it as
74 which like the Aristotelian ev6o£ov, is not very different from the sensus of Priscian .
75 which according to the universal grammar is the field of logic (the reference is from Plato, Theaetetus, 187b.
76 Harris, 1786, p. 257.
77 Ibid., p. 257. The disjunctive or adopts a different parameter of diversity, when relating the subject or the pre­
dicament of a proposition with a sentence which is the actual definition of it. In the case of a simple act of dis­
tinction, the conclusion drawn is that the disjunctive “appears to have greater or less force, according as the sub­
jects, which it disjoins, are more or less disjoined by nature”.
78 Harris distinguishes between the consignificative character of the accessory words and the obscure one of the 
adverbial conjunctions, a kind of middle beings, like zoophytes in nature. He justifies this obscurity with the 
help of a citation from Themistius: Jtokkaxoo ydp rj 4>6aic; bijkr] ytvexai icaxa pucpov pexafJaivooaa, 
(6'axe d|i<i)iapT]xeIa0a i ejtt xtvcov, Jioxepov £toov rf (jxuxov, ibid., p. 259 and 432.
79 This was, and is, the grammatical definition of it. The difference between the traditional and the strictly gram­
matical view is reflected in John Dalton’s Elements of English Grammar, 1801, p. 84: “As the only distinction 
between conjunctions and prepositions is, that the former connect one sentence to another, whilst the latter con­
nect one or more words to a sentence; it is no wonder if the same connective term be used for both purposes. 
Accordingly we have several instances of the same word being used at one time as a conjunction and at another 
time as a preposition; but late writers, having adopted the false notions and distinctions of language of the Greek 
and Latin grammarians, have endeavoured to separate the prepositions and conjunctions into distinct classes, and 
to keep them apart as much as possible”: quoted in Michael, 1970, p. 446.
80 “Sed conjunctio est, quae conjungit orationes plures,” quoted in Harris, 1786, p. 238.
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an articulate sound, devoid of signification, which is so formed as to make one significant articulate 
sound out of several articulate sounds, which are each of them significant.81
The universal perspective of the conjunction relies on the definition given in Rhetoric:
The conjunction makes many, one; so that if it be taken away it is then evident on the contrary 
that one will be many.82
To explain this universal application of the conjunction, Harris quotes from Ammonius’ com­
mentaries on Aristotle’s De Interpretation:
Of sentences, that which denotes one existence simply, and which is strictly one, may be consid­
ered as analogous to a piece of timber not yet severed, and called on this account one. That, which 
denotes several existences, and which appears to be made one by some conjunctive particle, is ana­
logous to a ship made up of many pieces of timber, and which by means of the nails has an appar­
ent unity.83
The upshot of this is that conjunctive words are significant of a specific degree of relation 
among the things signified. Either conjoining or disjoining the meanings of the names they con­
nect in speech, they are consignificative of: i) the relation between the subjects of the proposi­
tions connected in speech, ii) the analytical or synthetical method, followed in the construction 
of a syllogism (a priori or a posteriori reasoning), and iii) the degree of relation among the 
things signified by the subjects of the propositions. In strictly grammatical terms, Harris’ dis­
cussion of the conjunction follows remarks made by John Wilkins, who had affirmed an act of 
conjoining words or rather sentences, 84 as did A. Lane, and John Collyer,8^  and this point was 
further discussed by Robert Lowth,8^  and Lord Monboddo.87
The modes of diversity
In an extended reference,88 Harris presents his account of the modes of diversity. Diversity
81 (jXDVlj <XCTT]|iOS, EK JtXEuSvWV (J.EV <JxDV(OV [XlCt?, CJT][KXVTlKtdv 56, JTOIEIV JtE<j)\)Kia (LltaV (jXDVljv
OTlpavriKrjv, Poetics, 20.1456b38. Harris’ interpretation in Harris, 1786, p. 239.
82 'O yap cruvSeapoc; ev jioiel xa jtoXXa, (doxe eov E^aipEdq, 6r[Xov oxi xoovavxiov eaxai xo ev 
jroXXd,Rhetoric,3.12.1413b4, quoted bid., p. 240.
83 Aio Kai xtov Xoytov o p6v -ujiap i^v piav crq paivayv, o Kupiox; eI?, avaXoyo? dv eit] xcp p-qbEJtw 
XExpqpivco £6X(p, Kai Sia xovxo 6vi XEyopivcp o 66 jcXeiovck; •uitap^ Eu; bqXtov, 6va xivti 66 ctuv6e<3 
pov qvcoa0ai jko? 6oko5v, avaXoyEi xq vqi xiq ek jtoXXcov o’uyKEipivq £i3Xtov, ajjto 66 xcov y6p,<J>cuv 
(j>aivopEVT]v Exovox) xqv evcoctlv, quoted ibid., p. 241.
84 Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language, London 1668, p. 314.
85 The general principles of English Grammar, Nottingham 1735, p. 86.
86 A short Introduction to English Grammar, London 1762, p. 92.
87 Of the Origin and Progress of Language, Edinburgh 1774, p.178.
88 Harris, pp. 250-252.
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is a distinction between natural forms, seen in the relation they develop to each other. Since lan­
guage may denote both forms and the sort of their relation, this distinction may become appar­
ent under specific circumstances: a reference to a thing by the application of its particular name 
denotes this mode of diversity (e.g. John, as a name differentiating a person from others called 
by different names). On the contrary, a reference to the same thing, made by the application of 
the name of its species (e.g. the term man) or genus (e.g. the term animal), denies this divers­
ity. The diversity affirmed in the lower realm becomes a coincidence in the higher one. The 
classification is extended beyond than the realm of genus: in the transcendental comprehensions 
of end, being, existence, quantities, and qualities, the higher diversity is seen between being 
and non-being.
A diverse relation among the several natural forms of being may be predicated in one of 
the following degrees of relation: a) as a simple relation, b) as contradiction, and c) as opposi­
tion. In the first case, where the relation among the subjects is denoted either by a comparative 
degree or is just implied, 89 the subjects of the propositions are related “by necessarily inferring 
each other7’. 90 in the second case, contrary words become destructive o f each other . The third 
case is that of the absolute contradiction between the subjects related, where the attribute which 
is predicated of one subject as true, is denied of the other (e.g. Brutus was a patriot, but Caesar 
was not), or where of the same subject one attribute is affirmed and another is denied (e.g. 
Gorgias was a sophist, but not a philosopher). In the case of contradictory propositions, the 
same truth is affirmed and denied (d vT tfa o ig ).? 1 In the construction of complex proposi­
tions, these three degrees of diversity are reflected in the three species of the disjunctive: the 
(in)adequate, the adversatives of comparison, and the absolute adversatives.
For Harris, diversity may also subsist between: a) the name of a thing and its definition, 
and b) the various names belonging to the same thing, and the various things denoted by the 
same name. The first observation is based on Posterior Analytics, 2.10.93b29-31, according to 
which
since definition is said to be a statement of what a thing is, a nominal definition is a kind of it 
explaining the name of the thing, which is different from the wording definition explaining the 
thing itself.92
The distinction pointed out here is one neither between the substance and its name nor between 
the substance and its attributes as elements of its definition. Rather it is one between the sub­
stance and the nominal wording of the definition. The source of this lies in Metaphysics 
4.9.1018al0-12, where it is said that those things are called diverse, of which either the species
89 It is the case of adjectives in the comparative degree, and of words such as cause, effect, father, son.
90 It is the correlative opposition of the Categories, 10.1 lb l7 .
91 " Q o t e  SfjXov oxi Jttiax) Kaxcujxxaei eoxiv  tijto^ aais dvtiKEipEvr] Kai Jiacrr] dn;o<J>tiaei Kaxa<t>aai<;. 
Kai e o t g )  dvri<t>aCTic; x o m o , Kaxdtjxxaic; Kai drto^aai? a i  dvxiKEipevai:...hence for each affirmative state­
ment there is an opposite negative, quite as each negative statement has its affirmative opposite; and let there be 
called this a contradiction, and the affirmative and the negative statements let them be called contraries, De Inter­
pretation, 17a33-36.
92 'Opiapog 5’ ejreibrj Xeyexai elvai Xoyoq xao xt eoxi, <J)avep6v oxi o pev xk; Eaxai Xoyos xo\5 xt 
crqpaivei xo ovopa fj Xoyog exepos ovopaxtobqs, otov xo xi crripatvei...
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are numerous, or the matter, or the definition of the substance. The second distinction intro­
duced here, is of a merely semantic content. It is actually a diversity-relation in the definition of 
the substances. In grammar, synonyms work in presenting the similarity between distinct sub­
stances, seen in the elements of their nominal definitions. Universal grammar, bearing in mind 
the distinction between substantial forms, distinguishes between op.oW'up.a and auvoW'upa. 
The first93 have the same name, but they differ in the definition of their substances.94 For exam­
ple, man and the word man. The definition of the first is substantial, while that of the second is 
nominal. The second term stands for the description of substances, not in the nominal realm, 
but in reference to the common species or genus of them. According to this, man and sheep, 
for example, although having a different nominal definition, are identified with each other 
semantically, in respect of their special definition of animal
The preposition
The preposition95 is defined as a part of speech, devoid of signification, but so formed as to 
unite two words that are significant and that refuse to coalesce or unite of themselves.96 Such a 
definition is just a semantic expansion of the grammatical one, according to which a preposition 
connects two words within the limit of a simple sentence. 9v The function of it is to introduce in 
a simple proposition new substantives, which will not affect the completeness of its structure 
(e.g.The splendid sun with his beams warms the fertile earth).9i This means that prepositions 
do not nullify the relation between the propositional terms, but they simply add informative 
material. Harris distinguishes between two semantic species in the connective function of pre­
positions. The first one is consignificative of a contiguous relation o f place between a substan­
tive term of a sentence and its new form introduced by the application of the preposition (e.g. 
The lamp hang from the ceiling). The second consignifies a relation o f motion or rest, by rela­
ting one of the substantive terms of a proposition to the attributive of it (verb), on the mood of 
which the character of the preposition depends (e.g. The lamp is falling from the ceiling).
Prepositions may be applied to substantive words, either by juxtaposition (Kara jrapadi 
oiv), as in the above examples, or by composition (Kara ovvdecnv), where, by getting 
embodied within a word, they alternate its meaning (e.g. understanding). This second gramma­
tical case does not imply a different function, as the relation denoted is actually resolvable into a 
consignificative one. Finally, prepositions may adopt an adverbial character (e.g. He rides 
about): in this case, they reject their role as connective words, and they denote place, despite
93 which have nothing to do with homonyms or homophones, namely with words of the sam e pronun­
ciation but different in meaning and origin.
9 4 'O p to v u p a  X e y ex a i t5v o v o p a  p d v o v  k o l v o v ,  o  8 b  Kara x a u v o p a  k o y o s  xrjs a u a ta c ; c tepoc;... 5/uvo5 
v u p a  8 b  X byfix a i o5v t o  t b  o v o p a  k o i v o v  Kai o  Kara x o v v o p a  k o y o g  x f ja  o o a i a s  o  a m o g .. .:  things 
are termed equivocally, when they share the sam e name but they are distinguished in the meaning 
implied by that...; they are termed univocally, when they share both the name applied to them and the 
meaning of this name: Categories, 1.1a.1-8.
95 IIpoGEXiKo? cr\3v86CTpos, praepositiva conjunctio.
96 Harris, 1786, p. 261.
97 and where the word defined by the preposition is called the object of the preposition.
98 “The sentence as before remains entire and one”, ibid., p. 266.
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the fact that their primary relation was with the attributives." As for the formation of abstract 
nouns, prepositions function by extending the meaning of subjunctives, from denoting the local 
and corporeal, to the intellectual and incorporeal one.100 In this case, their proper function is 
converted into a metaphorical one. This metaphorical use of language, by the transformation of 
common words into terms attributed a new content with a special meaning, and the coinage of 
new words, are the only methods to denominate new concepts.101
The original use of prepositions was to denote relation by position (place) between substan­
tive words. This becomes apparent when considering that substances (as natural forms) preex­
ist the coalescence each one has with its attributes (quantities and qualities).102
...from this natural concord of subject and accident, arises the grammatical concord of substantive 
and adjective...the great objects of natural union are substance and attribute.103
Grammatically, the above is based on Priscian, according to whom, the reason why two sub­
stantives do not have a copula should be asked by philosophy, as two substantives, quite as 
substance and accidence, cannot be one in their essense.104 Philosophically, it is based on 
Aristotle’s Physics, where the meaning of substance is restricted to the substantial nature of 
physical bodies. Substances do not merge with each other. Distinct as they are, they coordinate 
only with energy, and only by this do they correspond to each other. In the same mode o f coa­
lescence, a subject of a proposition is combined with the verb, and by the application of this 
middle term, with the predicate. Whereas, within the field of grammar, a preposition ordinarily 
relates an accusative to a nominative,105 within the scope of universal grammar it relates those 
substantives to sentences, which at the time are unable to coalesce o f themselves.106
The Cases
Cases are suffixes which are considered to be a common ground of nouns,107 verbs, and 
prepositions. In the modem languages, the genitive and dative are, when resolved, a combina­
99 Ibid., p. 273 and 205.
100 Ibid., p. 268. In accordance with this sort of extension is the formation of Harris’ universal grammar. In the 
first chapter of the first book, he makes a point of it when saying that in the design of his book he will follow 
“the order consonant to human perception, as being for that reason easy to be understood”, ibid., pp.11-12.
101 Ibid., p. 269, where also Harris is giving a brief account of philosophical terms formed either by metaphor, 
or by coinage: “...the first words of men, like their first ideas, had an immediate reference to sensible objects, 
and in afterdays, when they began to discern with their intellect, they took those words, which they found already 
made, and transferred them by metaphor to intellectual conceptions. There is indeed no method to express new 
ideas, but either this of metaphor, or that of coining new words, both of which have been practised by philoso­
phers and wise men, according to the nature, and exigence of the occasion”.
102 which in language are denoted by the attributives.
1Q3 Ibid., p. 262.
104 Causa, propter quam duo substantiva sine copula, e philosophia petenda est: neque enim duo substantialiter 
unum esse potest, sicut substantia et accidens, quoted ibid., p. 264.
105 Ibid., p. 284. The observation stands for most modem languages.
'06Ibid., p. 265.
107 Pronouns, apart from some personal ones, which Harris calls primitive (e.g. I, me pov) have no cases.
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tion of a preposition and a noun, while the accusative is placed after the verb. The vocative and 
ablative are considered almost unknown to the modem languages. In Latin, the ablative was 
used in association with a preposition, but, for Harris, its function was not easily distinghuish- 
able from that of the Greek dative, so that its use is considered disputable. According to the 
Peripatetic School, cases were variations(;raua£tc, casae) of the nominative, which was thus 
excluded from them. This last was denied by the Stoics, who defined the case as derived not 
from the nominative, but from our discursive faculty, distinguishing between opdrj jtrcooig, 108 
indicating the primary form of a noun, and Jtkayia Jircooig^ indicating a variation of it. 
They also coined the term xX Loig^  to describe this “progressive descent from the noun’s 
upright form through its various declining forms”.111 Harris comments on the four basic cases, 
namely on the nominative, the accusative, the genitive, and the dative. His comments focus 
mainly on the way cases functioned in the Greek and Latin languages, as their consignificative 
character is not so apparent in the modem ones.
The nominative is case of a noun which stands as a grammatically substantive word, and, 
at the same time, signifies both the subject of the proposition, and the natural substance. It is 
the grammatical ground, which syntax, logic, and metaphysics identify as common, despite 
functioning in different fields. The affinity between substance and attribute is reflected, in the 
application of the nominative, on the congruity between subject and copula, as also between 
substantive and attributive.112 This last assimilates itself with the substantive, on adopting its 
case. And it does so also by adopting the number and the person of the substantive,113 whether 
it does this in the verb, or in the adjective of which it may consist. Harris’ account of the nomi­
native concludes with the distinction between regular and perfect sentences. A sentence contain­
ing a nominative has to be both regular and perfect. By this observation he excludes irregular 
sentences which, despite being logically correct (perfect), do not seem to be acceptable gram­
matically, because the substantive and the attributive (either the verb or the adjective) coincide 
in an oblique case.114
The accusative is that case which “to an efficient nominative and a verb of action subjoins 
either the effect or the passive subject”.116 It is distinghuished from any other oblique case by 
its reference to the primary substantive of the sentence. In other words, it points to the subject 
of the proposition, which stands as the efficient cause of the action implied by the active 
verb.116
108 Casus rectus, erect or upright case or falling.
109 Casus obliquus, oblique or side-long falling.
110 Declinatio, declension.
111 The citation, as also the major part of this account is based on Harris’ study of Ammonius’ commentaries on 
Aristotle’s De Interpretatione.
112 While in the English language this is a congruity in the number, in the Greek and Latin language it is also 
seen in the gender.
113 of which number and person are real properties, ibid., p. 170-171.
114 The term, in examples as ZatKpazei 'AkKifiiadovs piXei,is Jtapao'upPapa or jrapaiccmyyopTipa and the 
sources, concerning only the Greek language, are Apollonius and Gaza, ibid., pp. 180-181.
118 ibid., p. 283.
116 Harris stays within the etymological restrictions of the accusative,as a case concerned with the relation 
between cause and effect, presenting a judgment. He does not comment, apart from the above reference, on the 
application of the accusative when defining a subject in the passive mode.
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As for the genitive and dative, they are discussed, as expected, in their use in the Greek and 
Latin languages, in comparison with each other. This is in accordance with the spirit of a uni­
versal grammar, as it reflects the philosophical base of language. On this Harris cites an extract 
from Bacon’s De augmentis scientiarum, in which the slothfulness of the modem languages is 
compared to the elaborative character of the ancient ones. In the first, the primary method of 
expressing things is by a compilation of an auxiliary verb with a preposition. In the second, 
declensions, cases, conjugations, and tenses, make the Greek and Latin languages adequately 
subservient to philosophy. 117
The genitive, by introducing a relation between a preposition and a noun, consignifies a 
substantive, as setting up the action implied by the verb. Semantically, the genitive is a proxi­
mate illustration of the substantive as an efficient cause (equal to the expressions from  or out o f 
which ) and its consignificative character is laid out in the mode of diversity, with a segmenta­
tion of the primary substantive implied.118 On the other hand, the dative consignifies a procliv­
ity in action, towards the substantive term, and resembles the final cause.
The interjection
Interjection is styled as a part of speech, which “coincides with no other part of speech, but 
is either uttered alone, or else thrown into a sentence, without altering its form, either in syntax 
or s i g n i f i c a t i o n ” . 119 Two things are to be considered here. First, the distinction between two 
different semantic fields: one is that of syntax, the other is that of propositional logic. Accord­
ing to Harris, interjection should not be considered within the scope of universal grammar, 
because its semantic function is independent of any other part of speech. It is not related to the 
sentence, the most important part of language, and thus it does not share the consignificative 
role of the other particles mentioned before. Indeed, interjection does not relate substantives, 
either in an active or a figurative manner. In accordance with this, the adverbial character attri­
buted to it by the Greeks i20 should be rejected. Harris calls it a part of speech, but this is just in 
terms of conventional grammar. Rejecting this, he denominates the interjection as
...a voice of nature, rather than a [proper] voice of art, expressing those passions and natural emo­
tions, which spontaneously arise in the human soul, upon the view or narrative of interesting
117 “Annon et illud observatione dignum (licet nobis modemis spiritus nonnihil redundat) antiquas linguas ple- 
nas declinationum, casuum, conjugationum, et similium fuisse; modemas, his fere destitutas, plurima per prae- 
positiones et verba auxiliara segniter expedire? Sane facile quis conjiciat (utcunque nobis ipsi placeamus) ingenia 
priorum seculorum nostris fuisse multo acutoria et subtiliora”, De augmentis scientiarum, book 6. ch. 1.
118 In support of the reciprocality in meaning between substantive terms, Harris quotes some examples from 
Categories, 7.6a29-32, so as to explain that Jtdvra 6e xd rcpoc; xi Jipo? dvtioxpe^ovxa kiyexai... jxXrjv xtq 
jnxocrei 6ioiaei Kara xrjv Xe£iv...: all relatives have their correlatives... although the case or grammatical 
inflexion will perhaps differ.
119 Harris, 1786, p. 289.
12° The Greek grammarians considered the interjection and the adverb to be contracted sentences: “improperly, if 
we consider the adverbial nature, which always coincides with some verb, as its principal, and to which it always 
serves in the character of an attribute”: ibid., p. 289.
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events.121
Instead of expanding on this, Harris prefers to cite extended extracts from Vossius, Sanctius, 
and Priscian. According to them, interjection is not a part of speech, because it derives its exis­
tence from nature, and not from convention (either arbitrary or accidental), which is implied by 
the artificial character of language. Although the wording of an interjection differs from lan­
guage to language, in terms of its common function it is as a sign of notae naturales,122 and 
thus its usage and semantic value are irrelevant to the sentence within the terms of which it is 
interposed.
121 Ibid., p. 290.
122 as signs of natural sounds. Vossius in his Analogia uses the above term, while Sanctius calls them partes 
naturales, and Priscian accepts both the adverbial character of oxetXlckjhos and that of voces motus animi sig- 
nificatntes.
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Part III
The philosophical analysis of language
The material and formal parameters of language
Grammar, generally, is considered equally requisite for either logic, or rhetoric and poetry,1 
as it distributes one of its modes (indicative) to logic, for the construction of propositions, and 
some others to rhetoric, or poetry. In a sense, grammar seems to be the subject matter, a kind 
of stock, offered to the arts of trivium. Propositions inform the grammatical material (or matter) 
of specific sentences in a certain manner. Thus grammar provides logic with the stuff for such a 
campaign. Qualified by this, logic becomes inductively "in-formed" with scientific 
knowledge.2
For Harris, the rationalist, propositional truth is substantiated with respect to a supreme 
intellectual truth. Thus, while the relation of meaning to sign are artificial (adplacitum), the 
relation between grammar and universal modes of reasoning is not. Grammatical structures 
comply with those formed by natural realities,3 and thus language becomes the tangible 
evidence of the natural union of universal ideas. As we are by nature designed to identify these 
archetypes,4 by the application of linguistic forms in reasoning, we manage to approach these 
realities, and thus language, despite being a system of arbitrary signs, is termed as the medium 
in this action. The natural resemblance of words to realia rectifies the deficiency arising from 
the human derivation of their arbitrariness.
The two fundamental features of a rationalistic universal grammar are: i) the fact that, while 
it identifies itself as an art and not a science, its reasoning is considered scientific in character, 
as leading to necessary truths, and ii) that it focuses on the relation between the matter of 
grammar and the issues of metaphysic. From these two, the first is the common ground 
between universal and rational grammar, while the second relates universal grammar with its 
antecedent speculative grammar of the medieval era.
Language may be expressive of general truths; and if so, then of demonstration, and sciences, and 
arts; and if so, become subservient to purposes of every kind. Without (general terms), no art can 
be rationally explained5
Thus the purpose of universal grammar is the rational explanation of general propositions. 
These truths, deductively, have to be resolved to their necessary premises, so that then, by our 
own discursive faculty, we will be able to ascend to their first principles. Universal grammar 
has this explanatory task to carry out, aiming at the performance of true scientific knowledge.
1 Harris, 1751, p. 6 & 16.
2 : "syllogisms, paragraphs, sections and complete works,belong to arts of higher order", ibid. p. 19.
3 " those parts of speech unite of themselves in grammar, whose original archetypes unite of themselves in 
nature", ibid., p. 263 .
4 "there are truths or universals, of so obvious a kind that every mind or intellect, not absolutely deprived, 
without the least help of art, can hardly fail to recognise them..."
5 Ibid., p. 342.
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Harris admits that there is
a multitude of occasions for minute particularising, of which 'twas not possible for mere generals 
to be susceptible; ...'twas neccessary to the perfection and completion o f the language, that it 
should be epressive o f particulars, as well of generals; ...general terms are by far its most excellent 
and essential part, since from these it derives that comprehensive universality, that just proportion 
of precision and permanance, without which it could not possibly be either learnt, or understood, or 
applied to the purposes of reasoning and science...6
While proper names7 signify the particulars artificially, it is by the use of the more advanced 
definitives, “properly applied to general terms”, and articles that (the art of) language “without
wandering into infinitude, contrives how to denote things infinite”.8 The examples cited (words 
such as a, the, any, a certain, this, that, such, many, a thousand, every, each, first, second 
etc., all, no) are the medieval syncategoremata: terms that have a consignificative power only 
when being juxtaposed to others. Many of these terms are elliptic, namely grammatical 
abbreviations of a sentence-term, or simply imply a quality or quantity attributed to the 
categorematic terms. The most laconic demonstration of the concept of universal grammar is 
implied by Harris' definition of language:
Language is a system of articulate voices, the symbols of our ideas, but of those principally, which 
are general or universal.9
Consequently, in the matter of language there is "in-formed" existence of actualities. Harris 
does not just consent to the subsistence of the ideas of particulars. While he admits of a 
paradigmatic cause in the existence of natural forms, the particular truth of the individuals is 
actualised in virtue of the truth of these forms. Thus the difference between particular and 
general reasoning derives from this differentiation in causation. 10
Matter and form jointly, represent the immanent formal cause of the compound beings, 
namely of natural forms. The form preexists (pro rem), becomes materialised (in rem) when 
being becomes a hylomorphic composition of matter and form, and is the result of our mental 
abstraction (post rem). Abstraction is a procedure which, accounting for the explanatory 
purposes of this approach, proximates the aristotelian cast of universals, while, in platonic 
terms, reminiscence (dvdpvY]oig) is awareness by spontaneous recognition of the form 
recollected, independently from any sense of progress in the intellectual procedures. Matter
6 Ibid., pp. 344-345.
7 "which are hardly a part of language", ibid., p. 373.
8 Ibid., p. 346.
9 Ibid., p. 349.
10 Also in Proclus' commentary on Parmenides, 3.825.
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and form, conceived in their unity, constitute a universal,11 in the sense of their natural ability 
to be predicated of several subjects.12 Boethius regarded both matter (body) and form as 
necessary constituents of the individual subjects.13 It is in the light of this tradition that Harris 
contemplates upon them. The distinction between universals as eternal patterns of beauty, pre­
existing in a modus intelligendi and lacking any potentiality in character, and the sensible and 
perishable forms of the objects of everyday life is also the main point in Cicero's definition of 
form.14
Regarding the questions set by Porphyry in his Eioaycoyrf, on the existence and nature of 
the universals, Harris maintains that universals are i) real, ii) incorporeal, and iii) materialised 
only in order to become communicable. And as regards the fourth question raised and 
answered by Abelard on the sort of existence possessed by genus and species, Harris identifies 
himself with Abelard: iv) universals, namely genera and species, are of eternal existence.
The difference between Harris and the main branch of pure rationalism is that he admits a 
place for empirical truth, though not primarily, in the comprehension of reality as a whole. A 
priori reasoning, namely contemplating general propositions, is the medium for the discovery 
of absolute abstract truths and speculating upon them. Harris supports the supremacy of the a 
priori propositions in comparison with propositions a posteriori. It is a priori reasoning that 
which will unveil pure truth of universal validity. The form of beauty is an attribute of this 
truth. This is not about propositions of accidental validity, truth which happens to be the case, 
but about truth which is always the case, being an eternal reality unaffected by change and 
decay.15 The type of proposition Harris has in mind is discovered by abstract reasoning and 
does not rest on sense experience; it concerns the ultimate truth. This sort of philosophical 
contemplation focuses successfully on eternal universal truths of actual existence, insependent 
of any spatio-temporal restriction, and transcending the world of the contingents. These general 
truths are necessary and infallible. Universal grammar is termed rational exactly because of its 
concern with propositions as epistemological tools for our accomplishment of these necessary 
truths. The existence of universal truths and the belief in their being perceptible and thus 
conceivable, are the two features in the base of any rationalistic theory.
On the other hand empirical propositions, for Harris, are not to be disregarded; they are of a 
certain value in our everyday intercourse with each other, relating to people's common sense, 
but are, consequently, of restricted validity.15 The distinction between human and transcen­
11 In the meaning of Metaphysics, 6.8.1033bl8-20: ...to piv <oa eISo? ff auorta Xeyofxevov ao ylyveTai, 
rj 6e cruvokoc; rj Kara Ta\m] vT-eyo[XEvq ylyveTai, Ka*- d u  ev Jtavri xcjj yEvofXEVtp 'uX.tj eveoti, Kai eoti 
to fiEv to6e to 6e to6e: the thing in the sense of the form or essence is not generated; but what is generated is 
the concrete whole whoich is called after; matter is present in everything generated, and matter is the one part, 
while form is the other.
12 De Interpretatione, 17a.
13 See also Leff, p. 49.
14 Orator, 2.8-3.9, quoted in Harris, 1751, p. 311-312. In the same tradition is Bacon's idea of the form of 
language. It was the nominalists' view of the problem of universals, that universals are merely words in the 
linguistic syntactic realm, that they do not really exist, and that, on the other hand, the only things really 
existing are the specific individuals.
15 The source of it, in Plato's Republic, 485.
16 It is characteristic here that Harris does not reject empiricism. If we bear in mind all his aggressive attacks on
empiricism as also the justified response of the son of Hermes's dedicatee,(Probyn, p. 174) he seems to argue 
against himself.
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dental understanding is analogous to the distinction between practical and speculative wisdom 
(for Harris, between knowledge and understanding-comprehension.). Dialectic is the key to 
bringing forth this differentiation. Harris's reference to dialectic does not have the sense of 
exploring the truth of the theologians; his discussion originates from Proclus and the third and 
fifth book of the commentary on Parmenides, where, in the moderate sense of realism, dialectic 
is defined as the methodological tool in exploring forms (eidr/), which are seen not as eternal 
absolutes, but as the specific ideas of forms beheld by men.17
Harris's theology is more a philosophical meditation in metaphysics than a matter of pure 
theological science. Genera, species, forms, and divine ideas are not specifically differentiated. 
The third book of Hermes is an example of the Neoplatonic concept of universals, designated 
in Aristotelian terms. The discussion of universals is formed rather in the mode of metaphysical 
reasoning than in respect to theology; it was on this basis that accusations of atheism were 
made. Boethius had defined substance as being without accidents, and subsistence as the form 
of substance having additionally the specific accidents. Harris follows this tradition as much as 
he upholds a moderate rationalistic view of universals, treating genus and species rather as 
qualities than substances. But such a thesis is not dominant throughout his book. Additionally, 
he is not interested in the so called psychological aspect of the universals, namely in how the 
mind forms general concepts. His purpose is to explain the innate reality and not the 
recognition of it. This is for him the meaning of abstraction, and that is why, probably, he is 
not especially interested in metaphor as a universal.
The incidental material perspective of language
As is well known, it is the concept of the form and not of the matter of language that 
attracts the grammarian of the universals. But what is interesting in Harris's discussion on this 
subject, is his extended references to his sources, through which he acquaints us with both 
the matter of language and the doctrines of the “philosophers of the ancient”.
The third book of Hermes includes the resolution of language into its material and formal 
elements. Matter is the “common subject” of language; and what is meant by this is just those 
“species of sound called voices articulate”,*8 namely the sounds of our verbal intercourse, 
without taking into consideration the semantic aspect of them. The definitions of human voice 
given are those of P r is c ia n ,  *9 the Stoics,20 Aristotle, and Ammonius. What is to be determined 
here, is the differentiation between voice ((fxovrj, v o x )  from sound, and articulate ( d id k e K T o q ,  
sonus) from simple voice { d j ik c o q  tfxovTj, loquela). The stoic term d i d v o i a ,  meaning our
17 See also on this Harris, 1841, p.94.
18 Harris, 1751, p. 326.
19 "...suum sensibile aurium, id est, quod proprie auribus accidit", quoted ibid. in p. 316, from the first book of 
Priscian's Institutiones Grammaticae.
20 "...an undulation in the air propagated circularly",from the third book of Diogenes Laertius Lives o f the 
Eminent Philosophers, quoted ibid., p. 316.
6 9
own human intellectual capacities, is the “human ratio” referred by Harris.21
The material aspect of language22 is detected in terms analogous to those of the 
substantiality of the intellect. Harris is not interested in the stoic concept of corporeality of 
matter; his reference to the Stoics is made in order to suggest that it is our own discursive 
faculty that helps us to ascend with our mind to the supreme intellect. This faculty has the 
character of a mental action: our intellect has the innate power (dvvapig) of constructing out of 
the matter of simplest semantic units (words) more complex meanings (propositions, 
syllogisms, and arguments). As far as each of these terms corresponds to a specific wording 
functioning as the grammatical aggregate of subordinate syllables,23 a sense of corporeality is 
credited to the whole course. The parts of a logically complex unit, seen not in relation to its 
form, are combined to form their truth in a realm beyond that of syntactical structure; however, 
this process is not distinct from the grammatical and the syntactical practice; this is the meaning 
of Harris' observation when saying that
letters and syllables they [the ancients philosophers] called the vX a i [matter] of words; words, or
simple terms, the v k a i of proposition; and propositions themselves the vX a i of syllogisms.24
The words as vX ai of proposition are the nouns of a sentence, or, in the syntactic realm, the 
subject and the predicate. These two constitute the matter of the proposition, whereas the verb, 
as copula, is the form of it, typifying the mode in which matter becomes "in-formed". Harris 
here follows the Aristotelian doctrine of Anal Post 2.94a, and Physics 2.195a, where in terms 
of the Aristotelian causality, the premisses of a syllogism are identified with the material cause 
of it, leading necessarily to the inference.
This is how we rise from the grammatical to the syntactic element25 of language. 
Substantives and attributives are the grammatical terms denoting the categorematic forms of 
substances and attributes, and furthermore, the elementary principles of logic.26 To describe 
this materialised grammatical substance, Harris follows the Aristotelian definition of vXr\ as 
to (nrj Ka0’ ujroKEipivoo, aX ka  Ka0’ oi5 xa  aKka, given in Metaphysics, Z, 1029a: 
while the energies and affections of a subject are the attributes predicated of it,
[Substance]... is that which is not predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated.
21 "and human or rational sound they [the Stoics] defined as sound articulate and derived from the discursive 
faculty". According to Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.55), Zeno,when discriminating 
between animal and human voice, defines the second as an articulated percussion of air, which originates from 
human intellect: "while the voice of an animal is a percussion of air brought about by an internal impulse, the 
voice of man is articulated, deriving from his mind, and comes into maturity at his age of fourteen".
22 and the formal also, as we'll see later.
23 As those are the grammatical aggregate of letters.
24 Harris, 1751, p. 309.
25 In the first book of Hermes, Harris analyses the sentence into its semantic units, namely into categorematic 
and syncategorematic words: "..for all words are significant, or else they would not be words": ibid., p. 27.
26 Harris's interest in matter is seen in its relation to the form, as these two are " ...those elementary principles, 
which, being blended together after a more mysterious manner, are united in the minutest part, as much as in 
the mightiest whole", ibid., p. 307.
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The references to Aristotle focus on three motifs, accounting for the way Harris adopted the 
aristotelian concept:
i) a logical relation between substances and attributes, in terms of its analogy to the 
grammatical one between substantives and attributives.27
ii) substance as the undetermined matter, in the sense of it as the ultimate universal essence 
(substratum), which potentially may become materialised when predicated of particular 
matters.28
iii) the natural character of substance, which needs to be not simply a unit seen in its 
potentialities, but something which has a certain evidence of existence (such as body and 
magnitude), in order that the simple substances into which it is transformed have a certain 
existence.2^
Both the resolution of substance into its constituent properties and the composition of those 
into one concrete whole are mental actions.30 In these terms, the matter and form of the ultimate 
substance are identical with the two aristotelian species of qualities, the primary one, called 
essence (the presocratic idea of (pvobg), and its properties, namely its changing appearances in 
the passage of time. The most common and immediate mental act is that of mental separation, 
an act where mind is resolved into its qualities:
But the mind surmounts all power o f concretion, and can place in the simplest manner every 
attribute by itself; convex without concave; colour without superficies; superficies without body; 
and body without its accidents, as distinctly each one, as tho' they had never been united.31
The products of such a division are not material quantities; they are qualitative concepts 
deriving from natural resolution. Specifically, and in the most Aristotelian sense, this 
resolution consists of this body or essence, and its accidents (the ov\ipefir\K6Ta of 
Metaphysics 1025a. 30) in the meaning of eternal attributes attached to this essence not by 
necessity or habit, but in virtue of the intellect itself. The idea Harris has of matter is of 
something “capable of becoming something else; or of being moulded into something else, 
whether of the operation of art, of nature, or a higher cause”.32 Following the version 
elaborated in Aristotle's De Anima and especially, in the manner it was further developed by 
Alexander of Aphrodisias, he admits matter not simply as material mind or intellect but as
natural capacity,... denoting the original and native power of intellection, which being previous to 
all human knowledge, is yet necessary to its reception,33
27 Categories, 2.
28 Metaphysics, Z,1029.
20 De Caelo, 298a & 298b.
30 [the mind] "...when it thinks, and reasons, and concludes...yet are these more properly its own peculiar acts", 
Harris, 1751, p. 306.
31 Ibid., p. 306-307. Harris also quotes from Lord Bacon's Novum Organum: "itaque natutae facienda est prorsus 
solutio & separatio; non per ignem serte, sed mentem, tanquam ignem divinum": therefore, we must employ 
ourselves in a complete resolution and separation of nature, not [just] by fire; but by the mind-that divine fire. 
This procedure could be carried out infinitely, and in a way merely materialistic.
32 Harris, 1751, p. 309.
33 Ibid., p.310.
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This natural capacity is the Aristotelian material intellect, where matter is seen as the 
potentiality of becoming something 34 and not as just a material substrate capable of being 
coined each time by the application of form. Had it been so, Harris would be rather close to the 
platonic concept of matter: a materialistic reality in the sense of a space in which everything 
derives its existence. On the contrary, even when Chalcidius is praised,35 even then, 
Chalcidius's idea of matter, comprising both in which and out o f which, has not any place in 
Harris's presentation.36
The formal status of language
Harris opens his discussion of form (eldog) with a referene to its common meaning in the 
everyday life of the ancient Greeks: the figure of a well-built and beautiful body perceived by 
sight.37 He ascends then to the linguistic and philosophical perspectives on form: first, in the 
sense of Metaphysics, A  6.1016b34-35,38 in its less epistemological and materialised view of 
symmetry and proportion, where matter and form are the proportional parts of a visible 
corporeality. Then, by relating form to beauty, he ascends to a more complex substance. The 
beauty, symmetry, and proportion of it are not simply incidental attributes:39 in a way moving 
from beauty as the symmetry of members of a body, to the beauty of the supreme universal 
truth, substance is distinguished by order, symmetry, and limit.40
...it is in the uniting of these [matter and form], that every thing, which is generable, may be said 
to commence; as on the contrary, in their separation, to perish and be at an end; ...that while they 
co-exist, 'tis not by mere juxta-position, like the stones in a wall, but by a more intimate 
coincidence, complete in the minutest part; ...that hence, if we were to persist in dividing any
34 "...it is simply a capacity for a certain sort of entelechy and soul and a capacity of receiving forms and 
thoughts. This intellect, being material, exists in all beings that share in the complete soul, that is, human 
beings", Alexander of Aphrodisias, De intellectu, 107.15.
35 Chalcidius's concept of matter comprised both the platonic version of matter, as the cosmic space in which 
things are substantiated, and the Aristotelian one, as substantive potentiality out of which things may become 
real (the comments of Chalcidius (295-357) on the platonic Timaeus were greatly extolled all over medieval 
Europe and his term silva is the word chosen by Harris for further clarification of the concept of vXt])
36 Harris also cites untranslated Cicero's definition of matter given in Academica, 1.7, which is nothing more 
than a simplified version of the Aristotelian one.
37 "Form or figure in its original meaning denoted visible symmetry and proportion ... having its name from 
eT6(o to see, beauty of person being one of the noblest, and most excellent objects of sight. ...the form or figure 
of visible beings tended principally to distinguish them, and to give to each its name and essence; hence in a 
more general sense, whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal) was peculiar, essential, and 
distinctive, so as by its accession to any beings as to its or matter, to mark them with a character, which 
they had not before, was called by the Ancients etbo? or form", Harris, 1751, p. 310.
38 ...kcct’ dvakoYiav 6e [eoti] oaa e%Ei ox; aXko Jtpos akko: those things are analogically one, which have 
the same relation to a third object.
39 To 6e kcxXXoc; xcov (lieXojv [t o \ 5  c^poo] tic; cruppExpta 6okei fitvai: for beauty is considered to be a 
certain symmetryof the limbs (of an animal).Topics, 3.1.116b22-23.
40 To\> 6e KaXkov pEyioxa Eibq xd£u; kcli cruppexpia xai to  copiapevov: the main species of beauty are 
order, symmetry, and definiteness,Metaphysics, M.3.1078a37-1078bl.
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substance (for example marble) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both matter 
and form, and these as perfectly united, as before the division began; ...lastly, that they are both 
pre-existent to the beings, which they constitute; the matter being to be found in the world at 
large; the form, if artificial, pre-existing within the artificer, or if natural, within the supreme 
cause, the sovereign artist o f the universe;41 ...we may see among all animal and vegetable 
substances, the form pre-existing in their immediate generating cause; oak being the parent of oak, 
lion of lion, man of man etc.42
Additionally, the distinctiveness of forms is also given by Harris in epistemological terms: the 
objective of science is our clear knowledge of them, what they reveal is truly objective 
knowledge.43
Forms are distinguished from each other in terms of the definition of the matter of language 
they indicate, namely in terms of the different qualities attributed to the primary substance in 
each individual case. As the natural and real constituent which marks the substantive nature, 
both of corporeal and mental realities proportionally, form is a universal, and its definition, as 
the predicate of that, is also universal. Definition is the primary manifestation of form, whether 
we bear in mind only the nominal definition (the linguistic entity of a statement of what a thing 
is, considered in the realm of modus significandi)44 or the essential (in the realm both of 
modi essendi and intelligendi, and whether this essence is matter of f ir s t  or seco n d  
philosophy), or both the nominal and the essential. The examples of forms given by Harris are 
organised in three levels:
i) in the state of ratio recta, where form is the mark of distinction between specific 
substantive natures,45 the reason of the mathematical proportion,48 and the evident reason in 
products of art47
ii) in a realm of concepts, where our discursive faculty may have the character also of 
prudent reasoning in its ethical perspective, and where Harris stays close to Cicero's 
aristotelian version of practical wisdom,4« in a sense not very distant from the platonic one of 
our intellectual contemplation Eibq.
iii) in a realm where forms, harmonised in the state of genus, are comprehended as a unity, 
and where genus represents the highest predicational affirmation of the truth of a supreme
41 Harris, 1751, p. 312: in this point, Harris is following Metaphysics, 2T.7.1032al2-13.
42 Ibid., p. 313.
43 If Harris in that point was to specify more , he would have found himself contemplating in empirical terms. 
We ought to recognise here a trace of Spinoza's second realm of universal apprehension, that of ratio: according 
to Spinoza, while at first level (imaginatio) we conceive images mainly of particular things and scarcely of 
general, in the realm of ratio we adequately contemplate the truth of only transcendental subjects. For Spinoza, 
there is a third realm of intuitive knowledge of universals where our rational knowledge of them as abstract 
entities is seen in a more concrete and real existence.
44 in the sense of Posterior Analytics, 2.10.93b29-31.
45 E.g., the shape of the brass of a statue.
46 E.g., the proportion of the drugs as in medicine.
47 E.g., the orderly motion of the human body in dance, where dance is the adplacitum form of movement.
48 "the just arrangement of the proposition as the form of the syllogism, the rational and accurate conduct of a 
wise and good man in all the various relations and occurrences of life" (:Cicero, De Oficiis, 1), (Further one 
who is more accurate, and more competent to give instruction in the causes of things, we regard more wise 
about every science: Metaphysics, 1.2.982a8-14.
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intellect, a substantiated actuality in comparison with the potentiality of human contemplation:
the supreme intelligence, which passes thro' all things, and which is the same to our capacities, as 
light is to our eyes, this supreme intelligence has been called e l - d o g  e id td v ,  the form of forms, as 
being the fountain o f all symmetry, of all good, and of all truth; and as imparting to every being 
those essential and distinctive attributes, which make it to be itself, and not anything else A9
In the above passage, light is a covert expression of the platonic simile of sun: quite as the 
natural light through the senses is the first cause of our knowledge and first intentions, in the 
same way the eternal light, which originates from the supreme truth, refers to our second 
intentions. Harris' citation of the Boethian secundum placitum relates to Aristotle's second 
intentions.50 While first intentions refer to the act of conceiving first substances, namely 
individuals, of which we become aware through the grammar of specific languages, second 
intentions (intentiones secundae) refer to our own mental realisation of the real universal 
{modus construendi), when ascending to a mode of second substances, namely that of species 
or genus.51 This sense of the Boethian term, cited by Harris, was additionally what Roger 
Bacon had in mind when writing that grammatica una et eadem est secundum substanciam in 
omnibus Unguis, licet accidentaliter varietur,52 The fo rm  o f  form s, a term which seems to 
contrast with Bacon's sylva sylvarum 55 is the aristotelian vdrja ig  vorjoew g, the divine 
intellect, identified with the objects of its thought (as in Metaphysics, X.), and thus having its 
knowledge by self-inspection.
Apart from form as the genus or species, we are also introduced to form as an internal, 
orderly, natural, and, preexisting primary quality. 54 Talking about the pre- and co- existence of 
forms, Harris restates what Aristotle saw as Plato's mistake: the hypostatization of forms 
(eiSri as universals) to a level of a separate existence.55 He then tries, in the final chapters of 
the third book of Hermes, to specify further the aristotelian concept of the third realm of forms 
by openly following Augustine: this realm is actually the mind of God, and it is there where 
forms exist.
The inaugural objective of language, according to Harris, is the verbalisation of our 
sentiments, which are the simplest semantic units: they are thoughts before being expressed,
49 Harris, 1751, pp. 311-312.
50 n p o x e p a  6 ’ e o x i K a i yvtopipojXEpa Sixths. Ov yap xaO xov  jtp oxep ov  xiq <fn3a e i  K at Jtpoc; ijp a ?  
Jtpoxepov, 0O86 YV(0P l tlt^TeP o v  KCtl n p lv  yvw pipoSxepov. Aeyco 86 Jtpoc; n p a s  p iv  J tp oxep a  k cil 
yvtopipcoxepa x a  eyyuxepov xffc; aiaO^aEtDs, cbtXak; 86 Jtpoxepa K at yvcopipoSxEpa x a  Jtopptaxepov. 
vE o x i 86 Jtoppojxaxoi) p ev  x a  K aO okou p a k io x a , Eyyvraxos 86 x a  K a0’ 6 k a o x a . K at a v x iK e ix a i x a u x ’
aX>ajX.kou;: priority and knowability of things is in two senses; the prior in nature is not the same as the prior 
in relation to us, and the naturally more knowable is not the same as that which is more knowable by us. In my 
sense, prior or more knowable in relation to us is that which is nearer to our perception, while in the absolute 
sense is that which is further from it. The most universal concepts are furthest from our perception, while the 
particulars are the nearest to it; and these are opposing to each other.Posterior Analytics, 1.2.71b35-72a6.
51 In the meaning of Categories, 5.1-4.
52 Greek Grammar, p. 27.
53 Bacon, Francis, Sylva Sylvarum, or a natural historie, New AUantis, published by William Rawley, London, 
1635.
54 following Categories, 2a-b.
55 Metaphysics, 1086a, 1087a.
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and not simply common beliefs. While the common part of the language is its irrational animal 
sound, namely its natural matter consisting of utterances, the peculiar part of it is its form, its 
ad placitum content of ratio. The relation between object of reference (meaning) and word, in 
its significative potentiality, is established not naturally but by imposition (convention). This 
constitutes the very essence or nature of language and that in which its reality consists. 
Language is a conventional demonstration of the reality of forms, comforming with them in 
some sort of natural resemblance:
but as to the employing of nouns, or verbs, or sentences composed out of them, in the explanation 
of our sentiments (the things thus employed being founded not in nature, but in position) this he 
[man] seems to possess by way of peculiar eminence, because he alone of all mortal beings 
partakes of a soul, which can move itself, and operate artificially; so that even in the subject of 
sound his artificial power shows itself, as the various elegant compositions both in metre, and 
without metre, abundantly prove.56
Harris asserts that language may also be preoccupied with the accidental traits of things;57 
but it literally pictures only particular individual objects and not qualities considered 
separately;58 it cannot stand as a picture of a genus. Words are not themselves natural signs, as 
they cannot be found anywhere in the real universe. Their form (meaning) is attributed to them 
artificially; they are a certain species of positive symbols resembling in some way the really 
existing forms:
...all languages are founded by compact, and not in nature; for so are all symbols, of which words 
are a certain species.59
The presuppositions here meant are i) that symbolic representation may efficiently depict truth, 
and ii) that language, as a system of symbols, can be a sufficient tool for our reaching this truth 
by reasoning. In order to make truth perceptible, words must have an intimate connection with 
their semantic content, despite the conventional type of this relation. Thus our mistakes in 
universal reasoning are actually misconceptions or inappropriate arrangements in the relations 
between symbols and their forms of reference.
Language is a kind o f picture of the universe, where the words are as the figures or images o f all 
particulars; it is symbols, deriving from accidents quite arbitrary, and not a pictorial image, an 
imitation of the universe, coming out of natural attributes.60
56 This is a translation, made by Harris, of the folowing passage from Ammonius1 Commentary on Aristotle's 
De Interpetatione: ...to 5e ovopacriv, r[ prlpaaiv, f( T0T5 ex xauxouv ovyKEipivou; >.07015 xpijaGai Jtpo? 
xijv orifxaatav, (ovketi (Jxuctei oajaiv, aXkd Geaei) e^aipexov exelv xa aXoya £(5a, 810x1 Kai
pdvos xtijv Gvt]X(ov amoKivijxou (hexe/ el i^ voxTh;, Kai xexvikco? evepyelv ftuvap.Evrjs, iva Kai ev aoxaj 
xqj <J)WVT]V rj xexvlkt] aunrjs SiaKpivqxai bovapi?.
57 Something, which, in the definition of language, would be specified in the use of particular terms.
58 The horse, namely the thing, and not the horseness, the state of being a horse, which as all qualities is the 
real universal.
59 Harris, 1751, p. 337.
60 ibid., p. 329.
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The advantages of a representative performance of words, compared to the graphic pictorial 
one, are simplicity, a certain flexibility in the formation of speech, and the ability to make 
knowable everything that really exists.61 Words are the sensible bearers of meaning, quite as 
our bodies are the bearers of our souls. Since they are conceivable through the senses, and are 
thus attributed a sense of corporeality, names as media serve the intercourse of our souls by 
their application of the meanings these possess.62 It is the restrictions of this corporeality, 
namely of communication through making things “tangible”, which have to be overcomed by 
the symbolic use of language.
Quoting from Ammonius' commentary on De Interpretatione, Harris interprets the terms 
opoC cjpa  and  aifpLf iokov  (or or\pECov), respectively as resemblance {or 
representation) and symbol (sign). Ammonius had said that “a symbol or sign...is wholly in 
our power, as depending singly for its existence on our imagination” (i n t v o ia ).63 Harris 
elaborates this concept further:
We may perceive a reason, why there never was a language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, 
to express the properties and real essences of things, as a mirror exhibits their figures and their 
colours. For if language of itself imply nothing more, than certain species of sounds with certain 
motions concomitant; if to some beings sound and motion are no attributes at all; if to many 
others, where attributes, they are no way essential...if this be true, 'tis impossible the nature of 
such beings should be expressed, or the least essential property be any way imitated, while between 
the medium and themselves there is nothing connatural,64
The metaphor of mirror, illustratedin this quotation, was a popular one among the Christian 
Platonists. Ultimately this particular metaphor is derived from St Paul65 it was subsequently 
developed in the work of certain medieval philosophers. The same metaphor can also be found 
in the work of Leibniz.66 There the point is that the human mind is a mirror reflecting God and 
the universe in which we can view the truth of things through the truth of God.
Universal grammar in its general function is preoccupied with abstract entities which occur
61 Ibid., pp. 334-335.
62 Al tyvxcd cxL rjpexepai, yupvai pev o\5aai xo5v CTGjpaxtov, ijbijvavxo bi’ auxaiv xaiv voijpaxtov 
<JT|(LAOtivELV aXkrjXau; xa Jtpaypaxa. ’EjteiSil 6e aoipaai ouvSeSevxai, 5ikt]v ve<|xn  ^ JtEpiKak'UJtxauCTiv 
auxwv xo voepov, ES£rj0T]aav xtov ovopaxtov, 6i c5v arjpaivouaiv xa Jtpaypaxa: quoted
ibid. p. 333: Our souls, being without bodies, could convey the ideas to each other; but when they become 
incorporated, their mental hypostasis was covered as if by clouds-and thus they required names, trhough which 
they convey to each other the issues.
63 Both Ammonius’ text and Harris' translation, ibid., pp. 330-332.
64 Ibid., p. 335. Earlier Harris had noticed that: " ...as words, besides their being symbols by compact, are also 
sounds variously distinguished by their aptness to be rapidly or slowly pronounced, and by the respective 
prevalence of mutes, liquids, or vowels, in their composition; it will follow, that, beside their compact-relation, 
they will have likewise a natural relation, to all such things, between which and themselves there is any natural 
resemblance": from p. 32 of chapter III: On the subjects which Poetry imitates, but imitates only through 
natural media, or mere sounds, in A Discourse on Musik, Painting, and Poetry, in Harris, 1841. In the same 
book the next chapter is on Poetry ...imitating by words significant.
65 Corinthians, 1.13.12.
66 Discourse, paragraph 9.
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in the specific forms of each language, but subsist permanently. These general forms must a 
priori subsist independently from specific time references and also they have to be of a finite 
number. Proper nouns, and the substances presumed by them, cannot be identified with 
general forms, since they yield to time and place, which are modifications (accidents, not 
properties) of particular individuals, and are thus of an unlimited number. Also, they are not the 
most appropriate subjects offered for definition and demonstration,67 in the sense that they 
constitute propositions of particular affirmative truth-not general ones. According to Harris, in 
the particular languages, words as symbols not just of proper, but also of common names, 
have an incidental function, compared to the general terms, and their semantic engagement is 
analogically incidental.68 For Harris, words as symbols of proper names,69 and as such of 
individuals, must be infinite,70 because of the infinitude of the objects they represent. They are 
incomprehensible, and thus incommunicable, such as the words of the Chinese language, which 
are symbols of innumerable particulars. The inferences formed out of propositions with such 
premises would be indefinite, and thus invalid.
In this argument the reference to the Chinese language, a common example in the study of 
language during the eighteenth century, is not sufficient. The conclusion implied above is that a 
great number of Chinese words lack a natural resemblance with the concepts they represent, and 
consequently they should not be considered as a solid ground for general reasoning. The 
weakness of this argument lies in the reference to proper names in an indiscriminate mode, 
where the names of persons and places (the grammatically proper) are classified together with 
the names of every sensible object. Using this grammatical term in its reversed sense, Harris 
states here that such a language does not exist independently of any referential parameters of 
time or place, since individuals subject to time (are ever passing). For him, if all the words of a 
language, seen as propositional terms, are proper names of particular individuals (the so called 
singularia), then language cannot express any universal affirmation or negation. The general 
and universal properties of it are substantiated, as far as the terms applied refer to the common 
essence, or to the common properties (qualities) of the propositions subjects, and not to their 
incongruous accidents. The issue refers to the difference between essential and accidental 
predication.7i While, in the grammatical realm, affirmative sentences on particular subjects, 
may have in common not just their properties but their accidents too, the same statements, seen 
as propositions, differ in both the essential and the accidental part. Their subjects are different, 
and thus their definitions, their whole inner natural essences, are differentiated. On such an 
occasion, no valid argument or syllogism is constructible, since that would be a complex 
proposition made out of “particular negatives” premisses:
But if so, then is language incapable of communicating general affirmative truths. If so, then of
communicating sciences,72 which are so many systems o f demonstrations. If so, then of
67 For Aristotle, individuals are not subject to definition and, because of that, not to demonstration either: 
Metaphysics, 1039b.
68 Such observations constitute the moderate element of Harris's realism.
88 Harris, 1751, p. 338.
70 He does not specify whether it is an infinity in number or in the possible combinations of words.
71 There is no reference made by Harris to the case of;a syllogism which is based on axioms.
72 As propositions of universal affirmation.
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communicating arts, which are the theorems of science applied practically. If so, we shall be little 
the better for it either in speculation or in practise. ...Therefore, words73 are not symbols of 
external particulars, not also of sensible ideas (which are of the same infinitude and mutability of 
the particulars), but of general ideas... It follows that one word may be, not homonymously, but 
truly and essentially common to many particulars, past present and future; so that however these 
particulars may be infinite, and ever fleeting, yet language notwithstanding may be definite and 
steady.14
The hypothesis on which this argument is based is that words are significant only of 
particulars. In relation to this, general ideas, or forms, should be considered segregated from 
particulars, which are finite in number.
The triple order of general ideas
Harris distinguishes between “operating artificially ...as a distinctive mark of the human 
soul”, and the “mere producing the works of elegance and design”, such as works of some 
animals.75 These last may be either artificial in a metaphorical sense or just subjected to natural 
knowledge. But operating artificially has nothing to do with either metaphor or natural 
necessity; art76 is just the medium between man as an intentional and habitual cause, and his 
creations. The power for artificial operation has the meaning not just of the ability for 
production,77 but for production under the guidance of true reason. 7« Our mental acts are 
analogous to the mental acts of the eternal essence.7? On this point, Harris follows 
Metaphysics, 80 holding language is the artificial form of the one existing in the soul; this 
reference is assigned directly to soul conceived as the first mover. The artificial operation of 
human soul, both in the linguistic-semantic and in the mental realm, is the apparent evidence of 
its resemblance to the divine soul specified above.
Natural forms have for Harris an intelligible subsistence (vorjrdv). Opposed to sensible 
forms, the objects of our senses (aioGrjoei?) exist in a way analogous to the artificial forms of 
works of art. Thus, art illustrates the knowledge of universals, while experience is involved in 
knowledge of the singulars, si This relation between natural and artificial forms, in which 
Harris follows Aristotle, is the necessary condition for the preexistence of a homogeneous 
cause of natural forms:
73 : namely, common nouns.
74 Harris, 1751, p. 339.
75 "... many minds so fraught [with ideas], by a sort of compact assigning to each idea some sound to be its 
mark or symbol, were the first inventors and founders of language",Harris, 1841, p. 27, note c.
76 "Artbelongs neither to the divine nature (which is perfect and complete) nor to the brute or to the inanimate 
one",ibid., 1841, p. 4.
77 Nicomachean Ethics, 1140al6.
78 Ibid., 6.4.1140al0.
79 Metaphysics, 11.7.1072a24-27.
80 /farf.,6.7.1032a32-1032bl & 6.9.1034a24.
81 Metaphysics,I.1.9$lal5-16. Art is form: Metaphysics, 6.9.1034a24. From Art are generated those things of 
whatsoever there is a form in the soul: Metaphysics, 6.7.1032a32-1032bl.
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...in nature, as well as in art, there are intelligible forms, which to the sensible are subsequent;82 
...with respect to the works of art, we may perceive ...a triple order of forms; one order, intelligible 
and previous to these works; a second order, sensible and concomitant; and a third again, 
intelligible and subsequent. After the first of these orders the maker may be said to work; thro' the 
second the works themselves exist, and are what they are; and in the third they become recognized, 
as mere objects of contemplation. To make these forms by different names more easy to be 
understood; the first may be called the maker's form, the second, that of the subject; and the third, 
that of the contemplator.M
Priority here has not the sense of potentiality, and neither there is any further indication that a 
single sense of time, place, movement, order, or consequence, is connoted. As will be clarified 
later in respect of the extracts quoted, for Harris the priority of universals is compared to the 
posteriority of sensible singulars. It is an absolute priority which complies with natural reason 
and is related to an epistemological base of a connatural predicational order. »4
Harris' discusion of the triple order of general ideas is in its greatest part a compilation of 
quotations from i) the commentary of Simplicius on Aristotle's Categories, ii) the commentary 
of Ammonius on Porphyry's Introduction, and iii) the ’Emropr] Aoyaciis of Nicephorus 
Blemmides. There is also to be found a citation from Alcinous' AidacncakiKog. It is with 
reference to these quotations that we may get a more precise idea of Harris' view on the 
subject, and consequently we have to comment on them as if it was Harris' original material.
According to Simplicius, as quoted by Harris, the first order, compared to that of 
particulars, is a state of platonic transcendency and superiority of general ideas. His term 
particulars does not refer to individuals, but, as determined in the Stoic theory, to the specific 
shapes of substrate after its becoming qualified by form (jtve'up.a). U niform ity  and 
Sameness are the properties of ideas as the first universal cause. These two terms account for 
the communion of ideas (Koivai) and mark an opposition to the diversity of forms of second 
order. Uniformity is a term of aristotelian origin indicating forms-Eibr] as parts of a genus, 
which as a whole is something more than a result of their aggregation. Sameness is one of the 
five platonic summa genera, the very important forms, a term actually inclusive of the
®2 Harris, 1751, p. 379.
83 Ibid., p. 377. Harris, in order to explain his idea of the triple order of naturally existing forms, repeats 
Leibniz's example of the clock: a simile of the harmony of the universe, pre-established by the God of reason 
presented as a watchmaker, another example of Harris's deism (ibid., p. 375). He avoids discussing openly any 
argument on the existence of God but what he actually states is that forms (universals) depend for their existence 
on that of God. The example cited by Harris reveals a view of forms, which is in accordance with mechanical 
philosophy: knowledge of the nature of universals should be attempted in terms of its function and under the 
principle of the efficient rather than the final cause. Harris says that the mind through retentive and collective 
powers, becomes fraught with natural forms, as before with forms artificial (ibid., p. 378). Actually the 
discussion on the triple conception of forms is parallel to that on the actuality or the significative character of 
transubstantiation: for Harris, a first class opportunity to overcome any difficulty of taking the one side (the 
medieval belief of actuality) or the other side (the Enlightenment's belief on mere signification).
84 See also Categories, 12.14a-b.
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aristotelian sense of sameness.85 Both these two terms disclose universality, in a sense of 
unity, in all the three realms, being just transcendent in the first and subordinate in the second 
order. The second order of forms is for Simplicius differentiated by participation (pi0e£iq), a 
term implying division and describing the relation between forms (ei6r|) and sensible 
particulars (aia0r|xd). In this status forms are “infused from the first universal cause into the 
various species of beings ...when merged in matter”,85 while in the third order ideas exist as 
products of personal abstraction, as individual mental acts of our imagination.
By choosing Simplicius, Harris lays stress on the reality of existence of the general ideas in 
the state of participation. This is not different from the fourth Stoic category of the relative 
disposition, which Simplicius had commented on: a criterion, according to which by the 
reasonable action of associating and communicating, we may partake of the happiness of being 
associated with nature and God. Harris does not need to follow closely the Stoic tradition in the 
tight relation between jrvEtijia and substrate and their forming a bound abstract reality. By 
subjecting the Stoic theory to the aristotelian categories seen as forms, he focuses more on the 
metaphysical rather than on the logical-linguistic perspective. The existence of forms is 
admitted in all the three realms.
In both Ammonius and Blemmides, the triple order of forms is represented by the example 
of a seal affixed on various pieces of wax, where the seal of a ring is differentiated (i) from the 
imprints embossed in the wax, and (ii) from the subsequent impression of the form of seal in 
the mind of a contemplator. What is implied is that forms are the thoughts of God, considered 
as vofis, and being like the exemplars in the craftsman's mind before becoming immanent in 
the specific objects. This is the aristotelian idea of formal cause, as it was established and 
embodied in the Christian theology. In their neoplatonic version, forms are both the genera and 
the species, and their three orders are termed Jtpo rcJv Jiokkwv (ante multa), i v  rolg 
jtokkoig (in multis), and em  rolg Jtokkoig (post multa). The resolution of forms in a 
threefold order as introduced by Harris, dismantles Simplicius's sense of uniformity. In a very 
restricted sense of participation, the emphasis is on the (possibly differentiated) mental 
concepts, created in the human mind after the act of contemplating. The exemplary cause of the 
last is to be found only in their cast of the first order (something quite different from the 
aristotelian formal cause of essence).87
The citation from Blemmides is from his chapter On genus and species and individual 
(chapter XI). There, from the Stoic xi, a class of non-existing incorporeals which subsist on 
account of their forming the content of a thought, Blemmides advances a well-ordered 
classification. The subsistence of incorporeals is divided into quaedam propriam habent 
subsistentiam, like the angels and the soul, and quaedam in aliis esse habent, meaning the 
genera and species. The whole citation of extracts from Ammonius and Blemmides typifies 
Harris's triple order of forms as escalating from the philosophical to the theological point of
85 It is evident that sameness is a certain unity of the being of either many things, or when one employs 
anything as many: Metaphysics, 4.9.1018a7-9.
88 Harris, 1751, p. 382.
87 "The assertion that ideas are models or exemplars, and that other things participate in them is to speak quite at 
random and to assert what is mere poetic metaphor": Metaphysics,12.5.1079b25-26.
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view.
Finally, in chapters IX and X of his Didaskalikos, which are not quoted but are pointed out 
by Harris, Alcinous elaborated L6eai in the sense of exemplars'. Forms illustrate the God of 
Christianity as the exemplary cause, his eternal and perfect mental acts, the objects of our 
comprehension, the measure of the matter Cu'Xq), and, in a pure materialistic sense, the 
examples of the essence (o u a ia )  as a sort of natural and eternal pre-materialised substance. 
For Alcinous, the objects of our senses and contemplation are insufficient properties of forms, 
contrary to the perfect mental concepts of the divine mind, whose properties are divinity, 
essence, truth proportion, and good.
The process of perceiving universal forms
The rationalistic idea of universal grammar on this subject is in its consistency a peculiarity 
by itself, as it combines in the same cast various and frequently different theoretical 
perspectives. In studying the perception of general ideas, Harris moves from the field of 
Metaphysics to that of natural philosophy and De Anima. As in De Anima senses are the 
receivers of the form of things and not of their matter, he opens his discussion with the 
differentiation between the objects of sensible and those of intelligible perception. They are 
distinct in their mode of existence: the sensible exist only in their presence,88 while those which 
exist eternally occur each time in different mode, as past, present, or future. A reference by 
sensible perception is directed to objects yielding to modification, namely time: it is 
substantiated and lasts, only as long as these objects subsist. But for the general ideas, not only 
has the mode of perceiving them a different time reference, but also the very objects of 
perception have their existence related to time in a completely different way. Time is a criterion 
of truth, and existence in all time is the property of truth in general propositions. No truth 
restricted by time limits may conduct knowledge predicated out of universal propositions, since 
it is only a partial truth: it is vague and incomplete, since there is no reference in it either to the 
past or to the future, and its perception has the validity of our first, indefinite, fleeting, and 
transient concepts, after being bom. 89 General ideas have a permanence: an existence in all 
time, including past, present and future. Emphasising this, Harris says:
There is nothing appears so clearly an object of the mind or intellect only, as the Juture does, since 
we can find no place for its existence any where else. Not but the same, if we consider, is equally 
true of the past. For tho' it may have had another kind o f being, when (according to common 
phrase) it actually was, yet was it then something present, and not something past. As past, it has 
no existence but in the mind or memory, since had it in fact any other, it could not properly be
88 Tccurfl yap (aixjBrjaei) ov te  to peXXov, om e to yevopevov yvoipl^opEV, aXka to Jtapdv povov: "for 
by this faculty (namely, the faculty of sense) we neither know the future nor the past, but the present only", 
Harris, 1786, p. 105.
89 "Our first perceptions are indefinite, more fleeting and transient than the objects they exhibit, as they cannot 
subsist without their immmediate presence, and offer us no sensation of either past or future. ..had the soul no 
other faculties, than the senses, it never could acquire the least idea of time".
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called past. ...'Twas this intimate connection between time, and the soul, that made some 
philosophers doubt, whether if there was no soul, there could be any time, since time appears to 
have its being in no other region,90
From his remarks on the aristotelian text, it is worth noting that Harris interprets cruvixe ia  
not just as continuity in the sense of extension,9i but rather as that “junction or holding 
together, by which extension is imparted to other things”.92 The above passage is based on 
several extracts from the aristotelian Physics, as they have been conclusively interpreted by 
Themistius, when saying that
For when the mind, remembering the now, which it talked of yesterday, talks again of another now 
to-day, then it is it immediately has an idea of time, terminated by these two nows, as by two 
boundaries; and thus it is enabled to say, that the quantity is of fifteen, or of sixteen hours, as if it
90 Harris, 1751, 112. This last question is referred to in Aristotle's Physics 4.20: IhSxepov 66 prj otfcrqs 
aj),uxq<s Eiq a v  o  xpovoc;, d jtop rjae iev  a v  xi$. Harris several times quotes from this work: <t>avep6v o x i  
m 366 p o p io v  xd v u v  t o o  x p b v o v , coajtep o u 6 ’ a t  axiyp ial xqs y p a p p q s- a t 66 y p a p p a i 6 tio  xq? p ta?  
p o p ia  (: 4.17). T6 66 v \3v  o v  pepo?- p exp el x e  yd p  x 6  p epo?, K ai CTxr/KEiaOai 6 eT x o  oX ov e k  xtov 
pEpcSv o  66 x p d vo?  ov  6 o k e l  a'uyKEiaOai e k  xtov v w  (: 4.14). To 66 vO v e o x i  cru v6xeia  x P ^ v o u , 
tocniEp 6X6x 0q' o v v e x e i  ya p  x 6 v  x p d v o v , x o v  JiapEkO ovxa K a i E aopEvov, K at oXoq JtEpac; x p o v o v  
e o x i v  e o x i  yap  t o o  p6v a p x q , t o o  66 t e X e o t t i (: 4.19). "Oxi p6v o d v  oXto? o o k  e o t i v , q  poyic; K ai 
d p o 6pc5?, e k  xtov 56 xu; a v  t jjt o jt t e v c t e ie - x6  p6v y a p  a d x o o  yeyove, K ai o o k  e o x i - t 6  56 p6kk£i, K ai 
o o j io ) e o x i v  e k  56 xooxtov K at o  djiEipo? K at o  a c t  X a p P a v d p sv o s  x p d v o ?  adyK E ixai- t o  6’ e k  prj 
ovxcDV aoyKEtpEvov, a 6 d v a x o v  a v  6 o ^ e i e  K a x 6 x e i v  j i o x e  o d a ta ^  (: 4.14). T o t e  <f>ap6v y£y o v 6 v a i 
X povov, o x a v  t o o  Jipox6poo K at d o x 6 p o o  e v  xq K ivqaEi a ia O q a iv  kdpcopE v.’Opt^opEv 66 xcp aXko 
K at aXko d^ ok aP E tv  a d x a , K at pExa£d x i adxtov  6'xEpov o x a v  y a p  x a  a K p a  EXEpa t o o  p 6 a o o  
vorjacopEv, K at 6 d o  Eurq q  ^ o x q  x a  v d v , x6  p6v jtpoxEpov, x 6  56 d'oxEpov, t o t e  K at x o d x o  <|)ap6v 
Etvai xp d vov  (: 4. 16):"Tis evident that a now or instant is no more a part of time, than points are of a line. 
The parts indeed of a line are two other lines. A now is no part of time; for a part is able to measure its whole, 
and the whole is necessarily made up of its parts; but time does not appear to be made up of nows. A now or 
instant is (as was said before) the continuity or holding together of time; for it makes time continuous, the past 
and the future, and is in general its boundary, as being the beginning of one time and the ending of another. That 
therefore time exists not at all, or at least has but a faint and obscure existence, one may suspect from hence. A 
part of it has been, and is no more; a part of it is coming, and is not as yet; and out of these is made that infinite 
time, which is ever to be assumed still farther and farther. Now that which is made up of nothing but non­
entities, it should seem was impossible ever to participate of entity. 'Tis then we say there has been time, when 
we can acquire a sensation of prior and subsequent in motion. But we distinguish and settle these two, by 
considering one first, then the other, together with an interval between them different from both. For as often as 
we conceive the extremes to be different from the mean, and the soul talks of two nows, one prior and the other 
subsequent, then 'tis we say there is time, and this 'tis we call time": in several places of the seventh chapter in 
the first book of Hermes.
91 "Time and space have this in common, that they are both of them things continuous, and as such they both of 
them imply extension ... But in this they differ, that all the parts of space exist at once and together, while those 
of time only exist in transition and succession", Ibid., p. 100.
92 Ibid., p. 104.
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were to sever a cubit's length from an infinite line by two points,93
While the tradition of Physics is followed by Harris in his account of sensitive perception, 
imagination,94 memory,95 and even recollection^ are termed, in the aristotelian sense, faculties 
of the soul. Harris distinguishes between casual and rational association, as “a casual 
connection is often sufficient”. Sense is the receptive power of the soul, “a kind of transient 
imagination”, while imagination, a kind of permanent sense, is its retentive power:
It has to fix the fluency of sense, and thus provide a proper basis for the support of the [soul's] 
higher energies, as it is trying to exert the powers of reason and intellect.97
To understand these, we have to take into consideration the discussion of symbols: fancy is a 
power with which we contemplate a sign without thinking of the original idea;98 memory, on 
the contrary, is a power of thinking in reference to the significance of the symbol." Harris, 
following De Anima, 3.3.427b 14-429a, defines first imagination (fancy) in relation to sense. 
Placed between the acts of perceiving and conceiving, it is an act of withholding the images of 
perceptible objects, in order to make contemplation of them possible:
...subsequent [as to its energies] to sense, yet truly prior to it both in dignity and use, ...retains the 
fleeting forms of things, when things themselves are gone, and all sensation [comes] at an end.
These images retained by imagination are the general ideas. Imagination is quite distinct from 
sensibility; to the senses, it is posterior in time, but prior in dignity. 100 These forms are of 
objects which are things gone and extinct-ihey are subjected to our will, and yield to our 
reason, “over which we have an easy command ...and can call them forth in almost what 
manner we please”. To explain the distinction between sensitive and intellective perception 
Harris discusses the example the angles o f a triangle are equal to two right angles’.
93 "O xav y a p  o  vox)? d v a p v q a 0 Et<; t o o  v u v , o  x ^ S  ebtev, exepov jtaX iv  eurtq t o  xqpE pov, t o t e  Kat 
X povos euio^ EVEvoqaEv, d ito  xciv  56 o  v u v  op i^opE vov, o lo v  u jio  JiE paxov 6 u o lv . K a t o m w  X6yeiv 
EXei, o x i Jtocrov e o x i jtEVXEKat&EKa topajv, q  EKKatdEKa, o lo v  e£ a jtE ip oo  y p a p p q s  j tq x u a ta v  6 u o  
aqpE iou; ajtoxEpvopE vos. ...E l x o lv u v  6ixio? XEyExai t o  xe ap iG pqxov K at t o  ap iG poupE vov, x6  p6v  
t o  a p iG p q x o v  SqXa&q 6 u v a p E i, x o  66 EVEpyEic^, x a u x a  66 o u k  a v  u j to o x a tq , pq  ovxo?  x o u  
ap iG p q a a v x o ?  pqx£ 6u v a p E i pqxE ev£pyEt<ji, <J)avEp6v (o? o o k  a v  o  x p d v o ?  e iq , pq  o o o q ?  apoxq?: 
ibid., p. 108.
94 ."When we view some relict of sensation reposed within us, without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any 
sensible object".
95 : (fj.vrjfj.rj): "when we view some such relict, and refer it withal to that sensible object, which in time past 
was its cause and original".
96 : (dvdfivrjou;): "the road, which leads to memory thro’ a series of ideas, however connected whether rationally 
or casually".
92 Ibid., p. 357.
98 "Imagination may exhibit (after a manner) even things that are to come. Tis here that hope and fear paint all 
their pleasant, and all their painful pictures of futurity. But memory is confined in the strictest manner to the 
past", ibid., p. 356.
99 : "with reference to the original represented", ibid., p. 356.
100 For Plato universals can only be seen in their true purity freed from imagination" (Leff, 117).
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When the first word is present, all the subsequent are absent, and so on. No more exists at once 
than a single syllable ( to sensation at least). So sensitive perception is dissipated, fleeting, and 
detached; if mind was so, it follows that one mind would no more recognize one truth, by 
recognising its terms successively and apart, than many distant minds would recognize it, were it 
distributed among them, a different part to each. The case is every truth is one, tho' its terms are 
many. It is in no respect true by parts at a time, but it is true of necessity at once, and in an 
instant....where sensation and intellection appear to concur, that sensation was of many, 
intellection was o f one; that sensation was temporary, divisible, and successive; intellection, 
instantaneous, indivisible, and at once A01
The origin of universal ideas
The following question on the origin of ideas refers to the cause of things; even its wording 
is formated in accordance with the seventeenth and eighteenth century rationalism. Harris, who 
is not a rationalist philosopher but a literatus who accepted the doctrines of rationalism, does 
not need to spend much time with arguments proving the design theory; the answer to the 
question is for him simply subjected to necessity:
Are natural productions made by chance, or by design? ...We must o f necessity admit a mind also, 
because design implies mind, wherever 'tis to be foundA02
This is the classical argument of traditional rationalism; this proof was demolished three years 
before the publication of H erm es , by David Hume, in the 11th chapter of his Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles o f Morals: according to Hume, since God does not belong to any 
species or genus, and is thus unique by definition, there can be no parity with the simile of the 
clockmaker,i03 as that would be an argument by experience and for rationalism no inference is 
valid in such an argument.
Harris also states that natural objects are more exquisite compared to those of art, an 
observation derived from De Partibus Animalium,,104 where natural and artificial bodies are 
discussed in respect of the differences between their modi construendi, as a differentiation in 
terms of sufficiency in causality. He does not clarify that this self-sufficiency (a v r d p x e t a ) 
is a quality of the divine virtue (something in accordance with the later platonic tradition).
By the term mind we mean something, which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; 
something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are 
fashionedA05
101 ibid., p. 365.
102 ibid., p. 379.
1°3 : a simile which Harris repeats.
1°4: 1.1.640b20-38.
1°5 Ibid., p. 380.
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The self-awareness of the intellect is the evidence of its supremacy, as there is no prior cause 
above it. The intelligibility of forms and the necessity of their existence originate from their 
being products of divine activity. God, who is identified with this intellect, is omnipotent and 
omniscient. In the 1786 edition there is an additional note with references to Nicomachus and 
Philoponus. In his Introduction to Arithmetic, Nicomachus shaped the concept of God as the 
foremost artist, and forms were said to exist in the mind of the artificer God (ev ttq to v  
TExvLTou @8ot3 6iavoia).io6 On the same point, a quotation from Philoponus is cited, 
presenting God as possessing within himself the first causes of all things, and their reasoned 
proportions (xExvixr|v, ...o5? jrdvxcov xdq xptoxac; a ix ta? Kai too? Xoyovq adxcbv 
e'xovxa). This last concept will be found again later,when Harris comments on Pletho. There is 
also another passage quoted from Philoponus:
As therefore we, looking upon such sketches as these, make such and such particular things, so 
also the creator, looking at those sketches of his, has formed and adorned with beauty all things 
here below. We must remember, however, that the sketches here are imperfect; but that the others, 
those reasons or proportions, which exist in God, are archetypal and all-perfect .107
It is this reference that openly states that the nature of things consists of the same elements as 
the divine forms, despite their imperfection. Reason and proportion are the terms denoting the 
type of relation between the archetypical, all-perfect, divine forms, and the objects of the 
platonic divine creations, considered as their first causes. In order to elucidate this conception 
of first cause, which is rather the efficient, and inclusively only the final one, and to further 
advance the existence of universals, Harris follows Proclus and his third book of comments on 
Plato's Parmenides: in a sense close to Physics, 2.5.196b27-28,108 Harris adopts Proclus's 
thesis that
...the forms are the previous [to the sensible and external ones], their active and efficient causes, 
pre-existing in that one and common cause of all the universe.109
This operation by mere existence originates from the original, ever perfect, and essential nature 
of forms. Natural forms are primary, while corporeal forms are their incidental, subordinate, 
intermittent, and adventitious derivatives. Consequently, general forms act merely by existence, 
in contrast to our mental acts when by reasoning we ascend scientifically to them. This is the
106 : in Dei artificis mente. Nicomachus had identified numbers with the Greek Gods, and is considered 
representative of the Neopythagoreans1 influence upon the later Platonism, and especially Proclus. See also 
Wallis, p. 32.
107 : ..o5cniep ox5v rjpets, eu; xa xoiam a cnctaypatjyrjpaxa pkejtovres, uxoioxjpev to 6e tl, ovtco Kat o 
bTjpioupyos, jxpos EKEtva CbxoflkEJXtJUv, xa t»]8e Jidvxa kekooptjkev/  dkX’ ioteov, oxi xa |xev xt)6e 
cnciccypa^paxa dxeXfj eIcjiv, ekeivoi 6e ot ev xco @eg5 Xoyoi apxerujtoi Kai JxavxEkEioi eIolv: Harris, 
1786, p. 437.
108 To [xev ot5v KaB’ouro aixiov top Lapsvov, x6 Se Kara o 'u p P e P tjk o s  aopioxov...: the direct causation is 
determinate and calculable, but the incidental one is indeterminate.
109 ...eoxiv apa xa el6ti jxpo xc5v aia0r]xo5v, Kat aixia avxwv xa 6'npio'opYiKd Kara xov elpripevov 
Xoyov, ev xf) piqL xo\5 Koapou jxavxo? aitlrjt jxpoiijxdpxovxa..
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ground for similes like that of fire, referred to by Bacon, and before him by Proclus.110 Harris 
follows Proclus in associating knowledge with natural efficacy, in the sense of an effortless 
action. With a quotation from the second book of Proclus's work, universals are defined as the 
efficient and intelligent causes of all things produced in accordance with nature. Whilst their 
effectiveness is a potentiality (power) derived from principles relating to the natural existence of 
forms, our comprehension of these is based on artificial principles. These principles are 
identified with the above mentioned terms reason and proportion, and in all these cases account 
for the Greek Adyog.
Up to a point, the variability of names manifesting the universals reflects the manner in 
which Proclus discussed the subject in his comments on Parmenides 3.816, where anything 
which has the meaning of a copy or a likeness seems to be semantically devoid of reality; it also 
implies the distinction between the derivatives and original forms.
That such exemplars, patterns, forms, ideas...must o f necessity be, requires no proving, but 
follows of course, if we admit the cause of nature to be a mind;n l For take away these, and what a 
mind do we leave without them? chance surely is as knowing, as mind without ideas; or rather, 
mind without ideas is no less blind than chance, 112 ...on this system, we have plenty of forms 
intelligible, which are truly previous to all forms sensible; ...we see that nature is not defective in 
her triple order, having (like art) her forms previous, her concomitant, and her subsequentA13
Deviating from the tradition of Christian theism and that of Thomas Aquinas, Harris 
classifies himself with Spinoza, and accepts that the perfect, finite and real forms are included 
in the infinite (in time) supreme reason (God). This coordinates with the one in many 
speculation and with the argument by design. The opposed theory of the exclusive infinity of 
God was trapped between the doctrines of God's freedom and the necessity of the world. The 
way Harris defines language, as inclusive of both particular and general terms, is in accordance 
with the above sense of inclusive infinity, namely of a reality which is unlimited because it 
excludes nothing and includes everything incorporated within itself.114
The ontological status of general ideas
When considering the question what kind of beings are the general forms, Harris asks:
Now can we call the perception entire and whole, which implies either intellection without 
sensation, or sensation without intellection?115
110 : on his commentary on Parmenides, 3.187.
111 [ A l t io v  8e etvai] aXXov... t o  el8og K a i  t o  Jtapd5eiyfxa: The form and exemplar are regarded as causes: 
Metaphysics, 4.2.1013a26-27.
w  Ibid., p. 380.
^  Ibid., p. 381.
114 Ward, p. 218.
115 Harris, 1751, p. 348.
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The three essential properties of universals derive from Leibniz's Theodicy,116 where God's 
existence is determined by the order, harmony, and beauty of nature, and where the 
necessity of metaphysical truth is demonstrated by the actuality of natural substances, in  The 
three qualities originate from the stoic tradition; the discussion of them was advanced after the 
late middle ages with the study of Cicero's De Natura Deorum.118 The latter was the basic 
instrument for all those eighteenth century devotees of rationalised theology who tried to 
meditate on religion without, as they thought, superstition.
What we encounter in Hermes, is not so much the aristotelian concept of beauty.119 Harris 
seems to be closer to the pre-pythagorean heraclitean sense of Xdyog, as the order hidden in 
the appearance of things,120 and also close to Leibniz's Monadology, 58, where variety does 
not contradict order, but they exist under the same natural law. It was Aquinas121 who had 
advanced Aristotle's observations on the efficient cause122 and demonstrated the existence of 
God through the order of action observable in the natural laws which determine bodies. Harris, 
commenting on the nature of these ideas says:
...that they are exquisitely beautiful, various, and orderly, is evident from the exquisite beauty, 
variety, and order, seen in natural substances, which are by their copies or pictures. That they are 
mental is plain, as they are of the essence of mind, and consequently no objects to any of the 
senses, nor therefore circumscribed either by time or place.123
But, this may also work the other way round: the truth of our knowledge is proved by the 
beauty, variety, and order of the forms unfolded by our reasoning. According to Proclus, the 
order of universals suggests that they are not products of spontaneous generation; as they 
derive from the same intellectual single cause, they are naturally subjected to general laws.124 
Harris stays within the Platonic tradition, but on this point he does not follow Proclus. He 
includes order among the properties of forms, bearing in mind the rational order of the 
neoplatonic forms as a sign of ontological distinction in its most comprehensive sense. He does 
not refer to the Neoplatonic terminology of the three hypostase,126 according to which there 
was a corespondence in this orderly distinction between these three realms,126 as also between 
the ontological and the logical aspect of priority. Finally, the variety of forms accounts for the 
multifariousness of the creations seen as a whole, and it is also a variety in dignity and rank:122
That the previous may be justly so called is plain, because they are essentially prior to all things
116 Theodicy, Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil"(lllO).
117 The same also in Monadology, 58.
118 The references: beauty: 1.96 & 1.112, and order: 2.15 & 2.56.
119 As in Metaphysics 13.31078a36-1078b2 or in Topics, 3.1.116b21-22.
120 Heraclitus, q. v. 1.
121 Summa Theologiae, qu.2, art.3.
122 As in Metaphysics 2.2.996b22-23.
123 Harris, 1751, p. 381.
124 Comment. Parm.,3.3.
125 although it is a term often used by him.
126 See also, Wallis, p.125.
127 The source again is Proclus, 3.3.
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else. The whole visible world exhibits nothing more, than so many passing pictures of these 
immutable archetypes. Nay thro' these it attains even a semblance of immortality, and continues 
throughout ages to be specifically one, amid those infinite particular changes, that befall it every 
moment.128 The same immortality, that is the immortality of the kind may be seen in all 
perishable substances, whether animal or inanimate; for tho' individuals perish, the several kinds 
still remain.129 May we be allowed then to credit those speculative men, who tell us, 'tis in these 
permanent and comprehensive forms that the deity views at once, without looking abroad, all 
possible productions both present, past, and future -that this great and stupendous view is but a 
view of himself, where all things lie inveloped in their principles and exemplars, as being essential 
to the fulness of his universal intellection ?130
Harris quotes also from Damascius's De Principiis. 131 In this Damascius comments on 
Speusippus.132 In his commentary, which is a source for Speusippus' theory, Damascius 
distinguishes between the One (ev) and the numerical unit (povag): One is explained in its 
differentiation from the multitude, as that which cannot be a subject of further division 
(dpepeg). Damascius defines one as the absorbing principle of everything (ev o)? jrdvxa 
Karamcov), differing from Speusippus, who seemed to have attributed to it the meaning of 
minimum quantity. Harris, in order to lay a stress on the transmitive character of forms, in the 
sense of the tied relation between ideas per se and our conceptions, interprets the above Jtavd’ 
ape peg as universal impartiality. The citation from Damascius' commentary on Speusippus is 
also an indirect retort to the empiricists. Speusippus had rejected the platonic theory of forms, 
stating that the One is not a being, but just a principle of it. The discussion, as Taran notes,*33 
is on the Metaphysics, 1084b23-28,134 and on the comment of Aristotle on the way the 
Platonists treated One as a point occupying the minimum space. For Harris, One is the place
where all things lie inveloped in their principles and exemplars, as being essential to the fulness of 
his universal intellection4 35
Harris does not quote Damascius for the significance of his work, but because the latter had 
separated the principle form from formal numbers, in terms of causality and priority. This sort 
of causality is in accordance with his point of view, quite as Speusippus's doctrine that a
128 Hermes, 1751, p.3820-388.
129 Ibid. p. 389.
130 Ibid. p. 391.
131 : nepi'Apxwv, 1.2-3 : ...oacotep eoxi xa Jiokka Kara 5rj xiva pepiapov, xoaauxa Kai xo ev ekeivo 
jipo xov pepiCTpov Kaxa xo Jidvxfl apepe?. Ou yap ev, cos eXaxioxov, KaGajtep o Ejtevauntos e8o£e 
keyeiv, aXk’ ev (6$ jtavxa Kaxcuiiov: As numerous as is the multitude of individuals by partition, so 
numerous is also that principle of unity by universal impartibility. For it is not one, as a minimum is one 
(according to what Speusippus seemed to say), but it is one, as being all things, Harris, 1751, p. 441.
132 The text as fragment 49 in Taran.
133 Taran, 1981, p. 357.
134 From this passage: KaG&Jiep oi3v Kai exepoi xive? ek xou ekaxioxov xa ovxa cruvexiGeaav Kai 
oi5xoi: in the same way, some others [than the Platonists-probably the Atomists] represented things that exist 
as composed of that which is the smallest.
135 Harris, 1751, p. 391.
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principle o f Fs is not yet F  seems, for him, to be irrational and empirical. He tries to present the 
various philosophical traditions as conformable to each other as possible. By the fragmentary 
testimony of Damascius he is able to avoid making a point of the different content attributed by 
Damascius to unity. Contrary to Proclus, for the Neoplatonists of the Iamblichian tradition, like 
Damascius, unity is defined in contrast to multitude, while one is the ineffable principle.136
The innateness of our general concepts
Innate ideas relate to a priori propositions and knowledge, where priority is taken in terms 
both of time and justification. It is the priority in existence of general truths in the divine mind, 
which justifies our true knowledge. In this subject, Harris does not openly follow Plato's 
theory of dvdpvrjoig. He discusses the subject on terms of Aquinas' phrase nihil in intellectu 
quod non priusfuerit in sensu, as it was further elaborated by Leibniz,137 and he reconstructs 
the notion giving primacy to the divine intellect. He attempts a combination of the Platonic 
divine vovg  and the aristotelian proposal of De Anima, 3.8, that some sort of empirical 
knowledge should lie at the base of our reasoning:
Nil est in sensu, quod non prius fu it in intellectu. For tho' the contrary may be true 
with respect to knowledge merely human, yet never can it be true with respect to knowledge 
universally, unless we give precedence to atoms and lifeless body, making mind, among other 
things, to be struck out by a lucky concourse.
Harris cannot accuse empiricism of atheism; not just because Locke 13» had accepted 
revelation and had tried with The Reasonabless o f Christianity (1695) to compromise things, 
but, especially, because a well-informed reader would bear in mind Harris's ancestry from 
Shaftesbury. That is why he has personal reasons for such a concession. On the other hand, 
following the tradition of the classical seventeenth century rationalists, he states that sensory 
experience is acceptable as far its truth is validated by the forms innately existing. He is not 
interested in the construction of new systems of knowledge, based on a priori reasoning. Even 
the term modern philosophers as a reference to the empiricists, is a repetition of the Leibnizian 
one suggesting the empiricists, but originally applied to describe the nominalists' denial of 
general truths.139
'Tis far from the design of this treatise, to insinuate that atheism is the hypothesis of our later 
metaphysicians. But yet 'tis somewhat remarkable, in their several systems how readily they admit 
of the above precedence140 ...according to their account...first comes that huge body, the sensible
136 De Principiis, 1.86.3ff.
137 New Essays on Human Understanding, 2.1.110-111.
138 Hume was considered not even a deist, but an atheist.
139 This last was the meaning of the term as used by Leibniz, when he commented on the via moderna of the 
nominalists: Discourse, prgrf. 3 & 8.
140 Harris, 1751, p.392; it is extraordinary, that a deist is accussing others for atheism; in the above quotation, 
the word atheism seems to have just the meaning of being unreligious, in the sense of not believing in the 
specific God. In the passage quoted, Harris’ anti-empiricism seems rather insultive and tricky.
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world. Then this and its attributes beget sensible ideas. Then out of sensible ideas, by a kind of 
lopping and pruning, are made ideas intelligible, whether specific or general. Thus should they 
admit that mind was coeval with body, yet till body gave it ideas, and awakened its dormant 
powers, it could at best have been nothing more, than a sort of dead capacity; for innate ideas it
could not possibly have any.141
Harris feels that his aristotelian hylomorphism is challenged. In his attempt to reject 
empiricism, the duality form -m atter  is transformed into the type mind-body. For him, 
empiricism is based absolutely on materialism, and he roughly affirms this as the main 
difference between empiricism and his rationalism. In order to lay as great a stress as possible 
on the difference between innate ideas and accidental forms, he also attacks the natural 
scientists. He follows the mainstream of philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century, who misconceived Locke's empiricism considering it as a theory of metaphysics. On 
the other hand accusations and criticisms like these made by Harris imply that empiricism 
should be accused of just not having been transformed and expanded from an epistemological 
theory of perception to a theory of metaphysics. The problem for both parts is how to explain 
the presence of ideas in our mind. Harris's innateness counters what Locke saw as an 
awareness of the operations of our mind. The argument here implied by him is that if we deny 
the preexistence of forms, that would mean that mind does not exist before experiencing them. 
Harris misconceives the empiricists as believing in preexisting sensible forms. But Locke had 
defined forms {ideas) as that which only occurs in our mind. The following passage refers to 
the Newtonians and scientific deists of the beginning of the eighteenth century, who jointly 
used mathematical discoveries and experiment in biology and physics as proofs of order in the 
universe and of a god controlling the system of nature. On the other hand, it may also refer to 
the seventeenth century vitalists. The terminology used by Harris brings to mind the 
Empedoclean theory of sensation and the doctrines of effluences (djroppoaC),142 given off by 
the objects of knowledge, and entering the congruent passages (Jtopou) in the senses, so as to 
result in sensation.
At another time we hear of bodies so exceedingly fine, that their very exility makes them 
susceptible of sensation and knowledge; as if they shrunk into intellect by their exquisite 
subtlety, which rendred them too delicate to be bodies any longer. 'Tis to this notion we owe 
many curious inventions, such as subtle aether, animal spirits, nervous ducts, vibrations, and 
the like terms, which modern philosophy, upon parting with occult qualities, has found 
expedient to provide itself, to supply their p la c e d
The response to this (the so called intellectual scheme) is the rationalist's theory, according to 
which our epistemological capacities are of a metaphysical origin:
141 Ibid., pp. 392-393.
142 Fragment 29.
143 Harris, 1751, p. 393.
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But the intellectual scheme, which never forgets deity, postpones every thing corporeal to the 
primary mental cause. 'Tis here it looks for the origin of intelligible ideas, even of those, which 
exist in human capacities. For tho' sensible objects may be the destined medium, to awaken the 
dormant energies o f man's understanding, yet are those energies themselves no more contained in 
sense, than the explosion of a cannon, in the spark which gave it fire.144
By quoting Olympiodorus, Harris focusses on the difference between the efficient and 
formal cause, taking the last in a completely Platonic sense. In this quotation we find again a 
combination of different in their origin terms. The meaning of the term principle, as used by 
Harris, is reminiscent of the Parmenidean One, especially in the way it was developed in the 
Neoplatonic tradition, as the aim of an innately true knowledge, activated by means of 
dvdpvrjovg. Harris maintains the polarity between aioQrjou; and voijotg, but he attributes 
validity only to the noetic knowledge, and this specifically by ascending to the ultimate .. The 
extract of Olympiodorus is from his commentary on Timaeus: it focusses on the intermediary 
role in which sensitive perception should be restricted. Using a well-established terminology, 
Harris states the role of sensitive perception in the acquisition of knowledge, in contrast to the 
taints of the vulgar empiricists:
Those things, which are inferior and secondary, are by no means the principles or causes of the 
more excellent; and tho’we admit the common interpretations, and allow sense to be a principle of 
science, we must however call it a principle, not as if it was the efficient cause, but as it rouses 
our soul to the recollection of general ideas. -According to the same way of thinking is it said in 
the Timaeus, that through the sight and hearing we acquire to ourselves philosophy, because we 
pass from objects o f sense to reminiscence or recollection; ...For in as much as the soul, by 
containing the principles of all beings, is a sort of omniform representation or exemplar; when it 
is roused by objects of sense, it recollects those principles, which it contains within, and brings 
them forth.145
In Metaphysics 1010a, Aristotle said that by knowing things we become aware of their el 
bog; this was further developed in De Anima 3. 431b-432a, with the discussion about the 
reason of the elSoc; of known objects, by which they enter our soul. For Harris senses are
the destined medium, to awaken the dormant energies of man's understanding, yet are those energies 
themselves no more contained in sense, than the explosion of a cannon, in the spark which gave it 
fire.
144 Ibid., p. 393-4.
145 OGSejtoxe yap x a  x £LPto K ai Seuxepa a p /a i  rf a lx ta i e la t xtov Kpeixxovtov e l 6e bet Kai xaT? 
eyKUKktoi? e^Tiyij treat JtetGeaGai; Kat a p x ^ v  efoteiv xrjv aia0T ]aiv xf)? ercianjpTjs, ke£opev avxijv  
dpxrjv  °d x  to? JtoiTjxiKTjv, a Kk’ to? epeGt^ouaav xiqv ijpexepav i|ruxhv  £i? dvdpvTjaiv xtov KaQoXou - 
K axa xaoxrjv 5e xijv  e v v o ta v  e iprixa i Kat xtp ev T ipatto, o x i bi otyeto? Kat thcorf? xo  xfj? 
<j>ikoao<l>ta? ejtopiadpeGa yevo?, 810x1 £k xtov aiaGipctov el? dvd[ivT]CTiv dxJ)iKvov3pe0a. ...’Erceibij yap  
jidppop<j)ov d y a k p a  eox iv  r\ a|ruxh> Jiavxtov xtov ovxtov e x o o a a  koyou?, epeGi^opevr] amo xtov 
ala0r]xtov dva|ni|LmjoKexai o5v ev8ov exei Xoytov, Kat xouxoo? jtpopdXkexai: Harris, 1751, pp. 394-395.
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The uniformity of philosophical speculation, introduced with the reconciliation between the 
Platonic and the Aristotelian modes of thinking, was further developed in Rennaisance times, 
as a harmonised composition of the Latin-western and the Greek-eastern thought. As Sanctius 
stands in Hermes as a classic symbol of the western tradition, Pletho represents the eastern 
Christian philosophical thought. The extract quoted by Harris is from his work De Platonicae et 
Aristotelicae Philosophiae Differentia, a work trying to re-establish the authority of Plato over 
that of Aristotle. Harris adds Pletho to his extensive list of quotations in order to give further 
explanation of the principles referred to above:
... those who suppose ideal forms, say that the soul, when she assumes, for the purpose of science 
those proportions, which exist in sensible objects, possesses them with a superior accuracy and 
perfection, than that to which they attain in those sensible objects. Now this superior perfection or 
accuracy the soul cannot have from sensible objects, as it is in fact not in them; nor yet can she 
conceive it herself as from herself, without its having existence anywhere else. For the soul is not 
formed so as to conceive that, which has existence nowhere, since even such opinions, as are false, 
are all of them compositions irregularly formed, not of mere non-beings, but of various real 
beings, one with another. It remains therefore that this perfection, which is superior to the 
proportions existing in sensible objects, must descend to the soul from some other nature, which 
is by many degrees more excellent and perfect.146
Aoyog in the above quotation relates to knowledge of rational principles acquired by the soul; 
the prevalence of which compared to that coming directly from the objects themselves is based 
on Proclus' Parmenides 789.14-16. The target here is to discriminate between the nature of 
forms and their analogical reference to their natural principle, which reposes in a further realm, 
and of which forms are qualitative properties. On the other hand, as Harris specifies, 
mathematical numbers and geometrical magnitudes are both included in Pletho's account of 
proportions. This is actually the Platonic class of intermediaries (peragv), a separate 
ontological status between forms and things.147 Harris extends these mathematical entities 
(apLdpo'L padripauKOi) to include also the ideal numbers (dpidpoi eidrjriKot). Moreover, 
it is clear that his thought on this is along the lines of the Thomistic analysis of Plato, 14« dealing 
specifically with the distinction between abstract universals and the objects of our own 
intellectual abstraction. 149
The XoyoL or proportions, o f which Gemistus here speaks, mean not only those relative
146 T ijv tyvxu v  <t>aoiv oL x a  e l 6 t ]  x iB ep evo i d v a k a p p d v o v a a v  eayE ejucm j pi] v  xod? ev  xoi?  
alaB rixoi? Xoyou?, aK pi|3eaxepov adxod? exovxa? Kat xeketoxepov ev ea irn j ix e iv , r\ ev  xoi?  
ala0r]XoT? exauai. To odv xeXetoxepov xodxo Kai dKpi{leoxepov o u k  d v d xo  xtov alaOrjxojv Txeiv xfjv 
a|)'ux'nv > oye pij eoxtv ev adxoi?. Od 6’ a d  p ijbapod  akkoB i dv ad xijv  e£ adxfj? b ia v v o e ia B a c  od  
be yap  Jie(J)\3KEvai xijv ^ \)x 4 v  p^bapff dv, x i b iavvoeiaB ai; xa? yap  ipeubei? xtov 6o£cov odx'i pij 
ovxtov aTX ovttov pev, aXXtov be Kax' aXkcov e lv a i cnrvBeaei? xiva?, o d  K axa xd opBov y ivop eva?: 
K.a4-b4.
147 Parmen.129 and Phaedo, 74c.
148 De Substantiis Separatis, ch.l.
149 See also O'Meara, 1982, p. 102.
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proportions of equality and inequality, which exist in quantity, (such as double, sesquialter, etc.) 
but in a larger sense, they may be extended to mathematical lines, angles, figures, etc. of all which 
XoyoL or proportions, tho' we possess in the mind the most clear and precise ideas, yet it may be 
justly questioned, whether any one of them ever existed in the sensible world. To these two authors 
we may add Boethius, who ...enumerated many acts of the mind or intellect, wholly distinct from 
sensation, and independent of it.150
150 Harris, 1751, p. 397.
9 3
Epilogue
The immediate predecessor of Hermes is the speculative grammars of the medieval scho­
lars. The distinction between the material and the formal part of language is the primary feature 
of both the medieval speculative and the post-fifteenth centuryaccounts of universal grammar. 
Complying with this tradition, Hermes is divided into two parts: one containing the strictly 
grammatical observations on the matter of language (the first two books), and one which treats 
of the relation between this grammatical material and the specific philosophical principles to 
which this yields (in the last part). But Hermes emphasises not its relation with its medieval 
predecessor, but the relation with the common ancestor of both speculative and universal gram­
mar, namely the ancient classical texts.
For the linguistic, Hermes represents the connective link between the pre-scientific study of 
language and the science of linguistics as developed after 1751. For the philosopher, Hermes 
has no original material to present; its employment with neoplatonic sources are not something 
innovative for its time. The great value of Hermes lies in the comprehensive way in which it 
reintroduced during the age of Enlightenment the classical philosophical and grammatical tradi­
tion. It is remarkable that during the eighteenth century, it was by this text that the educated 
people became familiarised with the forgotten philosophical and grammatical background of a 
terminology, which was thus thought at the moment to be new and original. Thus the main 
contribution of Hermes is neither strictly linguistic, nor strictly philosophical; it is the incor­
poration of the classical authors into the modem theory of language and by this, the rehabilita­
tion of a uniformity between the traditional and the innovative, the old-fashioned and what was 
considered by the enlightened Europe as modem. This sense of uniformity in the modes of 
thinking gains its greatest tribute by depicting the Greek and Latin philosophical thought as a 
synthesis of harmonised components, quite as the choice to discuss Pletho, Blemmides, Sanc- 
tius, and Scaliger next to the ancient sources, reflects the continuity of the classical philosophi­
cal tradition and thought. Harris' conception of universal grammar combines the medieval and 
Renaissance discussion on the existence of a reason in language with the deistic attitudes of the 
eighteenth century and their neoplatonic background. Thus we may say that Hermes played a 
decisive role in the history of both the linguistic thought and study of philosophy.
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